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Abstract 
 
The thesis studies the development of the ASEAN Charter with the aim to 
understand its origins, the needs to codify implicit principles to explicit norms, and 
norm contestation in the process of drafting the Charter with special reference to 
Chapter VIII Dispute Settlement Mechanism and Article 14 Human Rights Body. 
Chapter VIII bestows ASEAN officials such as the Secretary-General with increased 
authority in mediation while Article 14 prescribes the establishment of concrete 
and binding regional human rights mechanism. Both constitute unprecedented 
practices since non-involvement of ASEAN in Members’ unresolved disputes and 
minimal institutionalism used to be adhered to strictly. The thesis explains why 
some norms are codified and strengthened while some are weakened in the 
context of ASEAN’s lifeworld, a shared understanding and common cultural 
background. Moreover, the concept of artificial lifeworld created by non-state 
actors when the existing lifeworld lacks normative space for newer norm is also 
explored. ASEAN is treated as a social context where negotiation takes place and 
the condition inducing to the use of arguments is analyzed. Having access to 
Records of the HLTF Meetings, the thesis sheds light on the drafting process which 
used to remain behind the closed door.   
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Chapter 1 
Overview of the research project 
1.1 Introduction 
The purpose of the thesis is to explore the development of the ASEAN 
Charter which introduces a departure from some of the former norms and 
practices ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) used to stand 
by. It aims to understand how the codification of norms in the Charter 
reflects upon the core norms in the ASEAN Way and set different standards 
of behaviour for ASEAN members in the future. The thesis thus posits that 
the core norms in the ASEAN Way (as instrumental parts in a shared lifeworld 
of ASEAN) undergo the process of norm contestation in the form of arguing 
and bargaining during the development of the ASEAN Charter which must be 
tested against a social setting, and may result in change of norms and/or 
practices prescribed by the Charter.    
After discussing in detail the conceptual framework, background of 
ASEAN as a social setting and rules of the game in drafting the text, the thesis 
examines two very distinctive propositions in the ASEAN Charter which are 
the increased authority of ASEAN officials in settlement of disputes and the 
establishment of ASEAN Human Rights Body. Both are unprecedented in the 
sense that ASEAN generally prefers non-involvement in unresolved bilateral 
conflict between members and the countries have religiously adhered to 
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minimal institutionalism. ASEAN is governed by a set of core norms 
embedded in its diplomatic and security culture, sometimes known as the 
ASEAN Way. However, some core norms matter more than others. Some can 
be watered down, became weaker, less essential. Some are stronger when 
facing contestations, and therefore still remain. The drafting process of the 
ASEAN Charter also involves norm contestation where actors argue or 
bargain their way through.  
According to Finnemore (1996), norms are shared expectations about 
behaviour held by a community of actors. Kratochwill (1989) sees norms as 
standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. ASEAN 
norms refer to both shared expectations and standards of appropriateness 
about ASEAN members’ behaviour. The norms of non-interference, non-
intervention, and pacific settlement of disputes are formally embedded in a 
number of ASEAN documents, i.e. the ASEAN Declaration, the Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, and the Declaration of ASEAN 
Concord. Some of the norms are unwritten but equally essential to interstate 
relations among member countries such as adherence to informal, quiet 
diplomacy and mutual respect and tolerance.  
While state-centric concept of security (by the strict adherence to the 
concept of non-intervention and state sovereignty) is uphold, the Charter 
also prescribes that ASEAN become a rule-based, people-oriented 
16 
 
community enhanced by more concrete mechanism in pacific settlement of 
disputes and human rights promotion and protection. Before the Charter and 
a few Declarations leading towards the drafting of the Charter, no ASEAN 
documents have challenged the core norms of non-involvement of ASEAN to 
address unresolved bilateral conflict between members or explicitly codified 
human rights. The Charter is therefore an important source to study recent 
norms development, contestation, and codification in ASEAN.  
 
1.2 Research Questions 
The central research question will include: 
- How have the ASEAN core norms manifested in the ASEAN Way been 
affected through the process of norm contestation in the development of the 
ASEAN Charter?  
- Does the social setting of ASEAN allow for the use of arguments?  
 
1.3 Context of the study and its significance  
  During the creation of several short-lived regional architectures and 
the birth of ASEAN in the 60s, there was a lack of scholarly interest from 
within the region especially in situating the studies within theoretical 
17 
 
framework. The works were not “theoretically self-conscious” (Huxley 1996, 
207) although they largely adopted realist assumptions in their arguments. 
For example, Michael Leifer’s (2005) valuable contributions on the region. In 
the 80s, the focus of the study shifted towards intra-regional cooperation 
and how to manage conflicts within the region (Jorgensen-Dahl 1982). This 
was in part due to ASEAN’s success in opposing Vietnam’s occupation of 
Cambodia in international arena such as the United Nations. 
The realist tradition was apparent at least until the Cold War ended 
where we saw more theoretical pluralism in the study of Southeast Asia. The 
works of the past two decades are also more theoretically informed, 
attempting to test various international relations theories – constructivism 
being the most popular – on Southeast Asia and its regional organization 
(Busse 1999; Eaton and Stubbs 2006; Narine 2006; Peou 2002; Tan 2006). 
The development of the region in general and ASEAN in particular as a 
theoretical testing ground demonstrated the scholars’ preoccupations with 
security in the study of Southeast Asia. Several concepts related to security 
were applied to and tested against the region’s affairs. These include 
“security complex” (Buzan 1988), “security community” (Acharya 1991; 
2009b; Simon 1988), “security regime” (Wiseman 1992), cooperative security 
and balance of power (Emmers 2003; Leifer 1999). However, this exercise 
was not entirely confined to the realist realm of dominance. Taking the 
regional norms and identity building process into account received much 
18 
 
attention as means to a more complete explanation of Southeast Asian 
affairs (Acharya 2006). Social communication in the form of negotiation is the 
valuable source for constructivist studies since it supplies the foundation 
where intersubjective reality exists. This is where actors reach consensus of 
constructing meaning for a contested norm. Constructivism is, after all, the 
view that the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by 
human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic 
interpretations of the material world (Adler 1997, 322). While the thesis 
benefits from the literature of norm studies and social constructivism, it 
constitutes a distinct contribution to the area of regional norm building as 
well as Southeast Asian Studies through a detailed analysis of an important 
development in the region, attempting to study it systematically. Moreover, 
the thesis benefits from primary source of records of all the Meetings of the 
drafters throughout the process. The records were kept at the ASEAN 
Secretariat and the access was not granted prior to this study.     
Since the ASEAN Charter was ratified fully in December 2008, there 
have been few attempts to study the development and contribution of the 
Charter, not to mention its normative value. Studies relevant to the 
formulation of the ASEAN Charter are limited. ‘The Making of the ASEAN 
Charter’ (Koh, Manalo & Woon, 2009) is a useful source, but is “a record of 
the impressions of the drafting process by members of the High Level Task 
Force.” It is collective memoirs by those involved in the process. There is an 
19 
 
academic void of theoretically-informed work on the development of the 
ASEAN Charter and its normative reflection on the current core norms. 
The thesis intends to fill that gap. The drafting of the ASEAN Charter 
from January to October 2007 was in a relatively closed space. There were 
some interactions with academics, other delegations and civil society, but 
their influences were limited and the text was kept confidential until after 
the signing. Moreover, the Summary Recordings of the Meetings were also 
classified and kept at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta. Only the end result of 
the negotiation was disclosed at that time. Fortunately, my request to access 
the Records for the study was approved by the Head Political Officer who 
used to preside over the drafting. The documents still cannot leave the 
Secretariat, but I was allowed to incorporate relevant parts into the research. 
The thesis therefore aims to clarify the formulation process of the Charter 
with special regard to provisions dealing with increased authority of ASEAN 
officials in settlement of disputes and the establishment of ASEAN Human 
Rights Body through those new materials as well.  
 
1.4 Overview of theoretical framework and methodology1  
                                                          
1
 Regarding constructivism, the section benefits partly from the summary in ‘theoretical framework’ 
in Kasira Cheeppensook, ‘The ASEAN Way on Human Security’, MPhil thesis in International 
Relations, University of Cambridge, 2006. 
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Dealing with norms change, the thesis is situated within social 
constructivism in international relations, bearing in mind that 
constructivism’s importance and its added value for the study of 
International Relations lie mainly in its emphasis on the ontological reality of 
intersubjective knowledge and on the epistemological and methodological 
implications of this reality (Adler 1997, 322-323). The thesis leans towards 
the critical strand of social constructivism, problematizing power (while the 
conventional strand is more analytically neutral to the distribution of power) 
in the relations as well as the role of actors regarding change. Although the 
importance of norms is not ignored by rationalist approaches, constructivism 
allows for a deeper understanding of norms in shaping states’ behaviours by 
explaining the constitutive effect of norms or how norms create identities, 
define and redefine interests (Katzenstein 1996; Finnemore 1996). When the 
constructivist analysis starts, some reality has already been made and is 
taken as given (Zehfuss 2002). It then proceeds to examine the change in that 
‘social reality’. Constructivists also stress the importance of shared practice 
deriving from social interaction. The international system is seen as socially 
constructed through practices, in particular diplomatic practices (Guzzini 
2000, 169), which constitute an important element of our subject of interest. 
The social environment does not only shape actors’ identities and interests, 
but it is also shaped by actors within that environment (Wendt 1994; 1998). 
Using rationalist approaches would be less useful in studying ASEAN since 
21 
 
they assume interests as a given. This could prevent the meaningful study of 
the change deriving from the states’ interactions (Wendt 1992). The core 
norms in the ASEAN Way are internalized in ASEAN member countries, but 
this does not mean that it is fixed and unchangeable from the constructivist 
point of view. 
Although the literature concerning norms diffusion and socialization is 
robust (Finnemore 1993; 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Katzenstein 
1996; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Klotz 1995; Kratockwill 1989; Risse, Ropp, and 
Sikkink 1999) with different focus on external actors vis-à-vis domestic ones 
and various case studies, there are few academic attempts (Acharya 2009a; 
Johnston 2003; Katsumata 2003; Katzenstein 1997) to study the norm 
dynamics in Southeast Asia in general and ASEAN in particular comparing to 
the European continent and the European Union (Checkel 2001; 2003; 2004; 
2007; Christiansen, Jørgensen, and Wiener 2001; Hopf 2002; Risse 2004). The 
thesis strives to contribute to the body of knowledge of norm codification in 
the ASEAN context.  
Emphasizing agency, Acharya (2009a) focuses on the role of norm 
takers that he regards as more important. The external norms will have to 
undergo modifications by the local norm-takers who will build congruence 
between the local and external norms. He terms this process “constitutive 
localization”. He also argues that the role of norm-takers is important to the 
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study of norms dynamics and should not be portrayed as passive. ASEAN 
members are definitely not passive norm takers since there were debates 
regarding new and controversial norms such as human rights since the 90s. 
Johnston (2003) also contributed to the understanding of the normative 
environment that can facilitate actors’ persuasion by proposing the four 
‘ideal combinations’ that should be present in the social environments. These 
are  
1) the actor is highly cognitively motivated to analyze 
counterattitudinal information (e.g. a very novel or potentially 
threatening environment);  
2) the persuader is a highly authoritative member of a small, intimate, 
high effect in-group to which the persuadee also belongs or wants to 
belong;  
3) the actor has few prior, ingrained attitudes that are inconsistent 
with the counterattitudinal message;  
4) the agent is relatively autonomous from principal (e.g. when issue is 
technical or issue is ignored by principal).  
Similar suggestions of the conditions facilitating persuasion were also 
present in the norm dynamics study in the European setting:  
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1) the target of the socialization attempt is in a novel and uncertain 
environment and thus cognitively motivated to analyze new 
information;  
2) the target has few prior, ingrained beliefs that are inconsistent with 
the socializing agency’s message;  
3) the socializing agency/individuals is an authoritative member of the 
in-group to which the target belongs or wants to belong;  
4) the socializing agency/individual does not lecture or demand, but, 
instead, acts out principles of serious deliberative argument; and  
5) the agency/target interaction occurs in less politicized and more 
insulated, in-camera settings. (Checkel 2007a)  
The literature on ASEAN negotiation cultures (Antolik 1990; Ba 2009a; 
Koh, Manolo, and Woon 2009; Severino 2006; Thambipillai and 
Saravanamuttu 1985) are also useful for exploring the negotiating style which 
fosters and preserves the core norms in the ASEAN Way. ASEAN is more 
familiar with the “high context” negotiating style. Cohen (1991) suggests that 
in non-Western cultures, group interests define individual needs. “Face” or 
one’s standing in the eyes of the group must be preserved. Personal 
relationships are key to the negotiation and must be cultivated before there 
can be any frank discussions. States then begin with establishing basic 
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principles, preferring to work on details later, once personal relationships are 
solidified. In the case of ASEAN Charter formulation, personal relationships 
are highly important. They even nicknamed one another; for example, “the 
King of Footnotes”, or “the King of Questions” (Pibulsonggram 2009, 90). This 
is opposite to “low context” cultures in Western countries where 
individualism is strong. Straight talk is admired. Face does not carry the same 
importance as in a high-context culture. The provision or articles formalized 
will also be more detailed than those negotiated in the high context cultures. 
The thesis bears in mind that ASEAN’s negotiating style informs the drafting 
process of the ASEAN Charter. The conceptual framework regarding mode of 
communication (arguing and bargaining) as well as the norm robustness will 
be discussed more in Chapter 2 when we turn to explore in detail the 
theoretical framework underpinning the thesis. 
There have been attempts to propose constructivist methodology by 
combining a number of social methodologies such as process tracing, 
discourse analysis, and counterfactuals as well as contextualizing the 
phenomenon. (Klotz and Lynch 2007; Lupovici 2009; Pouliot 2007) 
Recognizing the intrinsic interpretative and historical nature of 
constructivism, the thesis looks at numerous sources of primary data such as 
ASEAN official documents, declarations, agreements, reports from summits 
and ministerial meetings. It benefits in particular from difficult-to-access 
primary sources, i.e. Summary Records of the HLTF Meetings. Instrumental is 
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the ASEAN Charter and multiple versions of its drafts, including the minutes 
of the drafting panel’s meetings and issues tabled by the panels’ assistants. 
Relevant memoirs, interviews, speeches, and news articles are also used. 
Elite interviewing is given importance as crucial to constructivist studies 
(Tansey 2007). Defining elite members as those who decide on or influence 
policy making process, I managed to secure interviews of some HLTF 
members, their alternates, and an ASEAN Secretariat official who 
represented Secretary-General Ong Keng Yong at the Meeting. I also 
interviewed the officials relevant to the ASEAN Charter provision on 
authority of ASEAN in mediation such as Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan 
and a high level government official. The questions asked are mostly open-
ended to enable comfortability in answering some sensitive issues. Most 
interviews took the form of (guided) conversations. I took great pleasure 
interviewing them bearing in mind that there was only one occasion for each 
interview considering their busy schedules – one interview even occurred at 
the back of the car while the interviewee was rushing to another meeting. 
Some of the elite interviewees asked to remain anonymous but granted 
permission to be quoted in the examination thesis. The interviews are off the 
record, meaning there was no taping allowed, (although notes were 
permitted). I would omit their names in the version deposited in the public 
domain as per their requests. I would also include the nationality of the 
interviewee provided that the said interviewee allowed it. 
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1.5 Structure of thesis 
 The contents of the thesis are divided into seven chapters – an 
introduction, a conceptual framework, a background chapter setting up the 
organization as a social context, an analysis of the drafting process and its 
‘rule of the game’, in-depth examination of the two provisions that are 
virtually unprecedented in ASEAN interstate conduct and how they reflect 
upon the core norms of ASEAN, and the conclusion. 
Chapter 2 deals with the conceptual framework for the study in detail. 
It draws on social constructivism and Habermasian concept of lifeworld in 
order to constitute understanding for shared concepts among the 
negotiators. It begins by outlining how rationalist accounts treat norms with 
a special reference to legalization to demonstrate its inadequacy in 
explaining the outcome of the Charter negotiation. It will then contextualize 
the thesis in social constructivism with brief accounts of constructivist 
scholarship concerning the region with special reference to the critical strand 
of social constructivism. Varying degree of norm robustness which 
contributes to the need to formulate tacit rules into explicit ones will be 
addressed. The chapter then proceeds to explore arguing and bargaining, 
showing that the concepts are not mutually exclusive before further 
distinguishing both to facilitate the conceptual operationalisation. Borrowing 
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from Habermasian insights, the concept of lifeworld will be employed to 
enrich the conceptual analysis of arguing and bargaining. 
Chapter 3 will provide the background on ASEAN as a social and 
normative context in which the ASEAN Charter was negotiated. It explores 
regional cooperation in Southeast Asia prior to ASEAN in detail, starting from 
the 1950s during the Cold War. This will also shed light to how the governing 
core norms that came to be embedded in ASEAN have been developed and 
tested through time. Through the creation and demise of regional 
organizations prior to ASEAN, a set of norms also evolved. It will then 
examine the core norms constituting the ASEAN Way in detail as well as trace 
some contestations over the core norms prior to the drafting of the ASEAN 
Charter. The chapter establishes the ASEAN Way as the most manifested part 
of a shared lifeworld in ASEAN. 
Chapter 4 answers why ASEAN leaders agree to transform what used 
to be implicit principles into explicit rules. It deals with the need to codify 
governing core norms in ASEAN in written form. The ‘rules of the game’, how 
the drafters went about drafting the Charter under common understanding 
of expected behaviour, is then laid out. Last but not least, the role of non-
state actors as norm entrepreneurs interacting with the existing lifeworld, 
creating an artificial lifeworld as a way to provide and extend the normative 
space, will be addressed. 
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Chapter 5 examines Chapter VIII Settlement of Disputes of the ASEAN 
Charter. It begins by exploring peaceful settlement of conflict in ASEAN then 
proceeds to dispute settlement mechanisms in ASEAN. Both existing dispute 
settlement mechanisms in economic area and political area are analyzed. The 
formulation of Chapter VIII of the ASEAN Charter is then examined and the 
setting that arguments will prevail tested. The case of Cambodian-Thai 
dispute is analysed in order to demonstrate increased authority of ASEAN in 
dispute settlement, which was different from before. 
Chapter 6 focuses on the codification of human rights as a norm in the 
ASEAN Charter and the controversy around establishing an ASEAN Human 
Rights Body. It starts by exploring human rights development in Post-Cold 
War Southeast Asia in order to provide a backdrop for the analysis. 
Interactions with international norm are also examined. It then explains the 
1997 economic crisis as a window of opportunity for human centric values to 
gain a firmer ground in the region. The development of human rights 
mechanism in ASEAN is traced and the formulation of Article 14 analysed.  
The social setting that arguments will prevail is also tested. 
Chapter 7 summarises key findings throughout the work referring back 
to the research questions set at the beginning of this project. It emphasizes 
the contribution made to the body of literature on norm studies as well as 
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Southeast Asian and in particular ASEAN studies. Further avenues for future 
research will also be briefly explored.      
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Chapter 2 
Arguing, bargaining, and norm codification 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to establish an analytical framework to study how 
ASEAN’s diplomatic and security norms have been contested through the 
drafting process until they were finally codified (and therefore legitimized) in 
the ASEAN Charter.  In order to account for the process by which particular 
outcomes – the reinforcement of norms that ASEAN members consensually 
deemed essential to an effective and successful operation of the organization 
– occur, it is important to look at how contested norms were dealt with 
during the negotiation of key provisions. The final Charter stands as a 
milestone in ASEAN’s cooperation, the most concrete attempt to formally 
codify diplomatic norms in ASEAN so that all members must follow them ‘as a 
rule’. However, little is known of how norms and principles were included in 
or dismissed from the text.  
The normative contestation process is mainly associated with arguing 
and bargaining about what should be included in the Charter during the 
drafting process. Clearly conceptualizing arguing and bargaining can provide 
insights to how the two main provisions in the Charter come to look like they 
do now. Norms that have undergone exhaustive debates characterized by 
equal access to the discourse by all members and still managed to be codified 
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in the Charter were normally more robust. They should be able to weather 
further contestations in the future better than those imposed (or omitted) by 
power where bargaining was the preferred mode of communication. Robust 
norms put in place through reason-based argumentation usually signify ‘true’ 
internalization rather than adaptive behaviour.  
In negotiating a particular provision, actors aim at changing others’ 
position while seeking to protect their own or reaching mutual 
understanding while preparing to also change their former position. It can be 
said roughly that they bargain in the former cases and argue in the latter; 
however, these two types of social decision-making procedures are not 
mutually exclusive in real-world political negotiations. Actors engaged in 
bargaining often argue to justify their position. We need to pay attention to 
not only whether actors justify their positions, but also for what reasons. 
Therefore, conceptualizing arguing and bargaining does not only entail the 
difference between the two but also the difference between arguing for 
one’s own interests (which is only rhetorical) and arguing for better 
understanding of the ‘right’ course of action. Bargaining must also be 
distinguished further as this chapter will later clarify.    
Formulating the ASEAN Charter can be seen as transforming some of 
the formerly tacit rules and norms in ASEAN into explicit ones. In other words, 
it is the process of hard law making. The need to formally encode the norms 
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into written documents is the starting point of the ASEAN Charter and must 
be analysed in order to provide a complete picture of the development of the 
Charter. Thus, the framework that would be useful to the study must deal 
with 1) why actors choose to resolve commonly perceived problems in the 
way they do (in this case, creating a legally binding instrument which goes 
against former practices) and 2) why actors choose to justify their arguments 
in particular ways during the creation of said instrument (when do they see 
that they should opt for different types of arguing and/or bargaining?)  
Since creating the ASEAN Charter is, after all, law-making with high 
costs for all actors involved, rationalist accounts are relatively insufficient in 
explaining the negotiating outcome. In particular, neoliberal institutionalists 
argue that the most difficult area to achieve cooperation is when actors 
prefer cooperation but are still reluctant to sacrifice unilateral gain (in this 
case, to be free from binding legal obligations). When states enter 
agreements despite its costliness from a rationalist’s viewpoint, they may 
perceive other gains in terms of increased reputation as norm-subscribers. 
Their cumulative action could emerge out of a long process of norm 
socialization. To the extent that rationalism often downplays independent 
explanatory power of norms and their influence on state actions, 
constructivism provides a more satisfactory approach in explaining norms 
evolution in ASEAN through the ASEAN Charter formulation. Problematizing 
power relations and the role of actors constituting change, critical social 
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constructivism thus provides a guiding theoretical framework for the study. 
The thesis still benefits from the foundation of social constructivism, but 
leans towards the critical strand in the analysis of the ASEAN Charter 
development. 
The thesis takes ASEAN as a social setting where the negotiation 
leading towards the Charter took place. The negotiators shared collective 
norms and experiences in ASEAN diplomacy which provided common 
background for them. In explaining this backdrop or shared normative 
understandings, the dissertation benefits from Habermasian concept of 
lifeworld. The analytical framework thus takes that arguing and bargaining 
existing against culturally transmitted stock background knowledge 
conceptualized in Habermasian ‘lifeworld’ provides an insight into the 
process of norms and rules legitimization and codification in the critical 
constructivist framework which holds that norms are inherently contested. It 
will then proceed to test whether arguments prevail in a particular setting. 
 
2.2 Norms and law-making: the rationalist VS constructivist account 
2.21 The rationalists 
Rationalist perspectives which emphasize utility-maximization are 
most exemplified by neorealism and neoliberalism. While strategic 
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preferences can be influenced, the actors’ interests remain fixed. Structural 
realists, including neorealist institutionalists, often see that norms have very 
little impact on states on their own: they possess no independent 
explanatory power. Based on the self-interested calculation of great powers, 
they are only a reflection of the distribution of power in the international 
system or the hegemons’ national interests/values. The norms are usually 
positioned as the intervening variables or intermediate variables between 
the interests and outcomes in world politics (Mearsheimer 1994-5, 7; Krasner 
1983; 1985; 1993). The norms are seen to reflect, rather than shape, a 
strategic reality determined by the great powers’ decisions (Desch 1998). 
Norms are not constitutive of the interests during the process of interaction. 
March and Olsen (1998, 949) terms this the “logic of expected 
consequences”. Based on a model of utility maximization, actors choose 
options that best serve their (material) objectives and interests. Only 
obligations that are created through consent and contracts based calculated 
consequential advantage are recognized. Therefore, norms play very little 
role in influencing those decision-makings.    
Neoliberal institutionalists give more weight to the role of norms on 
state behaviour albeit in the regulatory, and not constitutive, sense 
(Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Keohane 1984; 1989). The state will be willing 
to follow a norm if its interests are furthered or there are sanctions involved. 
This is also the case for its perception of hard law making where the costs 
35 
 
and benefits are weighed. Hard law reduces transaction costs of subsequent 
interactions, strengthens the credibility of commitments, reduces the 
possibility of cheating and resolves problems of incomplete contracting 
(Abbott and Snidal 2000). At the same time, hard law constrains sovereignty 
and autonomy as a result of legal obligations of rules. Therefore, in creating 
hard law, the benefits must outweigh the cost in neoliberal views. It cannot 
really explain the case where it seems that costs outweigh benefits, and fails 
to capture legalization and norm codification as a social process whereby 
actors attempt to coordinate their actions while realizing that their interests 
are fluctuant in order to reach mutual understanding.  
In a rationalist account, a norm change might as well result from the 
changes in great powers’ interests or the costs and benefits calculation.  
Rationalists see that communication - the exchange of information - can be in 
an actor’s interest, depending on his/her bargaining position. It can lead to 
the restructuring of the preference order. However, communication is not 
used to build trust about the authenticity or honesty of the speaker. To 
signify that the speaker really means what he/she says, it must be 
accompanied by signs like promises or threats (Fearon 1997). This leaves a 
void when the audience is convinced of the speaker’s arguments despite the 
lack of tangible signals. Rationalists are particularly lacking when it comes to 
the case where a state still chooses to follow a norm even if it cannot gain 
any material benefits. The rationalists also minimize the role of other “norms 
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entrepreneurs”, such as non-governmental organizations in proposing, 
sustaining, and circulating certain norms among state actors. 
Viewing the ASEAN Charter through a rationalist lens, it can be argued 
that the Charter either originated from the members’ desire to constrain and 
control one another, or that the benefits of having a hard law in place must 
enormously outweigh the costs. However, that might not be the case given 
that ASEAN member countries have always guarded their sovereignty, 
avoiding binding legal agreements and resisting the involvement of the 
regional organization in members’ affairs. Nonetheless, the Charter was 
created despite the cost.  
Moreover, in a rationalist tenet, state preferences are formed 
domestically prior to the international negotiation and are quite fixed 
(Moravcsik 1998). After the interstate bargaining where all preferences are 
brought to the table returns results, the institutional choices are then made 
to seal the outcome. Preferences formation; therefore, is independent of the 
negotiation process (Checkel 2001, 556; Risse 2000, 20). The state identity is 
also relatively unaffected. Material considerations are the most salient 
sources of the preferences, outweighing normative considerations. However, 
preferences can actually be affected by the interactions during the 
negotiation. Along the same line, the source of preferences should be 
treated more sophisticatedly by recognizing other important non-material 
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factors such as the desire to portray a good image by keeping previous 
commitments. This leaves us to look elsewhere for an alternative tenet to 
account for norms evolution and its effects on negotiating outcomes.    
2.22 The constructivists 
Social constructivists (Kratochwil 1984; Onuf 1989; Wendt 1992; 1999; 
Zehfuss 2002) have criticized neorealist and neoliberalist assumptions on 
norms and provided a more satisfactory approach to the study of state 
behaviour by recognizing changes in state identities and interests. There are 
no fixed or given preferences formed independently of the interaction or 
communication process (Bozdağlıoğlu 2003; Checkel 2001; Chernoff 2008, 
68; Schmidt 2010). Material structures are given meaning by the social 
context through which they are interpreted (Jupille et al. 2003). The 
explanatory power of norms is given more importance than in the rationalist 
camp. Their status can vary from intervening variables to independent 
variables in explaining state behaviour. The social constructivists, to again 
employ the distinction introduced by March and Olsen (1998, 949), follow 
the “logic of appropriateness”, which is different from means-ends 
calculations or the logic of expected consequences employed by rational-
choice analysts. The reason for following a norm is not purely to maximize 
one’s own interests, but involves the perception of others and the ideational 
value attached to an action: is it the right thing to do in a given 
38 
 
circumstance? Rules and norms are intersubjective and sustained through 
interaction among actors. Norms are also inextricably linked with actors’ 
identities. They define the identities, and the resulting constitutive effects 
will specify what actions will cause relevant others to recognize a particular 
identity (Jepperson et al. 1996). The social structures and the agents are 
mutually constitutive.  
Constructivists treat law-making as a social process which cannot be 
reduced to mere cost-benefits analysis. The process itself is taken into 
account because law is perceived to be generated based on shared values 
and normative understandings. This normative dimension is not entirely 
overlooked by neoliberals, but they tend to focus more on the outcomes and 
effects and not the process (Finnemore and Toope 2001). 
Although it is situated in the reflectivist camp, constructivism is argued 
to be occupying the middle ground between the rationalists and other 
reflectivists such as postmodernists because it does not reject causal 
explanation or the “science” (Björkdahl 2002; Checkel 1998). However, some 
social constructivists prioritize “the logic of interpretation” over “the logic of 
explanation” and abandon the search for the “real causes” (Campbell 1992). 
Others still see the causal explanation as instrumental to the meaningful 
constitution of social reality (Checkel 1999; Laffey and Weldes 1997). 
Scholars focusing on tracing the causal mechanisms are known as modernist 
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or conventional constructivists (Hopf 1998; Ruggie 1998). They distinguish 
the ideas literature from the constructivist approaches. They do not want 
ideational arguments to replace structural and interest-based accounts. If 
anything, the ideational arguments should only supplement them. In some 
cases, i.e. when studying the domestic effects of norms, structural accounts 
are still more preferable (Checkel 1997b).  
Critical constructivism chides the positivist element in conventional 
constructivism, seeing that it is unable to criticize the boundaries of its own 
understanding. Alienation and domination exist in power relationships, and 
critical constructivism seeks to unmask that. Conventional constructivism 
does not take its own role in producing change or constituting social entities 
that they study into account, and remain analytically neutral on the issue of 
power relations (Hopf 1998, 185). Critical constructivism therefore has 
reservations against the scientific methods popular with conventional 
constructivists such as process tracing. Instead, it turns to focus on the role of 
communication and power relations in a certain social setting. 
The more conventional constructivism tries to discover the causal 
mechanisms, the more it loses the possibility of maintaining the ontological 
openness that its interpretivist method can afford (Hopf 1998, 197). As a 
matter of fact, some who employ process tracing and see its benefits also 
warn against “losing sight of the big picture” and support process tracers to 
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embrace more pluralism in their works (Checkel 2007a; 2007b). The thesis 
proposes to take the interpretivist turn seriously which starts from the idea 
of meaningful action, the nature of studying a set of socially constructed 
reality that requires an interpretation of an already interpreted world (Schutz 
1962). The intersubjectivity between several actors participating in a 
communicative process is essential to understand how they finally manage to 
reach a consensus.  
Social communications have significant effects on social relations, and 
the relationship among acting, communication, and rationality is critical for 
constructivists (Adler 2006, 102). Dissatisfied with the emphasis only on 
instrumental rationality, they advance the notion of practical or 
communicative rationality. It is tied in with communicative action theory 
where actors engage in validity proving of their claims to either pursue their 
interests or to convince the other party. This is where Habermasian legacy 
can contribute to a constructivist account of the development of the ASEAN 
Charter.  
 
2.3 Constructivism in Southeast Asian Studies 
 Up to the 1990s, academic works on the region were not 
“theoretically self-conscious” (Huxley 1996, 207). They are even considered 
“atheoretical” (Acharya and Stubbs 2006, 126), although realist assumptions 
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permeated the attempts to study Southeast Asia.2 Realist accounts of the 
region were dominant in the study until the end of the Cold War where other 
international relations theory proliferated and challenged the realist 
hegemony in the discipline. Also influenced by emerging and seemingly 
sustained cooperative arrangements in the region such as the launch of the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) forum, the works of the past two decades are more theoretically 
diverse, attempting to test various international relations theories – 
constructivism being the crowd favourite – on Southeast Asia and its regional 
organization (Acharya 2000, 2009a; Busse 1999; Eaton and Stubbs 2006; 
Haacke 2005a; Higgott 1994; Narine 2006). Still, for some (Buzan and Segal 
1994; Friedberg 1993-94), realism is the most promising candidate in the 
studies.  
ASEAN according to realist and neo-realist perspective is toothless 
since institutions are deemed unable to overcome prevailing patterns of 
anarchy in the global world system (Goldschagg 2007, 12). Outcomes within 
institutions merely reflect the workings of power or threat balances (Waltz 
1979; Walt 1986). In a rather pessimistic view, ASEAN is deemed a prime 
example of powerless ‘imitation community’ (Jones and Smith 2001; 2002): 
                                                          
2
 Leifer’s works (1996; 2000) demonstrate the importance of balance of power in foreign policy 
considerations which can be associated to the realist strand of international relations theory (Peou 
2002). However, his works were also seen to contain English School assumptions (Acharya 2009a; 
Haacke 2005b).  
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ASEAN is neither a security nor an economic community, either in 
being or in prospect. It is, in fact, an imitation community (comparable 
to a fake state whose insecure and illegitimate leaders, ensconced 
through bogus elections or military coups, wield unrestrained power 
over those whom they rule). Such insecurity translated to a regional 
level produces a rhetorical and institutional shell. The shell delivers 
declarations, holds ministerial meetings, and even supports a 
secretariat, but beyond the flatulent musings of aging autocrats or 
postmodern constructivists pontificating in Track Two fora nothing of 
substance eventuates (Jones and Smith 2001, 285). 
ASEAN’s future was deemed bleak in its security functions according 
to this tenet. ASEAN as a regional institution is perceived to play a minor role 
in determining regional order (Buzan and Segal 1994; Dibb 1995). 
Downplaying the role of norms in a ‘realist institutionalist’ conception, Khoo 
(2004, 43) states that ‘ASEAN is best explained as an institution that has 
locked its members into a vicious pattern of negative interaction. The 
emergent patterns of interaction are corroding ASEAN…’. Unfortunately, it is 
not clear in Khoo’s view what constitutes ‘negative interaction’ apart from 
his argument that ASEAN member states tend to employ extra-regional 
dispute settlement mechanism. However, this neither supports his claim that 
norms do not play any role when there are disputes nor the contention that 
constructivism does not recognize ‘negative’ norms. Social constructivism 
especially the critical strand maintains that the actors give values to the 
norms in a setting, and treats norms as more flexible than a fixed concept 
(Wiener and Puetter 2009). 
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Other ‘realist-based’ theory such as He’s ‘institutional realism’ (2006) 
sees ASEAN in a more positive light regarding managing security affairs in the 
region – unlike Khoo’s (2004) ‘realist institutionalism’. Still not fully 
recognizing the importance of the role norms can play, ASEAN is neither a 
facilitating mechanism for cooperation nor a constitutive means for common 
identity, but a balancing tool for its member states against both internal and 
external security threats (He 2006, 189). ASEAN states rely on institutions to 
engage in the regional balance of power. He (2006, 191) sees that neorealism 
cannot explain policy orientations of ASEAN states after the Cold War. There 
was no sign of balancing against the United States, an extra-regional super 
power, or China, a regional great power.  
Neoliberals and neoliberal institutionalists also take more optimistic 
view when it comes to cooperation in ASEAN. ASEAN has potential in 
managing intra-mural conflicts and plays a part in maintaining regional 
stability and order (Broinowski 1982; Jorgensen-Dahl 1982, 1990; Simon 
1982). However, most liberal theories of cooperation assume background 
conditions, such as a shared liberal-democratic domestic environment and a 
relatively high degree of mutual economic interdependence for closer 
cooperation to succeed. These conditions have never been marked features 
of ASEAN (Acharya 2009a). Among scholars who are dissatisfied with 
employing rationalism to explain the region, Peou (2002, 120) sees that 
neoliberalism lacks the empirical content necessary to “prove itself worthy of 
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recognition”. This is also the case for neoliberal institutionalism because the 
emergence and consolidation of ASEAN took place with fairly low levels of 
intra-mural transactions and interdependence (Acharya 2000, 199). Rother 
(2012, 52) sees that the Asian financial crisis of 1997 also serves as evidence 
that institutionalist interpretations are lacking. Little institutional building 
helped ASEAN cooperate on the problem since until the 1997 crisis ASEAN 
was still operating on an ad-hoc basis. The lack of empirical evidence from 
the neoliberalist side made constructivism a more prominent competitor vis-
à-vis realism. Some; nonetheless, maintain that theoretical pluralism is 
desirable and “Southeast Asian Studies need not be dominated by either 
realism or constructivism” (Acharya and Stubbs 2006). 
To be sure, constructivism in Southeast Asian studies is not without 
criticism. Tsuyoshi Kawasaki (2009) challenges the constructivist approach, 
characterizing it as romantic and intellectually naïve. In his view, the ARF 
which is the most institutionalized forum in ASEAN can best be seen as 
serving the members states’ interests and most usefully analysed through 
what he terms a ‘rationalist institutionalist’ lens. Jones and Smith (2007) 
claim that the empirical facts suggest that ASEAN was ‘making process, not 
progress’. Yet some scholars studying the region propose English school as 
‘distinct approach to understanding IR” (Narine 2006) while others (Alagappa 
1998; Roberts 2011) prefer to apply the regional security complex theory 
developed by Buzan and Wæver (2003) to Southeast Asia. This only 
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demonstrates that Southeast Asian Studies in general and ASEAN studies in 
particular are far from being dominated by any homogenized theoretical 
tenet. 
Lee Jones’ work (2012) attempts to explain ASEAN and intervention 
within the region from the perspective of political economy, aiming to 
“transcend the dominant realist-constructivist debate on ASEAN” (2) and 
demonstrate that the principle of non-interference is not as sacrosanct as 
one might think. Non-interference can be invoked and discarded by powerful 
social groups in the state to defend their particular interests. He argues that 
the principle of non-interference is applied in a much more flexible way on 
the ground and cites examples such as East Timor and Cambodia pre- and 
post-Cold War. ASEAN’s involvement in intra-regional conflicts was also 
studied by Alagappa (1993) who highlights ASEAN’s successful intervention in 
the Cambodian conflict. Jones contends that constructivists have “incentive 
to minimize evidence of norm violation” (2012, 5) in order to prove that 
norms matter.  
However, norm deviation does not mean abandonment of the norm. 
Rather, it is a test of said norm (Acharya 2009a). Certain norms might come 
out weaker or stronger after the process of contestation, but it also depends 
on the perception of member states in a community to determine its validity. 
Viewing the influence of norm from political economy standpoint might 
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overlook cases where actors follow, invoke or discard norms regardless of 
material interests, but from other reasons such as reputation. Non-
interference in mainly considered intra-mural norm in ASEAN’s diplomatic 
and security culture (Haacke 2003), to be employed mainly among members 
in the organization. When ASEAN ‘intervened’ in the case of Cambodia during 
the Cold War, neither Cambodia nor Vietnam was a member of ASEAN. Alice 
D. Ba (2005) also made similar arguments when she replied to Khoo (2004). 
Moreover, Ba argues that there are exceptions to rules even in wider context 
such as when the cases involve military aggression or self defense. ASEAN’s 
response to Vietnam’s actions in Cambodia is complicated by questions 
about aggression and about Vietnam as a non-ASEAN member whose 
intentions were furthermore made suspect by its past statements and 
actions toward ASEAN (Ba 2005, 258). It can be seen that the organization is 
acting on a security issue in the region and not on a particular member. If the 
power of norms is just an ‘excuse’ for constructivists to highlight its 
importance, the norm that is viewed to be often violated would not be 
incorporated readily when ASEAN members created a legally-binding 
instrument which codifies norms they deemed salient and valid in the form 
of the ASEAN Charter.  
Social constructivism provides welcome value-added insights to the 
explanation of various phenomena in the region by emphasizing the role of 
ideational forces on state behaviour. After constructivism gained ground as a 
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theoretical approach in the 1990s, scholars have come to study the culture, 
ideas, and values guiding Southeast Asian interstate relations among other 
interests. Constructivism challenges uncritical acceptance of the balance of 
power system posited by realist and neo-realist scholars as the basis of Asian 
regional order by giving greater play to the possibility of change and 
transformation driven by socialization (Acharya 2008, 72). The development 
of the Asian values, often grouped together as the ASEAN Way when dealing 
specifically with the regional organization, and the regional identity are taken 
into account in the analysis (Acharya 1997, 2000, 2009a, 2009b; Haacke 
2005a). Earlier in the 1980s, scholars have paid attention to the impact of 
norms on states’ behaviour (Davies 2013) despite the fact that they did not 
bandwagon under constructivist umbrella. Donald Weatherbee (1987, 1227) 
highlights the established norms of intra-ASEAN behaviour similar to what is 
known as the ASEAN Way today. Buszynski (1987, 765) analyses ASEAN’s 
behaviour regarding Vietnam issue, stressing the importance of dialogue and 
how ASEAN would want to instill values related to democracy such as 
inclusive election in Cambodia. Constructivism then bolsters the traditional 
understanding of norms, treating the power and influence of norms in a 
more sophisticated manner (Davies 2013).  
In studying Southeast Asian interstate norms, scholars tend to explore 
the region’s history (Stubbs 2008). This reinforces Wendt’s argument that 
“history matters”, and a constructivist account cannot be devoid of this 
48 
 
aspect. An appropriate mode of interstate relations practiced among actors 
in any normative space has usually gone through the test time and again to 
see whether it still worked. If it could not properly function, then it would be 
revised or replaced. ASEAN was labeled by some scholars as norm 
entrepreneur, norm brewery (Katsumata 2006), norm guardian (Stubbs 2008, 
455) by constructivists who emphasize the role of ASEAN in managing, 
producing and reproducing regional norms.  
Most constructivist accounts of the region are of the conventional 
strand (Acharya 2000; 2009a; Johnston 1999; 2003). Acharya (2009a) 
explores norms and socialisation in ASEAN and suggests that ASEAN is a 
nascent security community. Norms are important because they are 
intimately linked with the creation and maintenance of specific national, and 
regional, identities (Davies 2013, 211). Social communities, ASEAN included, 
rely on norms of behaviour which prescribe and proscribe legitimate and 
illegitimate conduct (Acharya 2009a). Busse (1999) argues along this line 
when he studies how norms influence the construction and endurance of 
Southeast Asian security by providing code of conduct for the interaction of 
member states as well as a set of working guidelines which set out the 
procedure by which the organization would manage problems such as 
conflicts.   
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Saravanamuttu (2010, 5) suggests that Acharya’s work still falls within 
the broad sphere of state-centric constructivism, more or less in keeping with 
Wendtian theory. He argues for dialogic interaction between civil society and 
state as a way to represent competing views and missions stemming from 
interests and identities of both state and non-state actors, framing the 
research agenda in a more critical approach (1999). Drawing from Cox (1981), 
humans are not only followers of given structures, but they also create them. 
Critical constructivism also concerns with a continuing process of historical 
change (Hwang 2006, 247) and recognizes that the person who studies the 
subject cannot claim to be objective, standing apart from the topic. Although 
the constructivist literature on the region is quite robust as outlined above, 
works with critical strand are quite sparse. Tan (2006) expresses concerns 
that constructivist accounts of the region might be too “essentialist” due to 
its state-centrism à-la-Wendt. He sees that this is partly due to the uncritical 
emulation of rationalist constructivist perspectives in International Relations 
Theory. Acharya and Stubbs (2006) contend that it is not necessarily the case 
that being social scientific means analysing only the role of the state and 
being deterministic about norms. States (or more often, individuals acting in 
the capacity of the states) are given primary focus as units of analysis, but 
constructivists are also interested in the roles of other non-state actors such 
as international non-governmental organizations in proposing new norms or 
questioning existing ones. The thesis will primarily employ an interpretive 
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method in order to avoid causal determinism. To the extent that the analysis 
problematizes power relations, it leans towards critical constructivism. Social 
constructivist account of ASEAN in a critical strand is still not common, and 
the thesis proposes to fill this intellectual and academic space in Southeast 
Asian studies.   
Hopf (1998) contends that the critical strand focuses more on 
interrogating and unmasking power relationships unlike conventional 
constructivists. Conventional constructivists have conceded that their 
approach might ignore the participatory character of social science in the 
construction of social reality (Wendt 2005, 211-214; Checkel 2007a, 59-61). It 
might have uncritically reified allegedly fixed norms and identities (Checkel 
2007a, 66-67). Simmerl (2011) thus argues that critical constructivism can be 
a way out of the dilemma. According to Simmerl (2011, 5), “critical 
constructivism invigorates the basic strengths of constructivism by 
incorporating three aspects of post-structuralist discourse theory: focus on 
language and communication; emphasis on discursive structures; and 
awareness for power relations in process of construction”.  
Critical constructivism understands language and discourse as 
producing social reality. It departs from the logic of causal explanation of 
conventional constructivism and applies interpretative methods instead 
(Simmerl 2011, 5). Social facts depend on a constructed consensus about 
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meaning. A critical constructivist research on norms thus maintains, “the 
quality of norms is what actors make of it” (Wiener and Puetter 2009). 
Furthermore, norm contestation in a necessary component in raising the 
level of acceptance of norms (Wiener and Puetter 2009, 7). While 
conventional constructivism focus on the structuring power of norms and 
their influence on state behaviour (Katzenstein 1996; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 
1999), critical constructivism focus on the meaning of norms as constituted 
by and constitutive of the use (Reus-Smit 2003; Weldes and Saco 1996). As 
cited in Wiener and Puetter (2009, 8), Wiener (2004) sees that critical 
constructivism’s “interest in relation to norms enhances the understanding of 
how intersubjectivity plays out in (interactive) international relations based 
on normative structures that entail meaning which is actually in use”. In an 
ASEAN context, employ a conventional constructivist framework might help 
us find out whether a specific norm influence policy outcome, but critical 
constructivism can help us discover the change evolving from the interaction 
and the power structure within the social setting that the actors make 
decisions. The venue where the interactions occur is conducive to 
establishing social recognition of a contested norm and social learning 
remains a process involving the participating elites within the environment of 
an international organization (Wiener and Puetter 2009). This leads us to 
look at the negotiation as the source to study norms codification within a 
specific social setting, with the mode of arguing and/or bargaining also takes 
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place as a means to reach the constructed consensus of the norm’s meaning. 
The contestation nature of norms which is a critical constructivist assumption 
implies that there is an ongoing process of norm interpretation within a 
social context. Wiener and Puetter (2009, 9) also sees that “the meaning 
attached to a norm is likely to differ according to respective experience with 
norm-use”. This is where Jones’ criticism on how constructivism 
misinterprets deviation from the norm of non-intervention also overlooks. 
Norms undergo process of contestation within a framework of shared 
understanding (conceptualized in Habermasian ‘lifeworld’ which will be 
further elaborated below in 2.6 arguing and bargaining in multilateral 
negotiations), implying new contestation which could lead to change in 
meaning or implementation when the situation arises. Actors neither merely 
‘follow norms’, adhering to ‘norm-governed’ behaviour as conventional 
constructivist account suggests, nor do they have a fixed set of interests they 
must comply to in a political economic sense since interests are also socially 
constructed (Weldes 1996). Critical constructivism, by problematizing power 
relations and take the quality of norms as inherently contested, could 
capture the dynamism of interaction among states trying out norms validity 
claims.    
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2.4 Role identity 
 One of the main contributions of constructivism is the notion that 
state identity fundamentally shapes state preferences and actions 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, 398). Wendt (1992, 1994) emphasizes 
international environment as important factor in shaping state identities. For 
Wendt (1999), identities’ roots can be found in an actor’s self-understandings 
as well as the recognition of other actors. Identity is constituted by views 
“held by the Self and held by the Other” (1999, 224). This idea was in 
accordance with Holsti’s (1970). Attempting to incorporate the concept of 
role into the analysis of foreign policy, Holsti sees that “national role 
conceptions are also related to, or buttressed by, the role prescriptions 
coming from the external environment” (1970, 246).   
Wendt (1999) discusses four kinds of identities: personal or corporate; 
type; role; and collective: 
1) Personal or corporate identities are constituted by “the self-
organizing, homeostatic structures that make actors distinct entities” (Wendt 
1999, 224-225). The construction of this identity in personal actors involves a 
sense of personal Self. Its construction in corporate actors also requires a 
sense of group Self through the formation of a joint narrative of selves 
(Behravesh 2011; Wendt 1994). Corporate identity thus refers to “the 
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intrinsic, self-organizing qualities that constitute actor individuality” (Wendt 
1994, 385).   
2) Type identities are social categories of states that share some 
characteristics, such as regime types or forms of state (Wendt 1999, 226). 
Type identities are influenced by international social structure since the 
perception of the international society can change over time. For example, 
colonized states and absolute monarchical states might be viewed as less 
legitimate forms of state nowadays. International values might dictate 
democracy as more desirable than authoritarianism. States can have multiple 
type identities, be it democratic, capitalist, Asian. 
3) Role identities are social – the product of dyadic relationships 
among countries and exist in relation to others (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, 
399). They rest on shared expectations (Wendt 1999, 27). Wendt defines role 
identity as “a set of meanings that an actor attributes to itself while taking 
the perspective of others, that is, as a social object” (1994, 385). While roles 
are structural positions, role-identities are subjective self-understandings 
(which also include additional intersubjective dimension by how others view 
them in a social structure) (Wendt 1999, 259). In Wendt’s approach, roles 
and identities are co-constitutive (Nabers 2011, 82). Identities supply roles 
with meaning, as it is the intersubjective representation of the role that is 
called role identity. States may be friends or rivals. States might view one 
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another as political entities enjoying equal positions or they might view 
themselves as leaders of the group. The officials they send into negotiations 
either view themselves as national delegates who must represent national 
interests or act as neutral mediator/chairperson depending on the social 
structure. In Track II diplomacy; for instance, the officials are less strict in 
following the national standpoint and are more open to new norms since 
they view one other as acting in unofficial capacity. 
4) Collective identity leads to the identification of Self with Other 
through blurring the distinction between them - Self is viewed as Other. 
Collective identity is a distinct combination of role and type identities, one 
with the causal power to induce actors to define the welfare of the Other as 
part of that of the Self, to be altruistic (Wendt 1999, 229).  
Aggestam (1999) conceptualizes role identities as “mutual 
responsiveness and compatibility of interest”. Following Deutsch (1957), she 
argues that high level of interaction between states encourage the 
development of a growing ‘we-feeling’ and common ‘role-identity’. There will 
be themes of ‘role conception’ that actors employ when they speak of duties, 
commitments or responsibilities such as mediators, leaders, collaborators etc. 
In this sense, role-identity extends beyond national perception to include 
collective perception of a group of actors. The thesis employs Wendt’s 
conceptualization of role identity, emphasizing a social product born out of 
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relationships among countries, but with Hopf’s (1998, 184) distinction 
between conventional and critical constructivism: “… conventional 
constructivists wish to treat… identities as possible causes of action. Critical 
theory… claims an interest in change, and a capacity to foster change, that no 
conventional constructivist could make”.  
  
2.5 Norms, rules, and institutions 
 2.51 Norm definition 
 There has never been a shortage of norm definitions provided by 
scholars interested in the subject. There are generally three strands of norm 
definitions. First, a norm is conceptualized as a standard of behaviour defined 
in terms of rights and obligations (Axelrod 1986; Keohane 1984; Krasner 
1983; Raymond 1997) or as collective expectations among actors with a given 
identity (Jepperson et al. 1996; Katzenstein 1996). More specifically, norms 
are considered as  
spontaneously evolving, as social practice; consciously promoted, as 
political strategies to further specific interests; deliberately negotiated, 
as a mechanism for conflict management; or as a combination, mixing 
these three types (Katzenstein 1996, 21).  
 
Second, the aspect of sanction is emphasized. Violating norms often 
entails punishments (Axelrod 1986). Punishments might not always come in 
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forms of collective military or economic sanctions imposed on the country 
that deviates from the norm. Norm violations entail disapproval from other 
countries in that particular community. They might imply that the violator’s 
action destroy its own reputation and/or the community’s3 (ALTSEAN Burma 
2005). Third, norms and rules are practically used interchangeably, 
sometimes until finer distinctions are made (Kratochwil 1989). The norms can 
operate as rules, obligatory or otherwise, that prescribe the appropriate 
behaviour of an actor and proscribe the opposite (Philpott 2001). Goertz 
(2003) maintains that principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures can be treated as the same since they all have similar basic logical 
form: syllogism.  Rules are, after all, variants of the basic concept of a norm. 
Similarly, Thomson (1993) argues that a norm is a norm only that “as a rule” 
states engage in practices considered as normal. This illustrates that 
generally scholars do not find problem in using norms as rules or vice-versa.  
However, rules and norms are not exactly the same even though they 
have a coordinating function. Kratochwil (1989, 10) especially noted that all 
rules are norms or they can become norms over time, but not all norms 
                                                          
3
 This was demonstrated in the case where Burma decided to relinquish its turn at the ASEAN 
Chairmanship in order to pay more attention to its much criticized democratization process. A civil 
society organization called the Asean Inter-Parliamentary Caucus on Myanmar (AIPMC) played an 
important part in disseminating the information within the region. The charge was followed up by 
ASEAN foreign ministers who communicate with Burma at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in the 
Laotian capital on July 26, 2005 that this might not be a good time for Burma to accept the ASEAN 
Chairmanship. The Foreign Ministers then issued a statement that Burma informed them that it was 
not yet ready to take on the Chairmanship (even though Burma was enthusiastic before in renovating 
the conference site and was expecting some economic boost the Summit would bring to the city. The 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) also demanded that the Junta eased political restrictions in Burma 
(See ALTSEAN Burma 2005).  
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exhibit rule-like characteristics. Rules are applicable generally. Human action 
is rule-governed because it only “becomes understandable against the 
background of norms embodied in conventions and rules which give meaning 
to action” (Kratochwil 1989, 11). Thus, Rules also have norms element even 
though some of the norms might not be rules. However, Kratochwil does not 
clearly define what he means by ‘rule-like characteristics’. Seeing that 
Kratochwil draws no clear distinction between the two categories, Zehfuss 
(2002, 98) does not treat these concepts as separate.  
In an attempt to “craft analytical tools to study institutional change”, 
Ostrom and Basurto (2011) distinguish norms from rules (see also Crawford 
and Ostrom 2005). Norms are “prescriptions about actions or outcomes that 
are not focused primarily on short-term material payoffs to self… While 
norms can emerge entirely internal to an individual, most norms are acquired 
in the context of a community in which the individual frequently interacts” 
(Ostrom and Basurto 2011, 322).  
Rules, on the other hand, are “linguistic statements containing 
prescriptions similar to norms, but rules carry an additional, assigned 
sanction if forbidden actions are taken and observed by a monitor” (Ostrom 
and Basurto 2011, 322; Commons 1924). For rules to exist, any particular 
situation must be linked to a rule-making situation and some kind of 
monitoring and sanctioning must exist (Crawford and Ostrom 2005; Basurto 
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et al., 2009). This departs from Axelrod (1986) who sees that norms also 
entail aspects of sanctions. Nonetheless, Ostrom and Basurto (2011) 
emphasizes the ‘monitoring’ aspect as well for rules to exist. 
Although it might be useful analytically to consider that norms and 
rules are not exactly the same, the thesis recognizes that for ASEAN, norms 
and rules are actually interchangeable and follow the “norms as rules” strand 
of norm definition. This means that in ASEAN, especially through the ratified 
ASEAN Charter, members cannot opt out from the norms incorporated in the 
legally binding instrument such as the Charter. These are their obligations as 
members to the organization. To the extent that the norms that are codified 
in the ASEAN Charter are of general applicability, they can be regarded as 
rules. Even though none of the provisions specify concrete punishments in 
case of breach, non-compliance, or violation of the Charter, the Charter still 
states measures for non-compliance guided by norm of sovereignty. Thus, 
the aspect of ‘monitoring and sanctioning’ is intact. The Charter gives the 
Secretary-General the authority to monitor state compliance with ASEAN 
agreements and report this to the ASEAN Summit. The Secretary-General can 
‘monitor the compliance with the findings, recommendations or decisions 
resulting from an ASEAN dispute mechanism, and submit a report to the 
ASEAN Summit’ (ASEAN 2008). The ASEAN leaders then collectively 
determine whether the breach has occurred and if so, what action should be 
taken (ASEAN 2008; Collins 2013, 34).  
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2.52 Norm robustness 
The core norms become “practical” when they are common in 
everyday interstate practices and interactions within the community. They 
are the best solutions tested by various circumstances during the 
organisation’s life. However, their robustness varies. Legro (1997, 34-35) 
suggests three criteria to measure the robustness of the norms: specificity, 
durability, and concordance.  
Specificity concerns with the simplicity and clarity of what can or 
cannot be done. If a norm is clear enough, one need not argue about the 
content or question its operationalisation before following it. Therefore, on 
norms that are clear, actors need not engage in truth-seeking behaviour. 
Durability denotes how long the rules have been in effect and how they 
weather challenges to their prohibitions. Concordance refers to how widely 
accepted the rules are in diplomatic discussions and treaties (that is, the 
degree of intersubjective agreement). Special conditions put in place 
regarding a norm’s acceptance, then, can diminish its robustness. These 
criteria are useful in judging the varying degree of robustness of norms when 
they are questioned from time to time. Less robust norms are more likely to 
be discarded. Where the norms are most robust, violations are not even 
considered. This can also explain the survival of some core norms in the 
bargaining process of the Charter. Pro-norms behaviour can be expected 
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where the norms are more robust since the states do not have to stop to 
consider their validity before following them.  
Due to the non-materialistic nature of norms, the influence of norms 
can be studied by analysing the norm-induced pattern of behaviour 
(Björkdahl 2002, 13). Justification for a decision, discussion in order to reach 
a consensus (often on agreements about the legitimate norms), and a 
number of micro-socialisation processes, i.e., persuasion, all leave trails of 
communication that can be studied. History of prohibitions and the related 
agents’ reactions to norm violations are also relevant to the study of norm 
development. Public efforts to reaffirm a norm can contribute to norm 
robustness if the norm in question is evolving (Legro 1997, 35). The state 
behaviour in questioning the norms and providing reasons for sustaining or 
bypassing them in the negotiation process of the Charter is illuminating to 
the study of norm legitimization.    
2.53 Tacit and explicit rules 
As long as the degree of norm robustness is high and the interacting 
parties share a common background, the rules serving as solutions need not 
be explicitly formulated, as they are implicitly understood (Kratochwil 1989, 
78). In a regional setting where members share a common background, a 
number of rules go without saying. Rules operating in a certain social setting 
are a mixture of both implicit and explicit understandings. The tacit or 
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unspoken rules normally emerge out of settled practices among the 
members. Helping coordinate interdependent choices among parties, the 
tacit norms function relatively well based on mutual expectations of the 
actors. The norms that are foreign to the region generally face difficulties 
before being explicitly formulated; therefore, they often remain in the 
background until there are circumstances or actors that question their 
validity. Under the contestation, they might be either weakened or codified 
as explicit rules. If the norms weather challenges well and go on to become 
robust norms after the codification, they will recur constantly. Norm 
subscribers reiterate them from one negotiated text to another to ensure 
that they will still be firmly in place.  
The emergence of the Charter suggests that an explicit formulation of 
these formerly tacit rules is needed. With respect to the Charter, ASEAN 
states intend that it be a binding regional pact that serves ‘as a legal and 
institutional framework of ASEAN to support the realisation of its goals and 
objectives’ through the codification of ‘all ASEAN norms, rules, and values’ 
(ASEAN 2005a; Tan 2011). The ASEAN Charter will ‘make ASEAN a more rules-
based organization… supplemented by a new culture of adherence to rules’ 
and ‘grow the culture of taking our obligation seriously’ (Koh, Woon, Tan and 
Chan 2007). Although ASEAN has traditionally been functioning on ‘soft 
institutionalism’ which means accepting collective values that are least 
legally binding (Acharta 2009a, Chanto 2003, 46), the creation of the ASEAN 
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Charter implies willingness to be collectively bound by the legal instrument. If 
ASEAN still embraces soft institutionalism, the process would still be in a 
form of dialogue or unbinding statement rather than a signed, ratified, legally 
binding Charter. 
Formality or formalization of rules provides several advantages. 
According to Kratochwil (1989, 78-9), “explicit rules allow for greater 
precision and they may enable actors to break out of a deadlock over the 
choice between equally desirable ways of cooperating”. Communications 
about tacit understandings become necessary when they are violated or 
when there are doubts, whenever there may be ambiguity of interpretation 
or practice. In such situation, actors may either deny the existence of tacit 
rules and hence any potential violation of a rule, or acknowledge a rule but 
argue that it was not applicable or that their deviant behaviour should be 
excused on specific grounds (Zehfuss 2002, 99). For example, non-
interference might be questioned or there might be norm-deviant behaviour, 
but this in turn raised the needs for communications and to reconsider the 
norm validity and therefore, the need to formulate explicit rules. If members 
in a community deem the norm outdated, it would not be codified into 
explicit rules in the form of a provision in the ASEAN Charter. In the ASEAN 
case, implicit norms/rules are codified into explicit norms/rules when they 
are ratified by all member countries in legally binding instrument. The act put 
the norm in a legal framework, with ‘monitoring and sanctioning’ mechanism 
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in place. Hence, the norm-deviating behaviour will now be more difficult. The 
‘sanction’ might not be as ‘hard’ as the punishment in other regional 
organizations, with expulsion and suspension or fines, but we have to bear in 
mind that ASEAN normative environment also constitute the drafters’ 
decisions until they rest the ultimatum with the leaders’ Summit. It took 
ASEAN almost ten years after its establishment to formulate its first legally 
binding treaty - the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. 
Although several norms have been embedded there, it lacks ‘monitoring and 
sanctioning’ aspect unlike the ASEAN Charter. 
Apart from the differences in history or culture, other conditions 
which make an explicit formulation necessary according to Kratochwil (1989, 
79) include 1) the imprecision of tacit rules; 2) the compelling character of 
the coordination; and 3) the solution (based on precedents) is likely to 
engender further debate. In other words, explicit norms or rules are more 
robust than implicit ones, and less robust norms or rules with less precision 
will often invoke the need to be codified explicitly more than robust ones 
(Kratochwil 1989, 78-79). During the transition to become explicit norms, 
they are also vulnerable to being discarded. The decision to discard some 
norms and keep others, again, might be influenced by a set of shared norms 
providing common background for the negotiators or even material gains 
(Thakur 2006, 279). The extent to which norms factor in actors’ choices 
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would become clearer when we look at norms’ roles in the first-, second-, 
and third-party contexts.   
2.54 Norms in the first-, second-, and third-party contexts 
Referring to Franck (1968), Kratochwil (1989, 34-35) clarifies the first-, 
second-, and third-party contexts (or laws) where norms can influence the 
actors’ choices. The first party context is characterized by the issuance of 
commands (which may or may not have generalized character). If they are 
situation-specific, then they are imperatives or commands. These are issued 
by one party to the other(s). The second-party context is characterized by 
“strategic” behaviour among the parties, i.e., by the recognition of 
interdependence of decision-making, and – in many circumstances – the 
existence of “mixed motives”, or even the perception of common interest. In 
the second-party context, rules and norms can, but need not, figure 
prominently in the actors’ choices since the bargaining between them might 
include coercive moves. The third-party context covers the cases in which a 
third party applies preexisting rules to a given controversy in order either to 
mediate or settle the issues authoritatively. 
Franck distinguishes the three by the number of the parties involved, 
but Kratochwil (1989, 36) sees that it is more appropriate to distinguish them 
according to the type of guidance these rules and norms provide in the 
reasoning process. Thus, it is not necessarily the case that the numbers of 
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parties must correspond to the types of contexts. Barkun (1968) suggests 
that the recognized norms can function as “implicit” third parties; therefore, 
the presence of actual individuals may not be necessary for a third-party 
context. In the case of bilateral bargaining, parties which have agreed to let 
their decisions be directed by recognized norms can be considered as 
achieving the third-party context. In the same way, the second-party context 
need not refer to the situation where there are only two actors bargaining.  
The coercive moves in the second-party context are similar to the 
(situation-specific) threats, but they are not exactly imperatives or 
commands in the first-party context because they lack the imposed character. 
“Breaking the other(s)’ will” in order to arrive at a decision was necessary in 
the second-party context. However, norms can still play a role in this context 
by governing the choices of actors when they face various possibilities arising 
from pending decisions. They do not, after all, have to follow the commands 
without any choice as in the first-party context. In other words, strategic 
action can be rule-governed and can sometimes lead to rule-guided 
behaviour. As coercion is still an option, the actors have no obligation to 
exhibit norm-guided behaviour ‘as a rule’ in this context.  
Norms will be playing the most significant role in the third-party 
context where parties look to settle the controversies by referring to 
established norms and the practices derived from them. Kratochwil (1989) 
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also proposes other normative criteria for a third-party context: the parties 
must grant to each other equal standing and forgo attacks – either verbal or 
physical – aimed at breaking each other’s will; they will therefore have to 
argue “the merits” of their case and, in doing so, their argument must be cast 
in terms of universalizable rules. Kratochwil’s criteria for a third-party context 
are very similar to the conditions presupposing a Habermasian 
communicative process, which means that norms will factor the most in 
actors’ decisions if power recedes into the background.  
2.55 Norm diffusion   
The norm diffusion literature in constructivist IR is quite massive. The 
literature can be grouped according to the emphasis on the factors most 
relevant to normative change. First, a number of studies focus on the 
universality of the “good” norms in question which should be learned by local 
actors and the role of transnational non-state actors in promoting them 
(Finnemore 1993; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Klotz 1995a; Nadelmann 1990; 
Price 1988; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). The actors in the process of norm 
socialization are relatively passive while the role of transnational norm 
promoter is highlighted. This kind of literature focusing on the international 
system level is termed the “first wave” in the norm literature (Acharya 2009b, 
9). Second, some studies referred to as the the “second wave” (Acharya 
2009b, 11; Cortell and Davis, Jr. 2000, 66) are more concerned with domestic 
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structures and agents in inducing normative change when faced with 
international norms (Checkel 1997b; Cortell and Davis, Jr. 1996; Gurowitz 
1999; Klotz 1995b; Risse-Kappen 1994). International norm entrepreneurs 
have to find domestic partners in the target state in order to make change 
possible. Domestic political processes are important in second wave norm 
studies because they condition access to information and political arena and 
thus prioritize some actors over others. However, this perspective can still be 
static since it emphasizes the historically-derived factors that facilitate or 
impede local actors learning international norms. Therefore, it cannot shed 
light on how local actors reconstruct ideas to make them fit their 
circumstances. This is similar to historical institutionalism (Collier and Collier 
1991; Gourevitch 1999; Pierson and Skocpol 2002): actors constrained by 
their prior actions find themselves in the self-reinforcing feedback process 
where particular patterns may recur (termed path dependence). Normative 
change is thus the result of custom or tradition, leaving little space for 
voluntary acts on the part of local actors.   
Dissatisfied with static perspectives of the role of local actors, some 
studies focus instead on the autonomy of “norm takers” (Acharya 2009b). 
The second wave norm literature suggests that norm acceptance will be high 
if there is congruence between external and internal beliefs; however, it does 
not see that the local actors can also reinterpret the external norm. The role 
of local actors in reinterpreting, reconstructing, and legitimizing the ideas by 
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making them fit their current shared ideas and circumstances is – according 
to this approach – more important than external norms entrepreneurs’ 
socializing role. The process whereby local actors attempt to build the 
congruence between the local norms and external ones is termed 
“constitutive localization” (Acharya 2009b, 14). Failed constitutive 
localization may result in resistance or rejection of external norms.  
Constitutive localization departs from the first and second wave 
conceptualization of norm diffusion mainly in two ways. Firstly, it emphasizes 
the active construction of foreign ideas on the part of local actors. They are 
not “trapped” in their previous commitments and actions; therefore, actors 
consciously reinterpret and reconstruct norms. Secondly, local actors are not 
seen as novices who should be inducted into the norms of a given 
community since it is not the case that international norms are seen as 
morally superior than regional/local norms. Rather than focusing only on 
external norm promoters, the thesis will draw on the concept of empowering 
local agents and the importance of “cognitive prior” in conditioning actors’ 
receptivity to new norms. The cognitive prior is derived from cultural norms, 
historical patterns of interstate interactions, ideas, or institutionalized norms. 
In negotiating the ASEAN Charter, the drafters did not only deal with 
traditional diplomatic norms in the region but also external norms struggling 
to be institutionalized. Norm diffusion is most relevant to the study when we 
look at how the drafters argued or bargained contested norm in a social 
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setting, especially if the norm in question used to be perceived as foreign. If a 
norm is successfully ‘localized’ prior to the negotiation, it will be less 
controversial and can be more easily codified. The social setting, i.e. an 
international institution or forum where actors operate is then crucial as a 
normative context conditioning the negotiation process and norm diffusion. 
2.56 International institution as social setting and norm entrepreneurs 
Institutions are often defined as related closely to norms and rules by 
both neo-liberal institutionalists and constructivists, the former often 
emphasizes the prescriptive role of institutions. For Goertz (2003), 
institutions are structures of norms. An institution is, as a matter of fact, its 
norms and rules. Ostrom (1991) also sees institutions as sets of working rules 
that are used to determine who is eligible to make decisions in some arena, 
what actions are allowed or constrained, and what procedures must be 
followed, inter alia. March and Olsen (1998) maintains that an institution is a 
relatively large collection of practices and rules defining appropriate 
behaviour of specific groups of actors in specific situations. Kratochwil and 
Ruggie (1986) see that institutions entail convergence of actors’ expectations. 
The interactions among actors within an institution can demonstrate how 
norms and ideas shape actors’ decisions even when other considerations, i.e., 
perceived common interests, are present. However, institutions do not 
generate discourse in quasi-automatic fashion but should rather be 
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understood as mechanisms fostering trust, stabilizing expectations among 
participants, offering shared normative background understandings and 
procedural mechanisms which allow for normative co-ordination action plans 
(Goodin 1996).  
Although institutionalists study how rules and norms can constrain 
state behaviour, they are still divided regarding the extent to which social 
interactions can change states’ interests, identities and preferences. The 
preferences of the actors are fixed, rendering the social context in which the 
actors operate undertheorized. For contractual institutionalists, institutions 
are rarely treated as social environments where group interactions create 
social pressures, incentives, and environments conducive to persuasion 
and/or pro-social conformity (Johnston 1999, 289).  
The influence of ideas on state policy is mediated by structure and 
individual agents. Internationally, a changing external environment helps 
create windows of opportunity through which policy entrepreneurs – the 
carriers of new ideas – jump (Checkel 1997b). Policy entrepreneurs are 
usually international non-governmental organizations proposing new 
information be considered by decision-makers (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), 
but they can also be officials who are socialized and desire to convince their 
peers. Based on Schneider and Teske’s definition, entrepreneurs are 
individuals who change the direction and flow of politics (1992, 737). The 
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literature suggests that successful entrepreneurs possess one or more of the 
following: expertise and knowledge in their given field; substantial 
negotiating skills; persistence; and connections to relevant political actors. 
Entrepreneurs can be clever, persistent, and politically well connected, and 
they can offer solutions to many problems. But their goal of changing the 
direction and flow of politics will be extraordinarily difficult unless elites in 
positions of political power also recognize that such problems exist. In other 
words, they have to argue to convince their targets so that they will share 
common perceptions of problems. Then, the local actors also have active 
roles in considering and reinterpreting or reconstructing the norms so that 
they can fit in the region. If an entrepreneur carries ideas that are at variance 
with core aspects of the organization’s ideology, his or her task will be doubly 
difficult (Checkel 1997, 10). In other words, local actors will find it difficult to 
build the congruence with new norms. Johnston (2003) also suggests 
similarly that the actor should possess few prior, ingrained attitudes that are 
inconsistent with the counterattitudinal message to facilitate norms 
acceptance.  
The thesis will treat international institutions as “social environments” 
of which social norms are embedded and social action takes place. Members 
in an institutional social setting might act differently from when they are 
interacting with one another outside the institutional context. In some 
instances, actors in the process of negotiation may attempt to construct 
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features they deem will facilitate reaching mutual agreement. In negotiating 
the Charter, the drafters must resolve conflicting goals through 
communication guided by norms. Attempting to reach a compromise or 
better understanding regarding contested course of action, they mainly 
employ two types of communication: arguing and/or bargaining. The 
concepts thus merit a special attention.   
 
2.6 Arguing and bargaining in multilateral negotiations 
The debate between arguing and bargaining emanates from German 
academic circles where the idea of Habermasian communicative action was 
introduced, suggesting that actors are prepared to change their ideas by the 
power of better arguments (Habermas 1984; 1992). In the beginning the 
debate used to focus on whether communicative action actually takes place, 
thereby distinguishing strategic from communicative action by separating the 
logic of action. Later, empirical evidence suggested that arguing and 
bargaining coexisted in negotiations (Elgström and Jönsson 2000; Holzinger 
2004). Actors who intend to employ strategic bargaining often argue to 
protect their initial standpoints and have to refer to a shared normative 
framework. Before entering the negotiations, they must come to share basic 
assumptions about the deep structure of their interaction: who are 
legitimate players and what is a legitimate value to be bargained over 
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(Johnston 2001, 493)? Guided by the norm of state sovereignty, legitimate 
players are generally national delegates. However, this can include other 
non-state actors if the social setting where the negotiations take place 
permit their participation. Müller (2004) agrees when he suggests that the 
pursuit of self-interest is legitimate as it is guided by two different sets of 
norms — the first set is substantial and defines which self-interests count as 
appropriate in a negotiation setting, and which type of self-interest is to be 
excluded. For example, actors agree without having to negotiate again that it 
is not appropriate or legitimate to ask for the territory of another country, so 
they will not bother to make that seemingly unreasonable request in the first 
place. In other words, the pursuit of self-interest is also governed by norms 
imbued in a particular social environment. Critical constructivism, in 
particular, is interested in what Weldes (1998, 223) calls a ‘mode of 
reasoning’. This phrase is intended to suggest the limitations of conceiving of 
rationality merely as a singular and formal mechanism of choice by 
highlighting the multiplicity of forms of reasoning that are available to actors, 
by emphasizing that rationality is an active process or set of practices 
through which meaning is produced, and by noting the intersubjective rather 
than individual character of reasoning practices. Social communication is 
important to constructivist analysis precisely because the process over 
content and conception of social reality as created in communication rather 
than through the interaction of pre-existing units is highlighted (Albert, 
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Kessler, and Stetter 2008). By engaging in a negotiation, by employing mode 
of reasoning resulting in an act of arguing and/or bargaining, the actors 
depict and create representations of the world. The question is, if actors still 
argue when they bargain, how could we differentiate the two categories?   
In this regard, Naurin (2007), following Barry’s typology of different 
types of social decision procedure (Barry 1965), further distinguishes arguing 
and bargaining into 1) cooperative arguing; 2) competitive arguing; 3) 
cooperative bargaining; and 4) competitive bargaining. Many other scholars 
deal with the conceptual distinction of modes of communication (Deitelhoff 
and Müller 2005; Panke 2006; Ulbert and Risse 2005). For instance, 
Deitelhoff and Müller (2005) distinguish three types of communications: 1) 
bargaining; 2) rhetorical action (which can be fitted into Naurin’s competitive 
arguing); and 3) arguing. However, Naurin’s work by far manages to best take 
motivations that define arguing and bargaining as types of social decision 
procedures into account, emphasizing the difference between cooperative 
behaviour and arguing which is often mistaken to be the same. To study 
bargaining without distinguishing it further can be misleading since it 
oversimplifies methods actors use to achieve their goals. Even though the 
goal of bargaining is to maximize one’s own wants, actors do not always do 
that at the cost of others. They can choose to maximize their interests 
through the want-satisfaction of others if that will lead to better solutions in 
the long run.      
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2.61 Arguing and communicative action  
Habermas (1984, 86) defined arguing as  
the interaction of at least two subjects capable of speech and action 
who… seek to reach an understanding about their action situation and 
their plans of action in order to coordinate their actions by way of 
agreement.  
 
Habermas himself says little that is concerned directly with 
international relations, except when he discussed Kant’s perpetual peace 
(Habermas 1998). He sees the gradual development of human rights and 
international law as a “cosmopolitan transformation of the state of nature 
among states into a legal order” (Habermas 1998, 149). Habermas’ works are 
vast and complex, but his ideas of argumentation along with public sphere 
have been of particular interest to international relations scholars (Crawford 
2009). Indeed, Adler (2006, 124) maintains that “we can find added value in 
constructivist theories that build on Habermas’ theory of communicative 
action”.    
Arguing implies that actors challenge the validity claims inherent in 
any causal or normative statement and seek a communicative consensus 
about their understanding of a situation as well as justifications for the 
principles and norms guiding their action (Risse and Kleine 2009). It can be 
done by providing sound reasons concerning various options on the table in 
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terms of normative rightness and/or factual validity. Successful 
argumentation results in the change of mind of the other party.  
Unlike bargaining, in communicative action power exercise recedes 
into the background and actors assume that preferences can be changed, 
especially their own. It is not necessary; however, that a valid consensus can 
only be achieved under conditions of the ideal speech situation. For 
Habermas (1992), strategic elements in the dialogue can actually be 
distinguished from strategic actions since they are indeed under the 
presuppositions of communicative action. However, in a “true” 
communicative action, Habermas requires sincerity from parties involved. In 
such cases, arguments are not used strategically to further self-interested 
goals. Interactions are ‘communicative’ when 
The participants coordinate their plans of action consensually, with 
the agreement reached at any point being evaluated in terms of the 
intersubjective recognition of validity claims (Habermas 1990, 58). 
This leads Naurin (2007) to further distinguish between cooperative 
and competitive arguing. Cooperative arguing is the “true” form of arguing in 
a Habermasian sense, whereas competitive arguing is known as rhetorical 
action. Schimmelfennig terms rhetorical action as “the strategic use and 
exchange of arguments to persuade other actors to act according to one’s 
preferences” (2003, 5). In his study focusing on why the Western European 
states agreed to the expansion of the EU and NATO, he shows that the liberal 
rules and values constituting the Western international community’s identity 
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and the organizations’ rules influenced the enlargement decisions through 
rhetorical action. The Western European countries were constrained by their 
previous commitments, and could not go back on their words for fear of 
damage to their own reputation. In rhetorical action, actors merely use 
arguments in a strategic mode in order to justify themselves and persuade 
others, but they are not prepared to change their own beliefs or reach 
common understanding (Risse 2000, 8; Naurin 2007, 562). They pursue their 
goals while anticipating and taking into account how others might react to 
their actions, but they do not aim to understand the claims of others. Apart 
from pandering and demagoguery, the mechanism at work is shaming the 
target into abiding by their previous commitments for fear of being 
inconsistent. Arguing along this line means that the rhetorical actor may only 
have to reinforce the audience’s former beliefs or shame them into 
cooperation in order to persuade other of one’s preferred course of action 
without actually convincing them.  
Arguing can also increase the influence of the less powerful. Lacking 
material resources and usually remaining in inferior position, these actors 
have to rely on the power of the better argument should they hope to 
convince others. When the act of following a norm is not automatic (the 
norms are not yet “taken for granted”), the actors have to stop to reason 
which norm should apply. It is in this situation that Risse (2000, 6) – building 
on Habermas’ communicative rationality – argues that social constructivism 
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encompasses not only the “logic of appropriateness” but also the “logic of 
truth seeking or arguing” and terms the process “argumentative rationality”. 
In a collective communicative process, actors will try to figure out 1) whether 
their assumptions about the world are correct; or 2) whether norms of 
appropriate behaviour can be justified, and which norms apply under given 
circumstances (Risse 2000; Risse and Kleine 2009, 5). Framing this under 
critical constructivist framework, we can say that norms are what actors 
intersubjectively make of them under a shared framework of common 
understanding.   
Argumentative rationality in the Habermasian sense is based on three 
presuppositions: 
• the actor’s ability to empathize 
According to Zartman and Berman (1982, 17), empathy involves 
the crucial ability to understand the other party’s point of view, if 
only in order to counter it more effectively. It encompasses both 
emotional/affective (Eisenberg and Strayer 1987) and cognitive 
process (Mead 1934). Habermas (1993) refers to empathy as “the 
ability to project oneself across cultural distances into alien and at 
first sight incomprehensible conditions of life, behavioral 
predispositions, and interpretive perspectives”. Empathy is a 
necessary prerequisite for an actor aiming to validate a moral 
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norm. They have to be able to take the perspective of other 
participants in discussing whether a proposed norm is fair to all. 
Research has shown that empathy also facilitates helping (Batson 
1991; Stephan and Finlay 1999). In the process of argumentative 
rationality in particular, actors with empathy enter the negotiation 
prepared to change their ideas for the sake of better arguments.   
• a “common lifeworld” shared among actors  
First used by Edmund Husserl (1970) to signify (in a very positivist 
sense) intersubjective experiences acquired by men for their 
common life, the concept of lifeworld was developed further by 
Alfred Schütz and Thomas Luckmann (1974) to mean the 
framework linking an individual’s life to the society. It occupies 
central position in Habermas’ theory of communicative action 
(1992). The theory of communicative action offers ‘a much needed 
microfundation of social construcivism, in so far as it stresses the 
collective communicative process of interpretation through which 
intersubjective structures of meaning are produced and 
reproduced, and the process through which the agents themselves 
– their identities, interests, and shared understandings of 
meaningful behaviour – are continuously produced and 
reproduced’ (Risse 1997). It supplements the ‘void’ social 
constructivism is often accused of lacking in methodology.  
81 
 
Lifeworld or lebenswelt can be perceived as a culturally 
transmitted interpretive patterns consisting of a shared culture, a 
common system of norms and rules perceived as legitimate, and 
the social identity of actors being capable of communicating and 
acting. It is an intersubjectively shared, collective life context 
comprising the totality of interpretations which are presupposed 
as background knowledge by members of society. Habermas 
(1990) also suggests that ‘societies reproduce themselves by 
continuing the interpretive acts of proceeding generations in which 
members intersubjectively exchange world orientations and 
situational definitions stored up in the lifeworld.’ This forms a 
common context where agents can obtain agreement about 
problematised issues since the contested validity claim (which 
essentially points to a problematic part of the lifeworld) is 
evaluated with reference to shared norms and principles 
(Deitelhoff and Müller 2005). Common lifeworld provides arguing 
actors with a repertoire of collective understandings to which they 
can refer when making truth claims (Risse 2003). It was long 
argued that international politics lack a shared lifeworld due to the 
anarchic nature of the system; however, international law-making 
usually takes place among diplomats who often share socialization 
history and common understanding about how things ‘work’ in a 
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particular venue. This is especially true in the ASEAN case, where 
the ASEAN Way provides a cultural and historical backdrop from 
which negotiators draw shared norms and principles. Since the 
concept of lifeworld would provide an important backdrop to the 
analysis of ASEAN negotiation in following chapters, it needs to be 
explored in more detail.  
The concept of lifeworld can provide an insightful framework for 
an analysis of ASEAN negotiating context particularly because it 
goes beyond a set of regional norms governing actors’ behaviours. 
Lifeworld defines who the actors are, what they value about 
themselves, what they believe in, which behaviour is deemed as 
offensive, what they aspire to, what they desire, what they are 
willing to sacrifice to which ends, and so forth. To participate in a 
lifeworld (and the lifeworld is nothing but mutual participation) is 
to share a common sense of who “we” are. (Frank 2000). ASEAN 
has been emphasizing that the ASEAN Way unifies and holds 
ASEAN members together. It is a regional solution to a regional 
problem (Loke 2005; Sukma 2010). Although in most instances it is 
manifested as a set of regional norms, it goes beyond that. It is a 
way of life. It defines how the actors perceive themselves and 
others and how they expect others to behave. It is true that some 
parts of the lifeworld might be questioned, resulting in some 
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behaviours deviating from the pattern, i.e. the norm of 
interference. However, if asked what the cardinal norms of ASEAN 
should be and what should be codified into the ASEAN Charter, the 
actors still agree on the validity claim of non-interference 
(Summary Record of the First Meeting). It is who they are and who 
they still want to be: countries that avoid intervening into domestic 
affairs of others. It is embedded in their lifeworld. 
Defined as “implicit knowledge”, lifeworld “remains in the back of 
communicative participants” (Dallmayr 1984). It is the social 
background to communicative action (although communicative 
action needs not occur every time the negotiating conditions or 
environment permit). Lifeworld is also conceptualized by 
Habermas (1990) as a “holistically structured knowledge”, implying 
the wholeness of its existence in the shared understanding of 
actors in a social group. 
For Habermas (1990, 103), “practical discourses depend on 
content brought to them from outside. It would be utterly 
pointless to engage in a practical discourse without a horizon 
provided by the lifeworld of a specific social group and without real 
conflicts in a concrete situation in which the actors consider it 
incumbent on them to reach a consensual means of regulating 
some controversial social matter”. Communicative action is a 
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rational action. The occasion for the argument will be motivated by 
the need to resolve a concrete situation and the content of the 
argument will also be shaped by the lifeworld (Habermas 1990, 
135).  
Lifeworld needs affirmation and reproduction. According to 
Habermas (1987), the lifeworld is divided into culture, society, and 
person aspect. The cultural reproduction of the lifeworld produces 
a store of valid knowledge as Habermas (1992) contends “in 
coming to an understanding of one another about their situation, 
participants in interaction stand in a cultural tradition that they at 
once use and renew”. Habermas (1987) calls culture “the store of 
knowledge from which those engaged in communicative action 
draw interpretations susceptible of consensus as they come to 
understanding about something in the world”. The cultural 
tradition shared by a community is constitutive of the lifeworld 
which the individual member finds already interpreted, and the 
processes of reaching understanding upon which the lifeworld is 
centered require a cultural tradition across the whole spectrum 
(Habermas 1992, 327). 
There is also a social dimension to lifeworld, which provides 
solidarity. Participants who coordinate their actions by way of 
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intersubjectively recognising criticizable validity claims are at once 
relying on membership in social groups and strengthening the 
integration of those same groups (Habermas 1992). In another 
words, members employ their positions in the groups to engage in 
the debate of the validity claims of the norm in question and by 
doing that further solidarize the “we” feeling within the group 
since Habermas (1987) sees society (as a component of lifeworld) 
as the legitimate orders from which those engaged in 
communicative action gather a solidarity, based on belonging to 
groups as they enter into interpersonal relationships with one 
another. Moreover, Habermas (1992) sees that newly arising 
situations can be connected up with existing conditions in the 
world. This takes care of co-ordination of action by means of 
legitimately regulated interpersonal relationships and lends 
constancy to the identity of groups. Engaging in argumentation 
activity reaffirms the norms in question as well as the identity of 
the participants sharing the same lifeworld. 
The socialisation process of the members can “secure the 
acquisition of generalized capacities for action for future 
generations and takes care of harmonizing individual life histories 
and collective life forms” (Habermas 1992). In international 
negotiations, we might expect to see negotiators with shared 
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lifeworld existing within the same social structure carry on the 
same pattern or ‘rules of the game’ of the negotiation from 
previous negotiators, given that the validity claims are not 
questioned4.  
Outhwaite (1996) sees that Habermas uses lifeworld to refer to 
relatively informal ways of life as well as to a cognitive ‘horizon of 
meaning’. He contends that the different status of these two 
senses has given rise to some misunderstandings in the reception 
of Habermas’ work (Outhwaite 1996, 369). In the ASEAN context, 
the thesis employs the concept of lifeworld which has manifested 
in a shared understanding of the ASEAN Way as the way the actors 
define and perceive themselves as well as others, drawing on their 
shared understanding. Thus, the lifeworld in this context 
incorporates both the ‘way of life’ and the ‘horizon of meaning’ 
whereby the actors base their shared understanding upon. 
Communicative actors always move within the horizon of their 
lifeworld (Habermas 1990). According to Lose (2001, 185), 
Habermas attributes to the lifeworld a contextual as well as a 
                                                          
4
 Habermas goes on to discuss the ‘uncoupling’ of social integration in the lifeworld and the system, 
but this is beyond the context of the thesis and adds little contribution to the subject at hand. The 
thesis employs the concept of the lifeworld, a culturally transmitted interpretive patterns consisting of 
a shared culture, a common system of norms and rules perceived as legitimate, and the social identity 
of actors, along with the concept of the artificial lifeworld that is not originally born within the group 
and thus must be created by external actors in order to extend the normative space for in-group actors 
to debate the validity claim of the norm in question. 
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constitutive function. Contextually, the lifeworld functions as an 
implicit horizon, a stock of understandings of the elements of 
reality. Constitutively, an acting agent is constituted by the 
structures of meaning embedded in the lifeworld, that is, in the 
acquired understandings that are the resource that one has to 
apply in order to conduct meaningful action, including speech acts. 
For some critics, the definition of lifeworld is still not clear-cut. 
Lifeworld is inherently subjective, leading Hardy (2014) to conclude 
that the use of conceptual term as a foundational piece of his 
theory weakens Harbermas’ own arguments. However, subjecting 
communicative action to interpretation which is rooted in the 
subjective nature of the lifeworld highlights the role of the 
researcher as the subjective interpreter along the critical 
constructivist line. It implies that changes can be made via 
argumentation. Habermas’ ‘social constructivist’ theory (Lose 2001, 
185) does not build on a utopian understanding of the agent as an 
altruistic person (unlike Wendt’s ‘collective identity’ discussed 
above in 2.4 where the ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ is blurred, leading to 
altruistic behaviour) who suppresses all needs and interests in the 
name of the common good. Habermas’ social constructivist 
dynamic rests on the assumption of an agent who has the ability to 
critically reflect on her own understandings of reality, interests, 
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preferences, and maxims of behaviour; to estimate the 
consequences for other actors should she decide to pursue her 
own interests; and to participate in a discourse with others 
regarding the interpretation of interests and norms for the 
coordination of behaviour and interaction (Benhabib 1992, 71-72; 
Baynes 1992, 5-6). The actors “will always have the reflective 
capacity to change intersubjective structures of understandings 
through a discourse in which validity claims can be raised” (Lose 
2001, 185). Thus, employing the concept of lifeworld both 
highlights the role and capacity of the actors studied as well as the 
researchers towards the potential change in a reflexive way. 
Common lifeworld enables actors to engage in meaningful way, 
through which they can reach constructed meaning of a contested 
norm. 
If we recognize the concept of lifeworld as implicit, background 
knowledge by which negotiators or actors rely upon in a setting, 
what will happen if that stock of knowledge in a particular 
community does not include some norms? What if some newer, 
internationally recognized, widely accepted norms are not 
originally found in the group’s ‘way of life’? What if the 
communication gets stuck and cannot go anywhere? This leads me 
to introduce the concept of the ‘artificial lifeworld’ popularized in 
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international relations by Harald Müller. Müller (1994) sparked the 
debate in German international relations realm by questioning 
rationalist bargaining. Artificial lifeworld is where another shared 
lifeworld must be created in order for the negotiation to continue. 
It has to be created if the existing lifeworld does not permit 
normative space for the ongoing debate. Müller (1994) raises an 
example where an artificial lifeworld emerged during the 
negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians in Oslo: “Whenever 
the conversation got stuck, negotiators sat on the floor and started 
playing with the Norwegian foreign minister’s four-year-old son, 
thus pledging symbolic allegiance to fundamental elements of a 
shared lifeworld (fatherhood, duties and care towards children, 
and the threat to private life if negotiations failed). Diplomacy is 
generally conducted in an artificial lifeworld, which provides a 
substantial background of shared rituals” (Müller 2007, 210). 
Actors facing a breakdown in cooperation strive to create artificial 
lifeworld features (Deitelhoff and Müller 2005, 173).  
What if the actors in the negotiation setting are unwilling or unable 
to create an artificial lifeworld? Non-state actors could come in to 
fill this void. Deitelhoff (2009) contends that where the shared 
lifeworld is ‘thin’, it is possible to increase the degree of lifeworld 
certainties, i.e. the level of mutual trust. Norm entrepreneurs such 
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as NGOs or epistemic communities have the power of 
manipulating the discursive setting in which negotiations take 
place. By opening up lifeworld connections and generating 
publicity, they support discursive interactions among states 
(Deitelhoff 2009, 43-5). The NGOs have to employ basic norms and 
principles that can serve as a universally accepted point of 
reference for new arguments. They have to appeal to human rights 
and human-centric norms which are already widely recognized in 
the international community. 
In the ASEAN context, especially during the drafting of the ASEAN 
Charter, it is argued that the negotiation setting is usually ‘closed’. 
The decision-making was mainly made by the delegates consulting 
with their policy-makers or leaders. The delegates met with the 
NGOs and the CSOs during the process of the drafting. Even though 
there is no obligation for the delegates to incorporate the NGOs 
and CSOs’ opinions into the Charter, the NGOs and CSOs consistent 
activities which have been going on since the previous decade 
within the region have created an artificial lifeworld whereby the 
officials could have normative space to debate human-centric 
norms. Its ‘power’ in influencing the discursive setting of the 
negotiation cannot simply be measured and discarded in a single 
meeting. Their collective efforts open up normative space where 
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the existing state-centric lifeworld does not permit before, creating 
an artificial lifeworld where the negotiation could go on. Where 
negotiation objectives can be related to basic human rights, 
notably protection against death and suffering, it is hard for 
opposing parties to withstand arguments of this kind (Deitelhoff 
and Müller 2005, 173). ASEAN used to be a very state-centric 
organization and did not incorporate human rights formally in any 
of their documents. A lot has changed after 1993 where ASEAN 
along with other states in Asia-Pacific had to consider human rights 
norm seriously during the Vienna Conference. The reluctance by 
the governments to embrace universality of human rights (it was 
not in their lifeworld – being human rights champion in all cases 
notwithstanding their ‘cultural and historical background’ was not 
their identity. It was not ‘who they are’ at that time) spurred the 
NGOs to issue their own Declaration emphasizing opposite 
viewpoint from the governments, that human rights must be 
recognized in whole. The norm is universal and indivisible. ASEAN 
in 2007 cannot simply ditch human centric norms (crafted as an 
artificial lifeworld by non-state actors over the years) and must 
reconsider its validity claims during the negotiation process. It 
might not be necessary if this artificial lifeworld does not exist, 
because it will be beyond their cognitive ‘horizon of meaning’. 
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Based on the critical constructivist framework, social facts depend 
on a constructed consensus about meaning. A norms validity claim 
actors debate within a shared lifeworld also derive meaning from 
that constructed consensus. Non-state actors, supplying an 
artificial lifeworld for the negotiations to draw upon in a 
communication, help proceed the talks regarding human-centric 
norms. The ASEAN Way as a shared lifeworld will be further 
discussed in 3.3 and the role of non-state actors in supplementing 
ASEAN with an artificial lifeworld will be discussed in 4.4 when we 
turn to the incorporation of human rights provisions into the 
ASEAN Charter. 
• actors have to recognize each other as equals and have equal 
access to the discourse. 
In this sense, relationships of power, force, and coercion are 
assumed to recede into the background when argumentative 
consensus is sought. In other words, the institutional setting 
should be as close as possible to the ideal speech situation in order 
to allow for communicative action. Habermas (1982) by no means 
insists that this “ideal speech” situation is a perfect, Utopian goal. 
It is used rather to highlight the imperfections of actual 
communication which may be distorted by power relations.  
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 These presuppositions; nonetheless, are useful in assessing the 
conditions conducive to the use of communicative action in a certain 
negotiation. They form the basis where actors can more easily enter into 
communicative action mode, but they do not always guarantee that actors 
will not also employ competitive arguing or rhetorical action. We still need to 
go back to the actors’ motivations: do they intend to change the other 
parties’ minds by convincing them of the factual/moral rightness of their 
arguments or do they aim only to persuade others of their own preferred 
course of action? 
2.62 Bargaining and strategic action    
Bargaining is characterized by demands, concessions, or rejections, 
which can additionally be linked to a threat or to reasons that are related to 
the subjective world (Panke 2006, 362). Bargaining actors assess the moves 
in negotiations based on utility functions, seeking to sustain their own 
interests. The communication is focused on reaching a point where the 
involved parties can agree, but includes no effort at changing the minds of 
the others about what they want or what they perceive to be right (Naurin 
2007, 561). Along this line, it is not surprising that bargaining is linked to the 
logic of expected consequences present in strategic action because interests 
are assumed to be fixed in a short term. Compromise is usually a result of 
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strategic bargaining, rendering the outcome the lowest common 
denominator among parties. 
It is possible to distinguish bargaining with reference to a cooperative 
and competitive form (Naurin 2007, 562). Cooperative bargaining is known in 
negotiation theory as integrative (or win-win) bargaining. This involves 
promises and solutions-seeking after comparing and mating actors’ 
preferences in an attempt to satisfy all participants. The goal of integrative 
bargaining is not to transform the existing preferences, but to clarify them to 
find a good compromise. On the other hand, actors who engage in 
competitive bargaining or distributive bargaining will try to pressure the 
other party to make concessions and comply with their demands. 
Competitive bargaining process involves manipulating information about the 
utilities and costs of policy alternatives and using threats (Naurin 2007, 563). 
It depends on strategic management of information which can cause distrust 
among actors, believing they receive incomplete or even wrong information. 
In communicative action, by contrast, actors need to trust one another, i.e. 
to believe that his or her intention is meant as it is expressed. This will 
directly affect the social environment where the negotiations take place: 
actors who favour the use of distributive bargaining will withhold important 
information and form allies within the setting while actors who see benefits 
in using integrative bargaining will be more willing to exchange the 
information.  
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The following table demonstrates types of arguing and bargaining and 
the modes of communication used to achieve different goals. 
Table 1 Types of arguing and bargaining  
Arguing Bargaining 
Deliberation Integrative Bargaining 
 
Problem: Disagreement over course of 
action due to partiality of views, differing 
frames of reference. 
 
 
Mode: Dialogue, elaborate each other’s  
view, explore each other’s understanding 
of empirical facts and normative 
principles. 
 
 
Goal: Common and better understanding 
of right course of action 
 
Problem: Disagreement over course 
of action, caused by conflicting wants 
(self-regarding, other-regarding or 
ideal-regarding). 
 
Mode: Clarify wants of other and 
self, searching for optimal 
compromise solution, trading via 
issue-linkages, log-rolling, “I Owe 
You”. 
 
Goal: To maximize own wants (via 
the want-satisfaction also of others). 
 
 
Rhetorical Action 
 
 
Distributive Bargaining 
Problem: Disagreement over course of 
action, caused by lack of info or other’s 
wrong belief.  
Problem: Disagreement over course 
of action, caused by conflicting wants 
(self-regarding, other-regarding or 
ideal-regarding 
 
Mode: Monologue, “rhetorical action”, 
plebiscitary reason 
 
Mode: Signaling commitments, 
pressuring via threats and demands, 
giving concessions. 
 
Goal: Persuade other of one’s preferred 
course of action 
 
Goal: To maximize own wants (at the 
cost of others). 
Source: Naurin, Daniel. 2007. Why give reason? Measuring arguing and bargaining 
in survey research. Swiss Political Science Review 13 (4): 559-75, p. 563. 
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2.63 Conceptual operationalisation: Norm codification and 
legitimization in multilateral negotiations 
The contested norms and practices can be legitimized or delegitimized 
through different types of arguing and bargaining as clarified above. Framing 
this in a critical constructivist framework, contested norms derive their 
meaning from the actors constituting them in a particular context. After the 
contestation process, a ‘legitimized’ norm and practice would be codified in 
the Charter while a ‘delegitimized’ one would not find its way into the text. 
This does not mean that all non-codified norms are delegitimized. They could 
remain in the background as tacit rules since they were not questioned. 
Exploring the types of communication through which norms were codified 
provides insights to how the key provisions of the Charter were formed. Is 
the provision regarding human rights body there because of the parties were 
convinced that it was a ‘right’ decision (cooperative arguing) or because it 
was imposed (competitive bargaining)? Is it there because of rhetorics 
(competitive arguing) or because it was an optimal compromise (cooperative 
bargaining) at that time? How has the communication evolved? The 
negotiating process can begin with rhetorical exchanges then evolve towards 
true reasoning (Risse 2000, 9). The mode of communication affects norm 
legitimization because a norm legitimized through cooperative arguing tends 
to be more enduring than other types. It is, after all, commonly accepted 
after careful consideration of all the views by those at stake which also 
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enhances its legitimacy. Furthermore, communicative action or cooperative 
arguing helps reproduce the lifeworld (Habermas 1990) which will remain 
parts of the actors’ shared understanding as well as how they define 
themselves and others. Norm true advocacy “should not rely on promises of 
rewards and benefits, not on shaming and arm-twisting (of bargaining mode) 
nor overtly or covertly coercion to ensure compliance” (Björkdahl 2006, 8). 
Indeed, “coercive approaches... do not lead to authentic socialization” 
(Björkdahl 2006, 9). Norm undergoing the contestation process where 
communicative action takes place, where the negotiators have a chance to 
collectively weigh and debate its validity claims without any use of threat or 
force induces true acceptance of the norm and thus bolsters its endurance. 
Preference shifts promoted by suasion should be more enduring than those 
promoted by incentives and strategic calculation. With the latter, newly 
adopted behaviours can be discarded once incentive structures change; with 
the former, they will show greater stickiness, as actors have begun to 
internalize new values (Checkel 2005, 813). Adoption of norms according to a 
logic of appropriateness is preferred to adoption according to a logic of 
consequentiality, even if the latter is expected to lead to the former 
(Jonasson 2013, 13). If actors in a negotiation perceive that the constructed 
meaning of the norm reached through consensus is produced collectively, 
with more or less equal participation, they are more apt to embrace the 
norm.  
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It is thus important to distinguish cooperative bargaining from 
cooperative arguing. A highly cooperative attitude from the parties does not 
in itself indicate whether they are arguing or bargaining (Naurin 2007, 564). 
In an institutional setting where consensus-seeking is commonplace such as 
ASEAN, it should not be confused with true arguing.  
We can also assess the social environment of the negotiation setting 
to conclude whether strategic or communicative action is currently at work. 
The first-, second-, and third-party contexts outlined earlier in this chapter 
come in useful. Normally, the Charter was negotiated in the third-party 
context where preexisting rules are applied to a given conflict and the parties 
adhere to the principle of equal standing. However, in the course of the 
negotiation, the first- and second-party context intermittently conditioned 
the negotiating outcomes: when some delegates tried to direct or command 
the meeting and exercise strategic behaviour where coercive moves were 
used. The second-party context can thus witness cooperative bargaining, 
rhetorical action, or distributive bargaining. Moreover, when there was 
unresolved disagreement, the Members willingly seek the second-party 
context (mandate or decisions from the Foreign Ministers) to authoritatively 
settle the controversy. This is quite unique to the setting in the drafting 
process. However, it also shows that negotiation in the third-party context 
already collapsed in that particular issue.   
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The more the institutional setting is close to the ideal pre-conditions 
outlined in 2.61; i.e. the non-hierarchical nature of the institutional setting, 
the more conducive the environment will be for the actors to engage in 
communicative action and achieve solution that is better than the lowest 
common denominator. At the end of the negotiation process, some actors 
may still preserve their initial position, not because no parties engage in 
arguing, but probably because arguing was not yet successful (at least in the 
short term). Since the use of arguing does not guarantee that other parties 
will become convinced of better arguments, operationalising guidelines are 
needed to test whether arguments will prevail.   
In testing whether arguments will prevail in a particular setting, Risse 
and Kleine (2009) put forward following propositions built on arguing and 
persuasion literature: 
1) Institutional settings that favour overlapping role identities are 
likely to increase uncertainty about appropriate behaviour and other actors’ 
preferences and, thus, the likelihood that arguing leads to persuasion. In 
situations where different rules overlap, actors may be uncertain about their 
appropriate behaviour. As a consequence, their counterparts cannot be sure 
about the preferences of their negotiating partners, and do not know which 
incentives or threats to make in a bargaining situation. This should induce 
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arguing to clarify the doubt. They will also likely to be open to persuasion due 
to uncertainty about their role identities.    
2a) A transparent negotiation setting is conducive to persuasion, the 
more actors are uncertain about the preferences of their audiences whose 
consent is required. The more the consent of the audience is required, or the 
less certain speakers are about the preferences of their audiences, the more 
norms can affect their derived preferences. Thus, the more public the 
negotiation is, the more careful the speakers have to be regarding the 
content (preferably impartial, consistent, and plausible) for fear of damage to 
their credibility.  
2b) Negotiations “behind closed doors” are conducive to persuasion, 
the more actors know the preferences of their audiences whose consent is 
required. Once speakers know the preferences of their audience whose 
consent is required, they do not need to argue, but can employ rhetorical 
devices to sway their audience. Under these conditions (of a principal-agent 
relationship), secrecy and negotiating behind closed doors might be the only 
way toward problem-solving, since it enables speakers to argue “out of the 
box” and to work toward a reasoned consensus without having to fear that 
some principal in the audience might accuse him/her of “betraying the 
national interest.” 
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3a) The more the institutional norms and procedures privilege 
authority based on expertise and/or moral competence, the more arguing is 
likely to lead to persuasion and  
3b) The more institutional norms and procedures require neutral chairs 
of negotiations in centralized settings, the more leadership is conducive to the 
prevalence of arguing. Honest brokers, who are considered trustworthy by 
the opposing sides and who can acquire authority to suggest innovative 
solutions, can shift negotiations toward a problem-solving mode. 
Trustworthiness and authority are not only a matter of individual personality 
solely; they are the result of a specific institutional context that privileges and 
legitimates negotiating authority and leadership. If coupling with 
corresponding personal quality, it will further facilitate arguing oriented to 
understanding. In other words, the “honest broker” or chair acts as the third 
party to whom negotiators refer the matters.   
Employing the above-mentioned propositions, we can analyse further 
how the setting of the negotiation influences the use of arguing. Deciding the 
prevailing mode of social decision procedures in drafting each key provision 
against the backdrop of the institutional setting should illuminate how the 
norm in question was perceived by different negotiators and how willingly it 
was incorporated into the Charter. It can be argued that the fact that the 
norm is codified in written form should be the proof of its relevancy; 
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however, it could be the case that some norms are vigorously debated using 
arguing mode while some norms are imposed or traded off by bargaining. 
The different path of how norms found their way into the Charter should 
suggest the strength and level of legitimacy. For instance, if it is achieved 
through arguing, it is likely that that the norm will sustain its appropriateness 
and normally will be less exposed to future contestation since it is approved 
on the basis of its merits or moral rightness. The meaning of the norm is 
intersubjectively constituted by the actors along the critical constructivist 
framework, deeming it ‘right’ or ‘good’. In this way, situations where 
submitting to the better argument is required and how particular outcomes 
on agreements about legitimate norms are achieved can be traced to assess 
whether they are the best solutions agreed by the parties. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 This chapter attempts to lay out an analytical framework for studying 
norm codification in ASEAN that culminated in the ASEAN Charter. It explores 
how rationalists and constructivists treat the question of how norms affects 
actors’ decisions, then grounds the thesis in a critical strand of social 
constructivism by problematizing the power relations among involved parties. 
Because the making of the ASEAN Charter is essentially law-making, the 
chapter explores why there is a need to formulate hard laws or transform 
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tacit rules into explicit ones. This is linked to the degree of norm robustness. 
If the norm is clear, around for a long time despite challenges and widely 
accepted, there is less need to formulate a written code. The thesis is also 
informed by Acharya’s constitutive localization in explaining the actors’ 
active role in conditioning the norms based on their cognitive prior. This will 
be explored further in the next chapters in order to provide the backdrop of 
the normative context prior to the drafting of the ASEAN Charter.   
Distinguishing the modes of social decision procedures which actors 
employed to decide on norm validity in each key provision is crucial to the 
understanding of the development of ASEAN norms during the process 
leading to the Charter final outcome. Only then can we fully understand how 
a contested norm was legitimized or delegitimized through the negotiation, 
and whether the norm validity claim was accepted through the use of 
argumentation, rhetorics, force, or trade-off. Since the negotiation took place 
within an institutional context, the institutional norms and procedures are 
also important to the prevalence of arguing. Based on the common 
normative framework or, in Habermasian terms, the shared ‘lifeworld’ 
namely the core norms in the ASEAN Way, a problematic part of the lifeworld 
(questioned by community members) constituting the problematic validity 
claim is evaluated. Actors aiming to settle the problem whether it is due to 
conflicting frames of reference or conflicting wants can engage in arguing or 
bargaining. Arguing is key to the theory of communicative action and is on 
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the opposite end of strategic bargaining. However, it is necessary to further 
distinguish arguing and bargaining into cooperative arguing/bargaining and 
competitive arguing/bargaining in order not to confuse cooperative gesture 
without transforming preferences with arguing which aims to convince 
another party. Cooperative bargaining suggests that the outcome is a 
compromise based on preferences of involved parties while competitive 
bargaining entailing coercion and threats indicates that the norms in 
question were imposed and may remain problematic.  
The next chapter will deal with ASEAN historical background, setting it 
up as a social environment where the negotiation took place. It will explore 
the traditional diplomatic norms of ASEAN – the ASEAN Way – as a shared 
lifeworld which provides a common normative framework for members to 
evaluate raised validity claims.   
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Chapter 3 
ASEAN’s ‘lifeworld’: Exploring core norms in the ASEAN Way 
3.1 Introduction 
 This chapter aims to provide the background to the social and 
normative context in which the ASEAN Charter was negotiated. The 
negotiation which re-evaluated the relevancy of governing norms and 
practices in ASEAN did not take place in the normative vacuum. Rather, the 
actors share a culturally transmitted interpretative pattern providing them 
with a stock of norms and rules they can refer to when seeking agreement 
about problematic issues. As discussed in Chapter 2, this is known as a 
‘lifeworld’. Over the time, norms can be questioned due to their perceived 
ineffectiveness in providing solutions, or because of their weakened 
legitimacy. The efforts to reaffirm the norms which are already under heavy 
criticism might weaken the norms even further by revealing the lack of 
integrity, or result in the norm legitimization and codification if the norm in 
question is rather robust in the process of development. The social context 
also exerts influence on the lifeworld. ASEAN formation as well as its 
predecessive regional set-ups will be discussed since the development of the 
institution is also linked to how the lifeworld has evolved.  
 In ASEAN, the shared lifeworld is usually referred to as the ‘ASEAN 
Way’, a term favoured by both policy-makers and interested academics. The 
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core norms and practices of the ASEAN Way were contested during the 
drafting process, and the codification was a result of arguing and bargaining 
in many levels to reach better solutions or compromises. As a matter of fact, 
the norms have been questioned by other member countries prior to the 
drafting of the Charter through a number of events. Therefore, the chapter 
will also trace the main contestations of some of the core norms before the 
members countries embarked on the road towards the ASEAN Charter in 
order to provide a complete picture of the normative context the drafting 
panel found themselves in at the beginning of 2007.  
 
3.2 ASEAN as a social setting5 
As discussed in Chapter 2, actors refer to structures of norms 
embedded in an institution which offer shared background understandings, 
reference arguments and procedural mechanisms allowing for normative co-
ordination action plans. It is then useful to briefly trace the development of 
regional cooperation in Southeast Asia up to ASEAN in order to understand 
the current institutional setting where the normative contestation of a part 
of the lifeworld took place. Looking at regional organizations prior to ASEAN 
can also shed light to how the governing norms were developed at the same 
                                                          
5
 This section benefits partly from Chapter 2 in Kasira Cheeppensook, ‘The ASEAN Way on Human 
Security’, MPhil thesis in International Relations, University of Cambridge, 2006. 
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time as the institutions. This will provide a ‘social reality’ in a constructivist 
sense, setting the stage for the drafters when they began their work in 2007.  
3.21 The Great Power brainchild: SEATO and its demise, 1954-1977 
In the wake of the Cold War, collective defense was the US main 
strategy to contain communism since the UN-based collective security 
system became stagnant as a result of the Soviet veto. The brain behind 
collective defense framework was John Foster Dulles, who relentlessly 
argued for an Asian collective defense organization, with the US interests in 
the region in mind even before he became the US Secretary of State under 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower. He notes in Foreign Affairs journal article, 
“it is in Asia that Russian imperialism finds its most powerful expression” and 
“considerations of justice and morality… call for the creation in the Pacific 
area of a more adequate security system” (Dulles 1952, 186-187). 
The idea of regional collective defense pacts was predictably met with 
suspicion from some Asian leaders who shared long and enduring 
experiences of struggle for independence, resulting in a strong sense of anti-
colonialism. It was also at odds with “non-alignment” policy popular in post-
World War II era. Prior to the signing of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense 
Treaty at Manila in September 1954 to create the Southeast Asia Treaty 
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Organization – SEATO, the growing crisis in Indochina6 brought the leaders 
from five Asian countries (India, Pakistan, Burma, Indonesia, and Ceylon) 
together in a group that came to be known as the Colombo Powers7. The 
group made non-intervention the basis of its response to the Indochina crisis 
(Acharya 2009b, 37), in contrast to the US approach in its involvement with 
the crisis. It should not come as a surprise that the group viewed the US 
proposal to create a regional collective defense system as a form of 
intervention and remained deeply skeptical. At the Manila Conference there 
was some clash of opinion on how the purpose of the proposed body should 
be officially proclaimed. The United States wanted to limit it to resistance 
against communist aggression, while the United Kingdom and some other 
countries thought it would be more politic to refer to aggression in general 
terms, since this might make SEATO less unpalatable to the Colombo powers. 
The United States then agreed to refer to aggression in general terms in the 
body of the Treaty, but announced its “Understanding” that its own military 
obligations were limited to the resistance of communist aggression (Ball 1958, 
17).  
The crisis in Indochina led to the negotiations between France and the 
Viet Minh in Geneva in the same month. In July 1954, the Geneva Accords 
                                                          
6
 The first Indochina war between the French (and supported by the Vietnamese National Army) and 
the Viet Minh was entering the last stage. After the Second World War, France reoccupied Indochina 
and met with Viet Minh rebellion. It escalated into a conventional war at the beginning of 1950s with 
the French campaigning it as a war against communism. The US supported the French forces while 
the Soviet Union supported the opposite side.  
7
 The group held its first meeting in April 1954 in Colombo, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka). 
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dividing Vietnam at the 17th parallel, in addition to the ceasefire agreements, 
were signed. The Northern part of Vietnam was designated to be governed 
by the Viet Minh while the Southern part was to be governed by the French 
and US-supported State of Vietnam. John Foster Dulles who was at the 
meeting did not sign the Accords, feeling that it gave too much power to the 
communists, and instead set out to work on the Asia-Pacific collective 
defense pact against communism. 
SEATO held its first meeting in Bangkok, February 1955. Only two 
Southeast Asian countries, Thailand (at that time known as Siam) and the 
Philippines, joined. Both were steadfast allies of the US. Other members 
apart from the US were Pakistan, Australia, New Zealand, the UK, and France. 
The British actually recognized that in order to stabilize and ensure the future 
of this new cooperation, the involvement from other members in the 
Colombo Powers was crucial (Olver 1956; Lowe 2009). However, the 
remaining powers were not convinced. Indonesia and Burma saw it as a 
compromise to the principle of non-alignment and also feared of great power 
domination (Penders 1979). Ceylon sided firmly with India whose Prime 
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru disapproved NATO to which SEATO was expected 
to perform similar functions. The SEATO Treaty is considered the Asiatic 
counterpart to the North Atlantic Treaty. Article 4(I) of the SEATO Treaty 
commits the state parties to take measures in accordance with their 
respective constitutional processes in the case of an aggression by means of 
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armed attack against one of the other state parties. Unlike Article 5 of the 
NATO Treaty; however, the parties to the treaty do not consider an attack as 
an attack directed against them all, but as endangering the ‘peace and safety’ 
of the other parties (Meiertöns 2010, 118). 
SEATO was never a full-fledged military pact and was far from a 
collective defense organization like NATO (Buszynski 1983; Severino 2006). It 
was stagnant by the practice of unanimity and only required the members to 
act according to one’s constitutional procedures. Thus, an attack on one was 
not deemed necessarily an attack on all. No members ever sought help from 
the organization except Thailand who wanted support in containing 
communism in Laos. The US indeed deployed military forces in Thailand to 
that end albeit limitedly, but this can be argued to be the fruits from the 
obligations in the bilateral agreement – the Thanat-Rusk Joint Communiqué 
signed by the US Secretary of State and Thailand’s Foreign Minister in 1962 
to reduce the stagnancy from consensus-seeking practice in SEATO – rather 
than from the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. Pakistan withdrew 
from the organization in 1968. When Nixon visited China in 1972, it seemed 
that there was no point in maintaining SEATO with its anti-communist front. 
France refused to contribute any more financial aid by 1975. Finally, Thailand 
and the Philippines agreed in 1975 for SEATO to cease its operation. SEATO 
formally came to an end in 1977. 
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There are several different attempts to explain the demise of SEATO. 
From a realist perspective, the lack of commitment in maintaining the 
organization by the hegemon – the US – triggers the organization’s 
premature death. There was also no commonly accepted regional hegemon 
at that time to whom the US could successfully delegate the leadership to 
further maintain the organization. The cause can also be from the power 
differentials between the US and its Asian allies. Seeing that the Asian 
members had so little to offer in terms of material resources, there was no 
point to employ multilateralism in Asia-Pacific (Crone 1993). If the interests 
of the hegemon change (as when the US leader finally visited China), the 
cooperation might as well collapse. Some attribute the SEATO demise to the 
conflict of interests within the region and the lack of overwhelming and 
clearly defined threat to all members (Sneider and Borthwick 1983). The 
Liberals tend to blame the overly politicization of the cooperation which 
renders it weak and unsuccessful (Schubert 1978).  
On the other hand, Hemmer and Katzenstein (2002) provides a 
constructivist account of why there is “no NATO in Asia”. It is because of the 
perception of the US towards its Asian allies as inferior and the lack of 
strongly shared identity comparing to the European allies.  However, all of 
the explanations above tend to undermine the active role of local actors in 
selecting the competing norms: collective defense and non-intervention. The 
exclusion of the Philippines and Thailand from earlier Anglo-American 
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deliberations over collective defence, the subsequent failure of Western 
powers to secure wider Aian participation in the alliance, and the evident 
conflict between the sense of Asian identity fostered by Bandung and the 
nature of SEATO as an outsiders’ project weakened the alliance from its very 
perception and strengthened its alternative: a subsidiary norm against 
collective defence pacts (Acharya 2014). As Acharya (2009b) argues, there 
was a strong normative opposition to the idea of an Asian regional defense 
organization from the influential section of Asian leaders. Collective defense 
means weakened authority on security issues for them, a return to colonial 
era where sovereign equality was imperceptible. Their perceptions 
undermined the legitimacy of collective security while non-interference and 
non-intervention was promoted. There was virtually no norm contestation on 
the principle of non-interference and non-intervention at that time. The 
persistent rejection of the organization prevented a meaningful participation 
from most of the Asian countries until the only two countries from within 
Southeast Asia had to announce the end of this regional cooperation. The US 
then had no choice but to let its brainchild wither and die. SEATO – an 
organization formed primarily to deal with security issues in a particular 
region –  needed support from powers within the region to survive. However, 
the institution failed because it could not garner blessing from prospective 
members who disapproved of the norms embedded within the structure of 
the said cooperation.  
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3.22 The ASEAN ‘in-betweens’: ASA, ASPAC and MAPHILINDO, 1961-
1967 
 By the beginning of the 1960s, it was quite clear that the norms of 
sovereign equality and non-intervention have been established firmly in the 
region alongside the growing ineffectiveness of SEATO. Malaya, the 
Philippines, and Thailand decided to form the Association of Southeast Asia 
(ASA) in July 1961. To avoid the complications from having another security 
organization in the region, ASA stressed economic prosperity as a way 
towards regional stability. For the first time, the cooperation was confined to 
Southeast Asian states and was created by a regional initiative. ASA was not 
successful in bringing in more members from within the region since it was 
viewed by other countries, Indonesia in particular, as an attempt by the 
SEATO states to link themselves to the non-SEATO states to oppose China 
(Narine 2002). In the following year it collapsed over the Philippines’ claim to 
the former British colony of North Borneo (Sabah), which had opted to join 
the Malaysia Federation, and also because of the Indonesian confrontation 
(Konfrontasi) with Malaya (Palmer 1992). Because of the rift between 
members as well as the tension with Indonesia, ASA remained dormant and 
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continued to exist only in name until 1966 (Tarling 1992). Nonetheless, its 
founding rationale of political stability through economic prosperity (initially 
to counter communism), as well as other stated objectives of cooperation in 
cultural, scientific and administrative fields, were carried forward to 
succeeding cooperative efforts. ASA had minimal institutional structure and 
demanded very little from its members in terms of obligations. This legacy 
was also present in Southeast Asia’s later regional cooperative efforts. ASPAC 
(created 1966), which was composed of members from East and Southeast 
Asia as well as Australia, lasted only seven years. 
 Almost at the same time of the interruption of ASA, the Philippines 
was developing proposals for a ‘Greater Malay Confederation’, later dubbed 
‘MAPHILINDO’ which is an acronym for three proposed member countries – 
Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia. The Macapagal plan was discussed at 
a foreign ministers’ meeting of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines in 
June 1963, and the Manila Accord stipulating that the first summit be held by 
the end of July was adopted (Hamanaka 2010, 34). Established to settle the 
differences of those three countries over the legitimacy and territorial 
boundaries of Malaysia, MAPHILINDO was a diplomatic device which did not 
display any institutional form. Although it was expected to develop as a full-
scale regional organization in Southeast Asia (Hamanaka 2010, 35), its 
function was limited and temporary. Unlike ASA, MAPHILINDO was an 
experiment in conflict resolution (Dreisbach 2004, 251). Both Indonesia and 
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the Philippines considered MAPHILINDO as a potential device to increase 
their influence in the region. In contrast to ASA, MAPHILINDO drew from 
more obvious ethnonationalist ideas of region but proved even less able to 
manage the centrifugal forces and rivalries pulling states apart (Ba 2009a, 47). 
After MAPHILINDO foundered with the formation of Malaysia on 16 
September 1963 and Indonesia and the Philippines both refused to recognize 
the legitimacy of the new state, there was no attempt to restore the 
organization. While Kuala Lumpur joined MAPHILINDO in the hopes of 
gaining the others’ acceptance of the Federation of Malaysia; Jakarta and 
Manila conceived MAPHILINDO to preempt the federation. The political 
tension also caused a stalemate in ASA which lasted for about three years 
(Dreisbach 2004, 251). The norms carried over from the demise of SEATO, 
namely non-intervention, prevailed during several attempts from within the 
region to create a regional organization.  
3.23 Lessons learned?: ASEAN, 1967- 
 ASA was temporarily revived in 1966 after the improvement of 
relations between Indonesia and Malaysia after Sukarno lost power and 
Konfrontasi ended. The Philippines’ claim to Sabah also subsided since the 
election of President Marcos. The resolution of most of the major disputes by 
the end of 1966 offered the opportunity for a sounder basis of regional 
cooperation through the establishment of a new and more broadly based 
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grouping. (Irvine 1982, 11) Indonesia under Suharto then wished to be a part 
of the region’s cooperative arrangements, but the organization should ideally 
be the one that Indonesia had a role in creating. An initial proposal by 
Thailand for a ‘South-East Asia Association for Regional Co-operation’ 
(SEAARC) was withdrawn in favour of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations or ASEAN, a term devised by Adam Malik, Indonesia’s Foreign 
Minister at that time. Moreover, SEAARC was seen as a criticism to the 
security cooperation between many countries in the region with the big 
powers. Therefore, the proposal could not be accepted by a number of 
countries that favored such relationships.  
Apart from the end of Konfrontasi and a more harmonious attitude 
from Jakarta under General Suharto’s New Order, the formation of ASEAN 
was also facilitated by the restoration of diplomatic relations between the 
Philippines and Malaysia. Although the conflict was not entirely settled, 
Manila agreed not to raise the Sabah issue at future ASEAN meetings. This 
constituted a standard that bilateral disputes should not involve the 
Association (Haacke 2005a, 47). When the issues are not brought up to the 
ASEAN level, countries who want to pass advice or criticism to the conflicting 
parties must do so discretely (and informally) in a form of quiet diplomacy. 
According to Ba (2009a, 48), three factors are critical to explaining the 
emergence of ASEAN in the face of strong centrifugal forces: 1) a window of 
opportunity created by domestic and international developments; 2) a group 
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of transnational elites and advocates committed to an alternative vision of 
regional order; and 3) the ways that new regional ideas were defined in 
relation to established nationalist ones. These three factors worked together 
to create a condition where a more inclusive organization was possible, 
especially the last one, albeit we have to note that the nationalist sentiment 
has been upholding strong sense of state sovereignty as well as the principle 
of non-intervention. Nonetheless, resilience was broadened to a regional 
scale. Fighting between states simply provided opportunities for external 
powers to interfere into, and project their own agendas onto, the politics of 
Southeast Asia, or to manipulate one neighbor against the other (Ba 2009a, 
56). It was best for members in the region to minimize border disputes which 
in turn provided stability for them to focus on domestic economic 
development. 
The 1967 ASEAN Declaration (also known as Bangkok Declaration) 
leaves open the membership for all states in Southeast Asia to join, given 
that they accept ASEAN’s purposes (see Appendix A). Apart from reinstating 
the aim to promote economic, social and cultural cooperation which was 
carried forward from ASA (Leifer 1989), this inaugural declaration explicitly 
codifies the norm of sovereign equality, non-recourse to the use of force and 
peaceful settlement of conflict as well as non-interference and non-
intervention: 
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Desiring to… promote regional cooperation in South-East Asia in the 
spirit of equality and partnership…;  
Considering that the countries of Southeast Asia share a primary 
responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability of 
the region and ensuring their peaceful and progressive national 
development, and that they are determined to ensure their stability 
and security from external interference in any form or 
manifestation…;  
Affirming that all foreign bases are temporary and remain only with 
the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned and are not 
intend ed to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national 
independence and freedom of States in the area or prejudice the 
orderly processes of their national development;   
 
It is clear from the wording that the “founding fathers”, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines emphasized non-
interference and non-intervention to avoid SEATO-like illegitimacy as well as 
to prevent the collapse over internal rivalry like ASA. The founding fathers 
made clear from the beginning that ASEAN was not formed to be any military 
defense pact. According to Khoman (n.d.) who was Thailand’s Foreign 
Minister at that time,  
Attempts were made by some to launch us on the path of forming a 
military alliance. We resisted; wisely and correctly we stuck to our 
resolve to exclude military entanglement and remain safely on 
economic ground.  
 
To ensure the longevity of the organization, the lessons from the 
demise of both ASA and MAPHILINDO such as the significance of intra-
regional conflict containment and wider participation from other countries in 
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the Southeast Asian region were also taken into account. The norm of non-
interference and non-intervention is bolstered further by Zone of Peace, 
Freedom and Neutrality Declaration (ZOPFAN) signed in Malaysia in 1971. 
ZOPFAN recognizes “the right of every state, large or small, to lead its 
national existence free from outside interference in its internal affairs as this 
interference will adversely affect its freedom, independence and integrity”. 
The ZOPFAN takes after the governing norms made universal by the UN “in 
particular… the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of all states, abstention from threat or use of force, peaceful 
settlement of international disputes, equal rights and self-determination and 
non-interference in affairs of States”. By the 1970s, a group of collectively 
shared norms originated from shared experiences bolstered by the UN 
Charter have taken a firm ground among ASEAN leaders, providing them with 
a normative background from which they can draw when conducting 
interstate relations. This normative terrain continued largely uncontested 
until the 1990s where some of the validity claims were questioned. This will 
be discussed further in 3.4.  
 
3.3 The ASEAN Way as a shared ‘lifeworld’ 
Insofar as lifeworld is used to mean a culturally transmitted 
interpretive patterns consisting of a shared culture and a common system of 
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norms and rules perceived as legitimate whereby actors can operate under a 
common context, it was often assumed that international politics lack a 
shared lifeworld due to the anarchic nature of the system. However, 
negotiators engaging in international law-making often operate under the 
same frame of reference, mostly drawn from the institutional setting. Even 
when facing a breakdown in co-operation, they strive to create artificial 
lifeworld to resume the work (Deitelhoff and Müller 2005). In the case where 
actors are members of the same international institution, the shared 
lifeworld is even more perceptible and there is less need for artificial 
lifeworld to be constructed by themselves since institutions also generate 
shared experiences, understandings and reference arguments. Negotiators 
thus share a set of common norms and decision-making procedures to 
facilitate the decision-making process.    
In ASEAN, a shared normative terrain forming a common lifeworld was 
known collectively as ‘the ASEAN Way’. As discussed in Chapter 2, lifeworld 
goes beyond just a set of norms. The ASEAN Way is how ASEAN leaders, 
negotiators, officials, tend to define themselves, use as guideline in the 
meeting or when faced with problems. It is how they still would like to 
perceive themselves as well as others. Their expectations in the meetings lie 
mainly within this framework. In ASEAN diplomacy, actors more or less 
operate in the same lifeworld, manifesting in what could be called a 
diplomatic and security culture – the ASEAN Way. The officials tend to 
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reiterate this understanding (the aspect of cultural reproduction) and 
socialize one another through this pattern of behaviour (they are in the same 
society). In so far that the ASEAN Way is intra-mural, ASEAN actors share 
intersubjective meaning and understanding when they act in ASEAN forum 
and do not extend the lifeworld elsewhere. Ba (2009b, 44) sees that ‘ASEAN 
states do not view themselves and China as existing in the same “lifeworld”’. 
Maier-Knapp (2010, 97) also concludes that a lack of, or a mere rudimentary 
existence of a common lifeworld impedes deeper interaction between the 
ASEAN and the EU. In order to negotiate, actors might have to consciously 
construct the lifeworld.8 
Conceptualizing the ASEAN Way as ASEAN’s overarching common 
lifeworld provides an insightful framework in to why ASEAN officials usually 
refer back to the term when justifying actions or tackling problems. When 
communicating, the actors make truth or validity claims and refer to the 
common lifeworld as their source of justification (see also Maier-Knapp 
2010). ASEAN actors fall back on the shared understanding when they 
negotiate. ASEAN members ‘managed their conflicts… through a process of 
elite socialization around this set of shared ASEAN norms’ (Acharya 2005, 
107). These norms have constitutive effects by transforming over time and 
through repeated interactions the way ASEAN states (or their ruling elites) 
                                                          
8
 Risse (2000) does not distinguish the efforts where actors have to consciously construct the 
lifeworld anew, but this is where Deitelhoff and Müller (2005) sees as ‘artificial’. Artificial lifeworld 
has to be constructed where it does not yet exist in order for the negotiation to go on. 
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see themselves – their identity – as members of a regional grouping sharing a 
common lifeworld and fate (Ba 2005).     
Having no agreed upon or ‘official’ definition does not prevent the 
ASEAN Way from being used widely among policy-makers and academics. 
Practitioners tend to treat the ASEAN Way as a distinct decision-making 
procedure to provide solutions for problems within the region. It is perceived 
as a useful tool to ensure agreement and maintain harmony among actors. 
The leaders often use the term to signify regional solidarity by emphasizing a 
different process of intra-mural interaction when comparing to the one in 
other, especially Western, multilateral settings. In his interview, former 
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad (1997) has described the 
ASEAN Way as a “winning formula” which “more than anything else has held 
ASEAN together”. His minister of foreign affairs went further when he stated 
that ‘in fact, through the ASEAN way there are no problems or challenges 
that we in ASEAN cannot deal with.’ (Badawi 1998). The leaders usually 
perceive the ASEAN Way as behavioural guidelines or practices when 
conducting interstate relations. As former Singaporean Foreign Minister S. 
Jayakumar (1998) put it, the ASEAN Way ‘stresses informality, organizational 
minimalism, inclusiveness, intensive consultations leading to consensus…’.   
The way in which the academic literature captures the ASEAN Way 
ranges from regional conflict management (Busse 1999; Caballero-Anthony 
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2005; Goh 2003; Hoang 1996) to collective identity in-the-making (Acharya 
2009a; Rüland 2000). Scholarly attempts in defining the ASEAN Way are 
diverse and often result in overly itemizing what should be included in the 
ASEAN Way. For instance, Soesastro (1995) sees that the ASEAN Way is 
consisted of twelve principles9. Acharya (2009b, 79) attributes the ASEAN 
Way to how Asian leaders have behaved in various conferences (such as the 
Bandung Conference) since before the ASEAN was established. He lists 
informality, preference for consensus over majority voting, avoidance of 
legalistic procedures, preference for non-binding resolutions, among other 
traits, as how the ASEAN Way came to be known.  
The problem lies in the non-differentiation of widely accepted 
practices (or procedural norms) from the core norms. As Haacke (2005a) 
proposes, ASEAN’s diplomatic and security culture comprises six core norms: 
1) sovereign equality; 
2) non-recourse to the use of force and the peaceful settlement of 
conflict; 
3) non-interference and non-intervention; 
                                                          
9
 These are 1) the principle of co-operative peace; 2) the principle of seeking agreement and 
harmony; 3) the principle of respect for territorial integrity; 4) the principle on non-interference in the 
domestic affairs of member states; 5) the principle of egalitarianism; 6) the principle of decision-
making by consensus; 7) the principle of sensitivity, politeness, non-confrontation and agreeability; 8) 
the principle of mutual caring; 9) the principle of quiet, private and elitist diplomacy versus public 
washing of dirty linen and diplomacy through the media; 10) the principle of solidarity; 11) the 
principle of being non-Cartesian, non-legalistic and concentrating on process and content; and 12) the 
principle of pragmatism. 
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4) non-involvement of ASEAN to address unresolved bilateral conflict 
between members 
5) quiet diplomacy; and 
6) mutual respect and tolerance. 
Other practices often included as elements of the ASEAN Way are 
actually generated from one or more of these core norms. For example, 
consultation and consensus-seeking is derived from sovereign equality and 
mutual respect in decision-making process. Minimal institutionalism and the 
preference for non-binding instruments are also an expression of strong 
adherence to non-interference and non-intervention as well as non-
involvement of ASEAN to address unresolved bilateral conflict between 
members. Non-confrontational attitude – that members often agree to 
disagree while allowing others to ‘save face’ during a negotiation – is a result 
of quiet diplomacy, mutual respect and tolerance. These core norms and the 
practices derived from them form a common context where actors draw 
shared frame of reference when trying to solve problematic issues.  
The six core norms and the practices derived from them will be 
treated as a ‘social reality’, constructed collectively and therefore derived its 
intersubjective meaning from actors’ interaction along the critical 
constructivist framework, which then the change proposed by the ASEAN 
Charter will be set against. The focus of the thesis is not to construct a 
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detailed account of how these norms came about to be the common 
lifeworld, but to study how the problematic parts of the lifeworld needed to 
be re-evaluated and codified in the form of the ASEAN Charter. The 
contested validity claim essentially points to a problematic part of the 
lifeworld. The contestations of the validity claims and how the negotiators 
chose to resolve conflicts through competitive/cooperative 
arguing/bargaining will be examined through the following chapters dealing 
with the enhanced peaceful dispute settlement mechanism and the 
establishment of human rights mechanism. The problem of increasingly 
conflicting frame of reference allowed for re-assessment which norms are 
still relevant, and the ASEAN Charter formulated them. 
It is useful here to outline how each core norm has been understood 
prior to the contestation during the process of the Charter drafting. It must 
also be noted that the core norms in the ASEAN Way are perceived in the 
region (and thus defined) as ideal types to which states strive to adhere. This 
does not mean that they are unchallenged or that norm deviant behaviour 
does not occur as will be addressed in the next section.  
3.31 Sovereign equality 
This means that all states are equal in law despite their differences in 
other respects such as size, wealth, or population strength. The states (and 
their national delegates) are equal regarding their rights and will not be 
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prevented from having a say in matters concerning them. In any negotiation, 
it is presumed that national delegates should have equal access to 
information and should be treated by one another as equals.  
3.32 Non-recourse to the use of force and peaceful settlement of 
conflict 
One of the ASEAN’s main aims is to reduce intra-regional conflict so 
that the member countries could focus on the economic development. It 
thus reinforces the norms made universal by the UN to prohibit the threat or 
use of force to claim territories and to settle the disputes peacefully. It even 
establishes an institutional mechanism in the 1976 Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation (TAC) to facilitate the settlement of disputes, although the 
members prefer to solve the problems between themselves without invoking 
the institutional mechanism.    
3.33 Non-interference and non-intervention 
This norm is cardinal to modern diplomacy and was made universal by 
the UN. It forbids intervention in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of 
the states. The member countries refrain from criticizing the actions of one 
another and from supporting any destabilising activities. At the time Asian 
countries were not very much involved with the process of drafting the UN 
Charter and paid more attention to other agendas such as self-determination 
127 
 
and equality. Nonetheless, they ratified the Charter soon afterwards10. By the 
time ASEAN was established, any lingering so-called ‘Pan-Asian’ sentiment 
was replaced by the principle of non-intervention reinforced by strong desire 
to resist domination from outside powers (Acharya 2009b).   
3.34 Non-involvement of ASEAN to address unresolved bilateral 
conflict between members 
ASEAN members prefer to solve their disputes between themselves 
without any meddling from outside. That the mechanism for the pacific 
settlement of disputes outlined in the TAC which basically authorizes the 
High Council composed of ministerial level representatives from each 
member states to recommend appropriate means of settlement of disputes 
has never been invoked should illustrate this point. Moreover, there has 
never been any concrete regional legal instrument such as the Court to solve 
disputes that are political in nature.  
3.35 Quiet diplomacy 
This core norm is used to signify private conduct of diplomacy and the 
emphasis on confidentiality which in many cases allows ASEAN members to 
                                                          
10
 Most of the countries in Southeast Asia became members of the UN soon after the organization 
was established with the Philippines as early as 1945. Thailand followed suit in 1946. Over the 
following decades the remaining Southeast Asian countries subscribed to the UN Charter and its 
obligations with Brunei Darussalam joining in 1984, the same year as it joined ASEAN. In other 
words, most countries became UN members before they joined ASEAN. The founding fathers who 
found reciprocations in the UN Charter with their former adherence to a number of norms namely 
non-interference and non-intervention then further codified them in the inaugural Declaration which 
every country wanting to join the Association must accept.  
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evade resentful confrontation regarding conflicting polices. Comments are 
preferable through selected alleys and should be kept informal or done in 
informal venues. Members normally refrain from collectively making 
judgments on the domestic affairs of member states or their bilateral 
disputes. Some scholars actually use the term to mean intergovernmental or 
“third-party” engagement distinct from the traditional diplomacy of an 
interested party or Government to ensure impartiality in dispute settlement 
(Collins and Packer 2006), but this is certainly not in mind of the leaders 
when they conduct private diplomacy since it also conflicts with another core 
norm: non-involvement of ASEAN to address unresolved bilateral conflict 
between members.     
3.36 Mutual respect and tolerance  
This is essentially linked with ASEAN negotiation cultures (Antolik 
1990; Ba 2009a; Koh, Manolo, and Woon 2009; Severino 2006; Thambipillai 
and Saravanamuttu 1985). ASEAN is more familiar with the “high context” 
negotiating style. Cohen (1991) suggests that in non-Western cultures, group 
interests define individual needs, thus the bilateral disputes were continually 
shelved. “Face” or one’s standing in the eyes of the group must be preserved. 
Tolerance also generally applies in the case of violations; consequently, 
concrete punishments or sanctions are virtually non-existent.  
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3.4 Contestations over the core norms prior to the drafting of the ASEAN 
Charter11 
Over time, a norm may become problematic because it can no longer 
provide solution to problems due to the inefficiency in its problem-solving 
function, or may be questioned in its legitimacy. The governing core norms in 
ASEAN enjoyed relatively stable positions among member countries until the 
late 1990s. There were some turbulence in the 70s namely the invasion of 
East Timor in 1795 and Vietnam’s toppling of Cambodia’s regime in 1978, but 
at that time the East Timor issue was perceived as Indonesia’s affairs (thus 
warranted non-interference) and Vietnam and Cambodia were not ASEAN 
members. The ASEAN Way applies first and foremost to intramural 
relationship. As a matter of fact, the ASEAN members tried to approach the 
Cambodian situation in a manner consistent with the ASEAN Way and any 
attempts to challenge that were thwarted by reaffirming the validity of the 
non-use of force and non-intervention (Haacke 2009a, 111). In other words, 
the core norms’ robustness (Legro 1997) was high in terms of specificity (the 
clarity of what can and cannot be done), durability (how long the rules have 
                                                          
11
 This section benefits partly from Chapter 3 in Kasira Cheeppensook, ‘The ASEAN Way on 
Human Security’, MPhil thesis in International Relations, University of Cambridge, 2006; 
Cheeppensook 2007; 2012. 
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been in effect and how they weather challenges), and concordance (how 
widely accepted the rules). The catalyst that made ASEAN reconsider its way 
and destabilised some of the core norms’ robustness was the Asian Economic 
Crisis in 1997. The Crisis also served as a turning point that trigger more 
interest in human-centric norms, seeing that the state can no longer link 
state-centric security and stability to economic prosperity and development. 
This will be touched upon in detail in Chapter 6 dealing with the codification 
of human rights in the Charter. 
The rapid spread of crisis increased awareness that the countries were 
more closely connected than formerly presumed. ASEAN leaders recognized 
that the crisis had serious implications across the region and that cooperative 
efforts were needed in order to solve the problems (Pitsuwan 1998a; 2000; 
Habibie 1998).  The proposal of ‘constructive intervention’ by Malaysia’s then 
deputy prime minister, Anwar Ibrahim, stated that ASEAN members should 
invite each others’ services to improve the domestic social infrastructure 
such as education (Henderson 1999, 49; Sridharan 2007, 163). The specific 
measures suggested included 1) direct assistance to firm up electoral 
processes; 2) an increased commitment to legal and administrative reforms; 
3) the development of human capital; and 4) the general strengthening of 
civil society and the rule of law (Tay 2001, 253). This clearly suggested that 
ASEAN members should be more involved with one another to be prepared 
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for future crisis. There was a ripple in a part of the lifeworld that needed to 
be addressed.   
In June 1998, Surin Pitsuwan, Thailand’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
called for a review in the principle of non-intervention in ASEAN, proposing 
instead “constructive intervention’ in those cases where ‘domestic concern 
poses a threat to regional stability” (1998b).  This was in continuity from 
what Anwar Ibrahim proposed a year before (Thayer 1999). The proposal was 
also triggered by ASEAN’s failure in dealing with Myanmar12 and Cambodia13  
using the policy of ‘constructive engagement’ adopted in 1991. However, 
Surin had to soften his proposal into ‘flexible engagement’ due to opposition 
from other ASEAN members after a meeting with senior officials on June 26, 
1998.  It was further stressed in Thailand’s Non-Paper on The Flexible 
Engagement Approach (1998) that strict interpretation of the principle of 
non-interference was no longer practical: 
Many "domestic" affairs have obvious external or transnational 
dimensions, adversely affecting neighbours, the region and the 
region’s relations with others. In such cases, the affected countries 
                                                          
12
 In May 1990, Myanmar's military regime overturned the results of democratic elections won by 
Aung Sang Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy. Human rights were also seriously 
violated. ASEAN was criticized by the international society that it did not adopt any meaningful 
solution regarding the issue. ASEAN responded by adopting a policy of 'constructive engagement' at 
its annual ministerial meeting in Kuala Lumpur the following year. However, constructive 
engagement with Myanmar did not yield any fruitful result. 
13
 In July 1997, a violent breakdown of political order in Cambodia sparked the review of non-
interference principle in ASEAN once again. At the fourth ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Meeting 
in the same year, consensus was reached that ASEAN should adopt a collective stance regarding 
situations in Myanmar and Cambodia. As a result, ASEAN was committed at that time to conduct the 
policy of constructive engagement with those two countries. (Cambodia wished to join ASEAN in 
1997, then attained membership in 1998. Other ASEAN countries were treating Cambodia as a soon-
to-be member).  
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should be able to express their opinions and concerns in an open, 
frank and constructive manner, which is not, and should not be, 
considered "interference" in fellow-members’ domestic affairs.  
 
The proposal of flexible engagement is in essence a reinterpretation of 
one of the most robust norms in ASEAN, and a sign that a part of ASEAN’s 
lifeworld is problematic. When a part of the lifeworld is questioned by 
members aiming to change its definition or meaning in a certain situation, its 
intersubjective meaning must be debated in order to solve the contestation 
problem. Actors engaging in the debate would fall back on the unquestioned 
part of the lifeworld. Non-interference is clear that criticizing others’ 
domestic affairs is undesirable, but some members started to question its 
validity since it could not provide satisfactory solutions. At the end, ASEAN 
members reached a compromise that watered down the proposed 
constructive intervention, signifying that non-interference is still intact. After 
all, it has been there since before the inception of ASEAN, won over the 
competing norms such as collective security, and was widely accepted. On 
the other hand, constructive intervention (and even when it was watered 
down to flexible engagement) was a rather fuzzy concept and quite new. It 
lacked specificity (it was not clear how far members can criticize other 
members’ affairs), durability (it did not weather the objections well), and 
concordance (only the Philippines agreed with Thailand that it could be 
useful). It also went against the norms of non-involvement of ASEAN to 
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address unresolved bilateral conflict between member, quiet diplomacy, 
mutual respect and tolerance by attempting to raise the problems at the 
ASEAN level.   
The proposal of ‘flexible engagement’ was toned down even further to 
an ‘enhanced interaction’ whose meaning still remained vague but was 
eventually adopted by ASEAN foreign ministers at that meeting as a reluctant 
concession to what Surin formerly proposed. That the original proposal had 
to be watered down until it was unanimously agreed upon by all ASEAN 
foreign ministers only shows that the core norms of non-interference and 
sovereign equality are still quite robust. If anything, the questioning process 
might strengthen them. The norm is so strong that in practice enhanced 
interaction does not differ much from the principle of non-interference (and 
quiet diplomacy) when Thailand after all still urged private communications 
with any concerns about Malaysia’s human rights records in 1998. While 
arguing that ASEAN should be able to ‘discuss all issues once considered as 
“taboos”’, Surin also stressed Thailand’s ‘continued commitment to non-
interference as the cardinal principle for the conduct of (ASEAN) relations 
(Thailand’s Non-Paper 1998)’.  
There was really no conflict regarding the frame of reference since the 
proposed ‘new’ standard still conformed to the former principles and there 
seemed to be implicit consensus among ASEAN leaders to let the question 
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drop, partly because they did not want to be perceived as weak from internal 
criticism. Nonetheless, the lack of clarity in the contested core norms was 
highlighted as a result. It is no longer possible to view non-interference in 
absolute terms. The subjective meaning of a norm, after all, depends on the 
meaning actors give within a social context. When a part of the lifeworld 
becomes problematic, the actors’ ‘horizon of meaning’ also ripples and they 
must come together to determine its intersubjective meaning. The norm’s 
durability waned as a result of the challenge in its validity claim. This set the 
ground for common need to explicitly codify the rules, strengthening the 
norms member deemed essential even further. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 This chapter established the social and normative context prior to the 
negotiation of the ASEAN Charter to provide a social reality against which the 
proposal for change during the Charter negotiation could be analyzed. It 
explored how governing core norms known collectively as the ASEAN Way 
provided a shared lifeworld members draw upon when communicating. The 
lifeworld could be questioned and the process would condition the 
environment during the negotiation. In the process of negotiating the 
Charter, the HLTF members re-evaluated the contested validity claims arisen 
from the problematic parts of the lifeworld. ASEAN provided the institutional 
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backdrop, structures of norms governing the negotiation. Previous normative 
contestations in the region after the 1997 economic crisis resulted in less 
specificity and durability of the norms in question namely non-interference 
and non-intervention, rendering the norms less robust. The reinterpretation 
of the norm in the form of ‘enhanced interaction’ also did not provide 
satisfactory settlement of the issue in terms of specificity. These factors led 
to the need to transform implicit normative principles into explicitly codified 
rules as Chapter 4 will now explore. 
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Chapter 4 
Formulating the ASEAN Charter: Setting up ‘rules of the game’ 
4.1 Introduction 
 The ASEAN Charter is the first cohesive attempt to codify governing 
norms in written form that is legally binding. After almost five decades, 
having explicit rules to further facilitate interstate conduct as well as to guide 
future behaviours was deemed necessary. This Chapter will explain why as 
well as provide an analysis of the drafting process of the ASEAN Charter. It is 
necessary to understand the negotiating context where actors operate 
before proceeding to the detailed studies of the two controversial provisions. 
Although actors draw from shared lifeworld when they address a 
problematic issue, there are some parts of the lifeworld that were not 
‘home-grown’. This must rely on continuous promotion from norm 
entrepreneurs which include civil society as well as socialized officials.  
 
4.2 The need for explicit rules: The origin of the ASEAN Charter 
4.21 Key documents leading to the drafting of the ASEAN Charter  
The formulation process of the ASEAN Charter can be traced to a 
number of documents. Although ASEAN envisioned itself as a community 
since its inception, there was a lack of effort or willingness to realize it. In the 
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ASEAN Declaration (1967) establishing the organization, also known as the 
Bangkok Declaration, the aims and purposes of the Association shall be  
1. To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural 
development in the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of 
equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a 
prosperous and peaceful community of Southeast Asian Nations. 
(emphasis by author) 
 
 ASEAN evolved slowly at first, with the members preoccupied with 
their own affairs in maintaining domestic stability. It was commonly 
perceived that the “community of Southeast Asian Nations” will be loosely 
constructed around shared purposes stated in the Declaration, without any 
concrete obligations demanded from the members. This theme recurred in 
the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast Asia (1976) which 
laid down ASEAN’s principles and modus operandi in more detail including 
the dispute settlement mechanism. It is stated in article 6,  
the High Contracting Parties shall collaborate for the acceleration of 
the economic growth in the region in order to strengthen the 
foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of nations in 
Southeast Asia. (emphasis by author) 
 
Article 12 also states that, 
the High Contracting Parties in their efforts to achieve regional 
prosperity and security, shall endeavour to cooperate in all fields for 
the promotion of regional resilience, based on the principles of self-
confidence, self-reliance, mutual respect, cooperation and solidarity 
which will constitute the foundation for a strong and viable 
community of nations in Southeast Asia. (emphasis by author)  
138 
 
 
However, there was little movement towards an institutional structure 
for this “community of Southeast Asia” until 1997 when the region was 
struck hard by the economic crisis. This was not surprising given that the 
region has operated well enough on its practice of institutional minimalism 
and ad hoc problem-solving, requiring no concrete institutional structure or 
mechanism. The crisis, in a way, motivated ASEAN leaders to question the 
former practice and see the need for a more integrated community with 
substantive institutional arrangements. This triggered the declaration of 
ASEAN Vision 2020 adopted during the Second Informal ASEAN Summit in 
1997, envisioning “the entire Southeast Asia to be, by 2020, an ASEAN 
community conscious of its ties of history, aware of its cultural heritage and 
bound by a common regional identity” (ASEAN 1997). 
The ASEAN Vision 2020 also puts emphasis on human dignity and the 
development of human resources in the region. It was followed by the Hanoi 
Plan of Action adopted during the 6th ASEAN Summit in 1998 in order to 
complement the long-term vision set out in ASEAN Vision 2020. The Hanoi 
Plan of Action lasted from 1999-2004. It clearly forms the basis for the 
Declaration of ASEAN Concord II, also known as the Bali Concord II, adopted 
at the 9th ASEAN Summit in 2003. The Declaration designates that an ASEAN 
community will comprise of three pillars: political and security cooperation, 
economic cooperation, and socio-cultural cooperation.     
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The ASEAN Foreign Ministers agreed in their annual meeting in the 
following year that they would 
work towards the development of an ASEAN Charter which would, 
inter alia, reaffirm ASEAN’s goals and principles in inter-state relations, 
in particular the collective responsibilities of all ASEAN Member 
Countries in ensuring non-aggression and respect for each other’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity; the promotion and protection of 
human rights; the maintenance of political stability, regional peace 
and economic progress; and the establishment of effective and 
efficient institutional framework for ASEAN (ASEAN 2004b).  
 
The Joint Communiqué of the 37th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 
envisions what should be included in the Charter. At the 10th Summit, the 
ASEAN leaders adopted the Vientiane Action Programme (2005-2010) to 
replace the Hanoi Plan of Action that expired in 2004. The Vientiane Action 
Programme set out the strategic goals towards the realization of an ASEAN 
community. The leaders declared that they “recognize the need to 
strengthen ASEAN and shall work towards the development of an ASEAN 
Charter” (ASEAN 2004c). They accepted that the formulation of the ASEAN 
Charter was necessary to “the strategies for shaping and sharing of norms”. 
Therefore, they agreed to initiate preparatory activities for the Charter.  
4.22 The necessity for explicit rules codification in the ASEAN Charter    
All documents leading to the ASEAN Charter hold a common theme: to 
achieve an ASEAN community. Simon S. C. Tay (2010) identifies three factors 
fueling ASEAN’s desire to become a community. The ﬁrst of these was the 
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experience of the group from the ﬁnancial crisis of 1997-98 and its expansion 
to include all ten member countries of the sub-region. He argues that this has 
led ASEAN to recognize both its weaknesses and its potential strength if its 
member countries could have cooperated much more closely than in the 
early years of the group. A second factor is ASEAN’s desire to be more 
competitive as an economic unit. Fearing the rise of China and India, they 
strive to create the economic pillar of ASEAN community. A third factor 
behind the ASEAN Community and Charter is to maintain and gain political 
inﬂuence in the wider region. Yancha (2009, 2) also sees that the ASEAN 
Charter “may be considered as ASEAN’s strategic response to the challenges 
of a rapidly changing global milieu that is bolstered by the evolving political 
landscape in the region, globalization, increasing trade bilateralism, and the 
group’s own political dynamics.” Its effort was perceived as a strategy 
nurturing nascent Asian regionalism by shifting the focus to ASEAN from the 
East Asian hegemon. 
Attributing the ASEAN Charter development to geopolitical calculation 
may be plausible, but it cannot explain the commonly perceived need to 
transform the implicit norms to explicit rules. ASEAN Charter drafting, in 
essence, is international law-making, codifying code of conducts into written 
form with legally-binding effect for every member. This practice is in conflict 
with traditional practices in the ASEAN Way such as non-commitment to 
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legally binding instruments and preference for minimal institutionalism. 
What made codifying explicit rules possible in this context?    
If the degree of norm robustness is high and the interacting parties 
share a common background, the rules from which actor draw shared 
behavioral guidance need not be explicitly formulated, as they are implicitly 
understood. An explicit formulation will be necessary in cases in which the 
interacting parties do not share a common history or culture (Kratochwil 
1989, 78). This is hardly the case for ASEAN members, although their shared 
governing core norms popularly known as the ASEAN Way were questioned 
intermittently. The process of contestation weakened robustness of the 
norm such as non-interference as discussed in the previous section.    
Kractohwil (1989, 79) discusses three more conditions which seem to 
make an explicit formulation necessary: the imprecision of tacit rules; the 
compelling character of the coordination dilemma; and when the solution is 
likely to engender further debate. Less specificity resulted in the imprecision 
of tacit rules, and invited an explicit formulation of the code of conducts. 
Strict non-interference was less clear after the debate ensuing the proposal 
of flexible engagement and enhanced interaction. Clarification of the 
governing principles of interstate conduct was needed. 
The compelling character of the coordination dilemma can be 
attributed to the 1997 Asian economic crisis. Kratochwil raises examples of 
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the allocation of frequency bands of the radio spectrum and the 
establishment of rules of traffic on a river as too compelling to wait for 
emerging practices to develop. The compelling impact of the crisis also made 
ASEAN aware of the need for a more institutionalized measures such as 
cooperation in social safety nets programmes. They cannot wait around for 
emerging practices to develop in order to provide the solutions for the crisis 
that might recur. In 1998 ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) at Manila, 
the ministers agreed to set up the ASEAN-PMC Caucus on Social Safety Nets 
(Slazon 1998) to lessen the impact of the economic crisis. For the region that 
has been paying more attention to maintaining state-centric security, this 
kind of human-centric initiative call for an explicitly negotiated norm to 
bolster its legitimacy. Moreover, if one considers enhanced interaction as a 
compromising solution at the end of the norm contestation process in the 
late 1990s, it most certainly has not settled into widely accepted practice. 
These conditions made transforming the implicit understandings to explicit 
ones desirable for more legitimate and efficient operation of the institution. 
All in all, a problematic part of the lifeworld instigated the process of validity 
claim adjustment so that those sharing the same lifeworld could have 
common understanding and realign their approaches in future situations.     
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4.3 Setting up rules of the game: On establishing the EPG and the HLTF 
4.31 Mandates to establish the EPG and the HLTF 
The mechanism created to facilitate the Charter formulation was set 
out during the 11th Summit in 2005. The ASEAN leaders adopted the Kuala 
Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter which called 
for the establishment of an Eminent Persons Group (EPG) and tasked the 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers to establish a High Level Task Force (HLTF) to carry 
out the drafting of the ASEAN Charter. At the 39th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 
in Kuala Lumpur in 2006, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers then agreed on the 
formation of the HLTF on the ASEAN Charter. The Charter would be drafted 
on the basis of 1) the directions from ASEAN leaders at the 11th and 12th 
ASEAN Summits; 2) the relevant ASEAN documents; 3) the EPG 
recommendations; and 4) the guidance from the Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
(HLTF TOR 2006; see Appendix C).   
The EPG comprised  
highly distinguished and well respected citizens from ASEAN member 
countries, with the mandate to examine and provide practical 
recommendations on the directions and nature of the ASEAN Charter 
relevant to the ASEAN Community as envisaged in the Bali Concord II 
and beyond (ASEAN 2005b).  
 
The EPG met during 2006 and submitted a report recommending what 
should be included in the draft at the 12th ASEAN Summit in January 2007 
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(see also Appendix B for the Terms of Reference of the Eminent Persons 
Group on the ASEAN Charter). The ASEAN leaders adopted the Cebu 
Declaration on the Blueprint of the ASEAN Charter during this Summit, 
endorsing the Report of the EPG on the ASEAN Charter. They gave the 
mandate to the HLTF to commence the drafting of the Charter to be 
completed in time for the 13th ASEAN Summit in November that year (ASEAN 
2007). They accelerate the time frame for an ASEAN Community, and 
adopted the Cebu Declaration on the Acceleration of the Establishment of an 
ASEAN Community by 2015 during the same Summit. 
The HLTF differs from the EPG, since it was comprised of national 
delegates, representing their respective countries’ interests. The chairperson 
was changed twice. Ambassador Rosario G. Manalo, representing the 
Philippines, chaired the HLTF from January to August 2007. Professor Tommy 
Koh from Singapore then succeeded her from August to November 2007 
when the Charter was completed and signed by ASEAN leaders. The change 
of chair also affected the institutional setting conditioning types of 
communication used. Madame Manalo assumed double responsibilities as 
both chairperson and the Philippines’ national delegate while Professor Koh 
only acted as a chair (Singapore had another national delegate so that 
Professor Koh could be neutral as a mediator). This will be discussed further 
in the following chapters when the provisions negotiated under different 
chairpersons were explored. 
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Table 2 Members of the HLTF on the ASEAN Charter, January to November 
2007 
Country Name Position 
   
Brunei Darussalam 
 
 
 
 
 
Cambodia 
 
 
 
 
 
Indonesia 
 
 
 
Lao PDR 
 
 
 
 
Malaysia 
 
 
 
Myanmar 
 
 
 
Philippines 
HLTF Chairperson 
(January-August 2007) 
 
Singapore 
HLTF Chairperson 
(August-November 2007) 
Pengiran Dato 
Osman Patra 
 
 
 
 
Dr. Kao Kim 
Hourn 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Dian 
Triansyah Djani 
 
 
Mr. Bounkeut 
Sangsomak 
 
 
 
Tan Sri Ahmad 
Fuzi Haji Abdul 
Razak 
 
U Aung Bwa 
 
 
 
Amb Rosario G. 
Manolo 
 
 
Prof Tommy 
Koh 
 
Permanent 
Secretary/ASEAN Senior 
Officials Meeting Leader, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade 
 
Secretary of State/ASEAN 
Senior Officials Meeting 
Leader, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and International 
Cooperation 
 
Director-General, ASEAN-
Indonesia, Department of 
Foreign Affairs 
 
Deputy Minister, ASEAN 
Senior Officials Meeting 
Leader, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
 
Ambassador-at-Large, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
 
Director-General, ASEAN-
Myanmar, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
 
Special Envoy for the 
Drafting of the ASEAN 
Charter 
 
Ambassador-at-Large, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
 
Thailand 
(January-March 2007) 
 
Mr. Sihasak 
Phuangketkeow 
 
Deputy Permanent 
Secretary, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
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(April-November 2007) 
 
Mr. Pradap 
Pibulsonggram 
 
Deputy Permanent 
Secretary, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
 
Vietnam 
(January-August 2007)  
 
 
 
(September-November 2007) 
Mr. Nguyen 
Trung Thanh 
 
 
 
Mr. Pham 
Quang Vinh 
Assistant Minister, ASEAN 
Senior Officials Meeting 
Leader, Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs 
 
ASEAN Senior Officials 
Meeting Leader, Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs 
   
Sources: Koh, Manolo, and Woon 2009   
 
4.32 Rules of the game for the negotiators: How the HLTF operated 
Collective norms and understandings define the basic “rules of the 
games” in which they find themselves in their interactions (Kratochwil 1989; 
Wendt 1999). The rules of the games are underlying principles guiding the 
interaction shared as common knowledge by actors (Risse, 2000). The HLTF 
Terms of Reference (TOR) does not designate explicitly the negotiation rules, 
leaving the matter to the HLTF members. Normally before the actors start 
negotiating, there is a ‘pre-negotiation phase’ to establish the common 
knowledge or rules of the game (Risse, 2000). The ‘informal’ HLTF meeting on 
January 13, 2007 only requested the ASEAN Secretariat’s Special Assistant to 
the Secretary-General to prepare documents for the drafting. The HLTF 
members seemed to share a common understanding that the drafting 
process would also in general follow the same practices in other ASEAN 
meetings and conferences. Consultation and consensus-seeking was cardinal 
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in drafting the Charter. In an interview with author, a high-level official from 
Thailand participating in a number of Meetings (who requested to be 
anonymous) said that every drafter ‘knows’ that the discussion would not 
end in voting and that consensus is always preferred. Even when the HLTF 
members disagreed on some of the issues openly (as will be explored in 
Chapter 6 the establishment of the Human Rights Body), the end result must 
read as there was a consensus to refer the issues to the Foreign Ministers. 
Consultation and consensus-seeking is the unspoken rule of the game which 
also applies to most negotiations in ASEAN. 
During the First Meeting of the HLTF, Singapore proposed eight 
guideline points for the drafting which are: 
- The Charter should be visionary and inspiring 
- The Charter should be short and succinct 
- The Charter should be clear to the point that even students can 
understand it 
- The Charter should not get bogged down on details 
- The Charter should not attempt to solve every problem which can 
subsequently be better resolved in the form of subsidiary rules and 
legislation 
- The Charter should be flexible enough 
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- The drafters should consider adopting a better framework for the 
Charter, such as the UN Charter 
- The Charter should be people-oriented (Summary Record of the 
First Meeting) 
Then, Malaysia proposed the ninth point which is the Charter should 
be the basis of cohesive, strong, and rule-based organization to facilitate 
greater compliance. The HLTF adopted all nine points without much arguing.  
In an interview with author, a Thai high-level official who requested to 
be anonymous was of the opinion that since it was still early in the series of 
Meetings, none of the Members wanted to appear non-cooperative or 
obstructive to the drafting. Moreover, the guiding points proposed were 
general and flexible enough that there was no point in rejecting. He felt that 
there was a sense of equality among the drafters, and that every member 
can voice his or her concern. This was also confirmed by a Singaporean high-
level official who participated in the Meetings (and requested to be 
anonymous) in an interview with author.       
As a matter of fact, the drafting process and the general negotiating 
environment was conducive to the use of argumentative rationality or 
Habermasian communicative action on the surface. As discussed in chapter 2, 
there are three presuppositions for argumentative rationality: the actor’s 
ability to empathize, a common lifeword, and equal position in the 
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negotiation and equal access to the discourse. Apart from sharing a common 
system of norms and rules perceived as legitimate, the HLTF members 
operated as equals and were generally amiable to one another 
(Pibulsonggram 2009). Influenced by the core norm of mutual respect and 
tolerance, they generally entered the debate preparing to understand the 
other party’s point of view vis-à-vis their own national interests. However, 
power relationship did not completely recede to the background to provide a 
totally coercion-free environment. The famework of critical constructivism 
the thesis employs highlights the problematization of power. Actors might be 
able to debate the contested norm validity claims in a society of equals, but 
power relations must also be take into consideration. According to one of the 
HLTF members in charge of drafting the Charter, the prevailing mode of 
decision-making in ASEAN meant that “no single member state could claim to 
play the dominant role” but he also noted that, “the absence of ‘undue 
pressure’ did not mean the complete absence of threats exhibited by some 
members from time to time” (Razak 2009, 21). Another member mentioned 
that the first Chairperson of the HLTF, Madame Rosario G. Manalo,  
could also be dramatic such as when she called for a closed-door 
meeting, asked the other staffs to leave and… informed us that her 
Minister wanted this or that. We were compelled to remind her that 
her Foreign Minister was not our Foreign Minister and that we were 
also guided by our own Minister’s instructions. (Bwa 2009) 
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The threats were mostly in the form of walking out (temporarily) or 
even catching a plane home (Koh 2009). Given that the decision-making was 
by consensus, the absence of members would cause difficulties. The fact that 
some members retained the use of threat to maximize their wants make it 
more difficult for cooperative arguing to be the first choice. Still, in general 
members understood that the negotiating environment was one that 
promoted equality as can be seen from the overall mood and tone of their 
memoir from the event (Koh, Manalo, and Woon 2009). Regardless of the 
size, all countries could voice their opinions or opposition. The meetings 
almost always proceeded in a non-confrontational manner (as mentioned by 
a high-level Singaporean official requesting to be anonymous in an interview 
with author in 2011). They agreed easily on how to deal with the media, 
granting ASEAN legal personality, immunities and privileges (Summary 
Record of the Fifth Meeting). The meetings also proceeded smoothly on how 
the decision-making in ASEAN should be: consensus or employ the Summit if 
failing that. The use of threats in order to inhibit the meetings’ progress was 
an exception not a rule, and were widely met with disapproval from other 
HLTF members in the meeting (Bwa 2009). Using threats is not perceived 
commonly as ‘rule of the game’.  
When we analyse propositions outlined in chapter 2 regarding 
whether arguments will prevail in a particular setting, proposition 1) applies 
to the institutional setting in the drafting of the ASEAN Charter from the 
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beginning to August 2007. If actors with different role identities are supposed 
to clarify their uncertainty and seek to use argument, the HLTF members 
generally did not need to do that since they shared clear common 
understanding that each and every one of them represented their respective 
national interests. They constitute one another and understand one another 
as assuming the role of national delegate, unlike the EPG. Each HLTF member 
held only one role identity, and that is of the national delegate. However, the 
overlapping of role identities occurred when the Chairperson also acted as a 
national delegate. This will be analysed further in the following chapters 
when in-depth formulation of the controversial provision is tackled. 
 The drafting process is not a closed space, but it is not public or 
“transparent” either. The HLTF submitted some issues that they could not 
agree upon to the Foreign Ministers’ Meetings. Rosario Manalo who 
assumed both national delegate position and chairperson of the HLTF made 
clear that the HLTF will have to take into consideration directives from the 
ASEAN leaders in drafting the Charter, incorporating the second-party 
context in the negotiation process early on. The HLTF member from 
Indonesia agreed that “we work under government instructions” (Summary 
Record of the First Meeting). This was not an outright first-party situation; 
however, since the HLTF maintained a two-way communication with the 
Foreign Ministers when submitting the progress report. In some occasions, 
they recommended or requested the Ministers to approve or decide on the 
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formulated clause. In the first-party context, the order or directives must be 
followed in a one-way communication.  
Although neither the Kuala Lumpur Declaration nor the Cebu 
Declaration suggested the drafting process heavily involve the Foreign 
Ministers, the HLTF still consulted the Foreign Ministers. The negotiators 
adopted this practice voluntarily, censoring the public sphere. The HLTF 
Members met with actors outside their negotiating context such as the 
ASEAN High Level Task Force on Economic Integration, Senior Officials, and 
representatives from National Human Rights Institutions and the Working 
Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism which is an NGO; however, 
they had no obligation whatsoever to follow the recommendations from 
outside with the exception of their own Leaders and Foreign Ministers. 
The HLTF and the EPG went on field trips to Berlin and Brussels during 
7-15 March 2007. (The EPG also visited Brussels in 2006). It was termed 
‘working visit’ and occurred after the First Progress Report to the ASEAN 
Foreign Ministers. The HLTF then held the Dialogue with civil society 
organizations approximately two weeks after the working visit (Koh, Manalo, 
and Woon 2009, 211). Although some involved in the drafting were of the 
opinion that ‘ASEAN and EU are not comparable’ since the EU is only an 
inspiration but not a model (Chalermpalanupap 2009, 132), the others saw 
that the EU was a useful reference for regional conciliation and integration 
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(Wong 2013). It was decided that the EU developments are worth studying in 
order to avoid the same mistakes and pitfalls, hence the visit (Wong 2013). 
Wong (2012) concluded that the EU is an important reference point for 
ASEAN. Another specific reason was seen to be an attempt by the HLTF 
members to examine human rights systems in other regions (Vanoverbeke 
and Reiterer 2014, 193). Singapore Foreign Ministers George Yeo (2007) then 
remarked that 
… Some members of the High Level Task Force drafting our ASEAN 
Charter have visited Berlin and are now in Brussels, precisely to learn 
from the EU experience. I don’t think our integration will ever go as far 
as Europe’s but your footsteps, including your missteps, are a guide to 
us in our journey. The European Commission has been most helpful to 
us. Last year, the Eminent Persons appointed by the ASEAN Leaders 
received excellent briefings on the European Union in Brussels which 
influenced them in the way they crafted their recommendations.  
The HLTF also met up with civil society organizations such as Focus on 
the Global South and other groups comprising the Solidarity for Asian 
Peoples Advocacies (SAPA) Working Group on ASEAN half way through the 
negotiation, as well as representatives of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary 
Assembly (Koh, Manolo, and Woon 2009). Nonetheless, the HLTF did not 
have to seek consent from these “audiences”. As mentioned earlier, there 
was no bringing out draft for referendum, no effort to involve public opinion. 
The HLTF Members might bear in mind the wishes and recommendations of 
civil society organizations they interacted with, but the end result depended 
on what went down in the closed HLTF Meeting.  In an interview with author, 
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a Singaporean high-level official who requested to be anonymous mentioned 
that drafting the ASEAN Charter was actually ‘affairs of the state’. He and 
some of the colleagues would have liked to involve other (non-state) parties, 
but it would not be practical. 
Therefore, proposition 2b (negotiation behind closed doors) is more 
applicable than 2a (transparent negotiation). It remains to be explored in the 
following chapters whether this kind of negotiation is more conducive to 
persuasion. Communicative rupture can lead to the second-party context 
where the negotiators resort to coercive moves and form separate allies 
within the setting for the sake of leverage. 
The institutional setting did not particularly privilege authority based 
on expertise and/or moral competence. There was no invitation of experts to 
give opinion and Members never appealed to their individual expertise when 
arguing (confirmed by a Thai high-level official who participated in the 
Meeting as well as another Thai official in the Department of ASEAN Affairs, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand, in an interview with author in 2011). 
They would rather justify using their rights as national delegates. Therefore, 
proposition 3b which emphasizes neutral chair is more applicable. Although 
formulating the ASEAN Charter is essentially law-making, and requires legal 
experts to “scrub” it towards the end of the process, the HLTF member who 
is also a legal expert did not have any privilege in the drafting process when it 
155 
 
comes to voicing opinions (as confirmed by a Singaporean high-level official 
requesting to be anonymous in an interview with author in 2011). In this 
situation, an “honest broker” was needed more and his authority was 
derived from his neutrality. When a disagreement was severe, negotiating 
authority and leadership was essential in bringing parties to the negotiating 
table again as when there was a rift during human rights mechanism 
negotiation.     
 On the last day of the drafting process, the HLTF adopted a mode of 
operation where one single objection would lead to the dropping of any new 
suggestion or idea, granting all members de facto veto rights (Koh 2009). This 
demonstrates that the core norms of sovereign equality and mutual respect 
and tolerance were adhered to. It can be argued that this was done in order 
to push for the draft to be completed before the 13th Summit. However, the 
HLTF did not resort to voting even though it is by far a quicker method. 
Consultation and consensus seeking was emphasized. Since mutual respect 
and tolerance dictates consultation and avoidance of publicly humiliating or 
angering any one, the HLTF members opted for a compromise that was less 
confrontational.  
 To sum up the drafting process, the HLTF 
1) based the Charter text on directions given by the Leaders as 
reflected in the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN 
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Charter and the Cebu Declaration on the Blueprint of the ASEAN Charter and 
in consideration of the recommendations made by the EPG and other 
relevant ASEAN documents (HLTF TOR 2006); 
2) sought to reach consensus and exercised de facto veto rights based 
on agreed texts in previous meetings prepared by the working group of 
assistants; 
3) reported the progress periodically to the ASEAN Foreign Ministers 
and sought advice from them when the issues were considered too sensitive 
or when the HLTF could not reach consensus; and 
4) met up with various ASEAN officials as well as civil society 
organizations and the NGOs during the drafting process although the HLTF 
did not necessarily seek their consent or approval.  
The table below summarises the HLTF meetings with the main tasks 
completed in each meeting, leading to the signing of the Charter in the 13th 
Summit meeting. 
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Table 3 Meetings of the HLTF on Drafting the ASEAN Charter, January-
November 2007 
Date/Place Activities Main tasks completed 
   
13 January 2007 
(12th ASEAN Summit) 
The Philippines 
 
Informal HLTF Meeting requested the ASEAN 
Secretariat’s Special Assistant 
to the Secretary-General to 
prepare documents for the 
drafting 
 
5-6 February 2007 
ASEAN Secretariat 
Indonesia 
 
 
 
 
 
28 February-1 March 2007 
Cambodia 
 
 
 
 
1 March 2007 
(ASEAN Foreign Ministers’  
Retreat), Cambodia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7-15 March 2007 
1st HLTF Meeting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2nd HLTF Meeting 
 
 
 
 
 
First Progress Report to 
the ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working visit of HLTF 
1) authorized the Singapore 
delegation to redraft the 
preamble and the chapters on 
objectives and principles; 
2) agreed to meet with 
representatives of civil society 
before the 3rd HLTF meeting. 
 
1) adopted an agreed outline 
of the chapters and articles of 
the Charter; 
2) adopted a work plan for 
March to November 
 
(Following the Ministers’ 
recommendations) 
1) omitted the term “ASEAN 
Union” suggested by the EPG; 
2) omitted clauses about 
suspension, expulsion and 
withdrawal; 
3) omitted specific provisions 
on funding the Special Fund 
4) intended to draft a 
provision dealing with serious 
non-compliance and when 
consensus cannot be 
achieved; 
5) intended to include a 
provision on an ASEAN Human 
Rights Commission as an 
organ.  
 
Germany and Belgium 
 
 
and EPG members to 
Berlin and Brussels 
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27 March 2007 
the Philippines 
 
28-29 March 2007 
the Philippines 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 April 2007 
Myanmar 
 
 
 
19-20 April 2007 
Vietnam 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 May 2007 
ASEAN Secretariat 
Indonesia 
 
 
 
 
17 May 2007 
Malaysia 
 
 
 
17-19 May 2007 
Malaysia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25-27 June 2007 
Indonesia 
Dialogue with Civil 
Society Organisations 
 
3rd HLTF Meeting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dialogue with ASEAN 
High Level Task Force on 
Economic Integration 
4th HLTF Meeting 
 
5th HLTF Meeting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dialogue with senior 
officials attending the 
ASEAN Socio-Cultural 
Community 
Coordination 
Conference 
 
Dialogue with 
representatives of the 
ASEAN Inter-
Parliamentary Assembly 
 
6th HLTF Meeting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7th HLTF Meeting 
 
 
 
 
1) created a working group of 
assistants to meet one day 
before the HLTF to consider 
draft summary records and 
merge them into a single text; 
2) completed discussions of 
the Preamble and the 
Principles (Chapter I). 
 
1) discussed the Purposes;  
2) revisited what had already 
been agreed which slowed the 
process. 
 
1) completed discussions on 
legal personality, 
membership, privileges and 
immunities, and decision-
making; 
2) began a preliminary 
discussion on the 
organizational structure of 
ASEAN. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1) completed discussions on 
provisions on dispute 
settlement, budget and 
finance, and administration 
and procedure; 
2) considered a revised 
organizational srtructure 
proposed by the Secretary-
General. 
 
1) considered human rights 
mechanism in more detail as a 
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26 June 2007 
Indonesia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 July 2007 
ASEAN Secretariat 
Indonesia 
 
 
 
 
13 July 2007 
the Philippines 
 
 
22-26, 28, 30-31 July 2007 
the Philippines 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 July 2007 
(40th ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting), the Philippines 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dialogue with 
representatives of 
National Human Rights 
Institutions from 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and 
Thailand, and an 
informal Working Group 
for an ASEAN Human 
Rights Mechanism  
 
Dialogue with senior 
officials attending the 
ASEAN Security 
Community 
Coordinating 
Conference 
 
Informal Meeting with 
the Asian Development 
Bank 
 
8th HLTF Meeting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Second Progress Report 
to the ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
result of the dialogue with 
representatives of National 
Human Rights Instiutions 
2) discussed key organs 
(Chapter IV) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1) completed discussions on 
external relations, and general 
and final provisions; 
2) accepted Singapore’s 
proposal to insert a provision 
for the Leaders to task the 
relevant Ministers to deal with 
emergency situations. 
3) divided over human rights 
mechanism before accepted 
the Secretary-General’s choice 
of wordings for the clause on 
human rights body 
 
(Following the Ministers’ 
recommendations)  
1) the Foreign Ministers gave 
green light for the 
establishment of an ASEAN 
human rights body; 
2) included the principles of 
democracy and constitutional 
government, in place of the 
principle of rejecting 
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24-26 August 2007 
Singapore 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10-14 September 2007 
Thailand 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 September 2007 
Permanent Mission of Brunei 
to the UN, US 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 September 2007 
(Informal ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting), UN Headquarter, 
US 
 
 
 
3-5 October 2007 
Brunei Darussalam 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9th HLTF Meeting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10th HLTF Meeting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11th HLTF Meeting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Third Progress Report to 
the Foreign Ministers 
 
 
 
 
 
12th HLTF Meeting 
 
 
 
 
undemocratic and 
unconstitutional changes of 
government 
3) deleted the principle of 
non-discrimination and the 
repatriation of foreign works; 
4) deleted the provision on 
Special Funds altogether. 
 
(under the changed 
Chairpersonship from the 
Philippines to Singapore with 
another delegate representing 
national interests of 
Singapore) 
resolved some issues on 
organizational organs. 
 
 1) divided over the function 
of the human rights body, 
who should draft its terms of 
reference (TOR) and when it 
should be completed. 
2) Singapore played the role of 
mediator until the 
compromise was reached. The 
TOR will be determined by the 
Foreign Ministers. 
 
selected only two issues by 
request of the Foreign 
Ministers to submit to the 
Informal Ministerial Meeting 
and agreed that they should 
be human rights body 
together with the problem of 
its TOR, and the frequency of 
summit meetings. 
 
the HLTF was allowed for the 
first time to remain in the 
room during the meeting. 
Following the Ministers’ 
recommendations, the TOR 
would be drafted by the HLTF. 
 
“cleaned” the text of the 
Charter, although some 
members insisted on re-
opening agreed texts. 
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18-20 October 2007 
Laos 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19 November 2007 
Singapore 
 
 
20 November 2007 
(13th ASEAN Summit) 
Singapore 
13th and final HLTF 
Meeting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Presentation of the 
ASEAN Charter to the 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers 
 
ASEAN Leaders signed 
the ASEAN Charter 
 
1) adopted a rule that any 
amendment which was met by 
even a single objection would 
not be accepted.  
2) adopted the final texts, 
legally scrubbed by the 
national delegate from 
Singapore who also chaired 
the group of legal experts.  
Sources: ASEAN Secretariat 2007; Koh 2009; Koh, Manolo, and Woon 2009 
 
4.4 The role of non-state actors: Constructing an ‘artificial’ lifeworld? 
The common lifeworld in ASEAN was constructed through shared 
experiences and understandings. The actors then draw norms and principles 
to obtain agreement about problematic issues such as contested validity 
claim from this common context. Generally, the ASEAN Way constituting the 
common lifeworld reinforces the state-centric security concept, meaning that 
the state, and not human, is the ultimate referent subject. Security policy, 
first and foremost, must be directed to protect the state. Non-interference 
and mutual respect and tolerance implies the state’s absolute rights to 
prevent what it deems to be domestic issues from being raised at the 
international level. As a result, the region has been notorious for its less than 
stellar human rights records and erratic democracy: both norms are human-
centric in nature. 
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However, the human centric norms have been competing with the 
state-centric norms markedly since the 1990s. When the state-centric 
lifeworld has not been providing enough normative space for human centric 
ones, the norm entrepreneurs such as the NGOs and civil society groups have 
been active in creating an artificial lifeworld so that they (and the norms they 
champion) could be included in the negotiations. Artificial lifeworld is the 
system of norms and rules as well as patterns of understandings which are 
not culturally transmitted through shared experiences. It has to be created, 
constructed in order for the negotiation in a particular issue can go on. 
ASEAN might not be able to engage in any meaningful debate regarding 
human-centric norms if the appropriate normative space does not exist prior 
to the negotiation. Non-state actors often attempt to re-frame issues (often 
from state-centric to human-centric orientation) in order to establish norms 
that may serve as a basic common lifeworld (Deitelhoff and Müller 2005). 
They usually appeal to human rights related norms or human-centric norms, 
especially if the norms are against protection of death and suffering. The 
successful example is where the International Campaign to Ban Landmines 
(ICBL) reframed a security-oriented topic where military considerations were 
the focus to a humanitarian one where the suffering of the victims was 
highlighted. Other techniques include holding conferences parallel to the 
official ones, issuing statements, and organizing co-workshops attempting to 
socialize the officials. Seeing that ASEAN still does not have enough space for 
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civil society involvement in key decision-making process and human-centric 
norms, they work to create an artificial lifeworld for the ASEAN agents to 
operate within. This is most evident in the case of regional human rights 
mechanism campaign discussed later in Chapter 6. Although the HLTF 
operated in a relatively closed space, the continuous effort from civil society 
in creating as well as maintaining space for human-centric norms which used 
to be viewed as alien and external is not to be ignored. In the process of 
norm codification where debate on norms validity claims prevail, actors will 
move within their lifeworld, their ‘horizon of meaning’. If the lifeworld is still 
state-centric without the input from the non-state actors since the 1990s, 
actors would not have been informed of the new, extended horizon of 
meaning. They will not know that human-centric norms are now parts of rule 
of the game, a legitimate topic to be discussed. The fact that it is not 
culturally transmitted within the society or exists only in a ‘thin’ form leads 
the newly constructed lifeworld to be called ‘artificial’. Deitelhoff and Müller 
(2005) contends that an artificial lifeworld is constructed where negotiation 
gets stuck because of lack of shared lifeworld. The actors might strive to 
construct the lifeworld in order to facilitate the negotiation. If the actors in 
the negotiation are unaware of new ‘horizon’, new norms, then the role of 
constructing a new, artificial lifeworld belongs to non-state actors employing 
techniques as discussed above.  
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ASEAN has usually practised ‘elitist’ diplomacy behind the closed door, 
excluding the voices of non-state actors (Soesastro 1995). However, by 
promoting norms associated with democracy and human rights such as 
transparency and the people’s participation (Payne and Samhat 2004; 
Samhat 2005), the civil society groups have legitimized publicity in diplomacy 
and increased interaction between the officials and the experts/NGOs. In 
other words, they strived to widen the scope of public sphere. The EPG 
report that provided the basis for the Charter text was also written with 
continuous consultation with the NGOs and CSOs. The EPG was different 
from the HLTF as noted above: they did not have to receive mandates from 
the Foreign Ministers/heads of government and therefore might be prone to 
the socialization more. Although ASEAN generally acknowledges civil society, 
the HLTF did not strive to accommodate its feedback. Before the 10th HLTF 
meeting with the agenda to discuss the ASEAN Human Rights Body Terms of 
Reference, over 30 NGOs gathered for the first Regional Consultation on 
ASEAN and Human Rights (Forum Asia 2007). As the title suggested, the main 
concern was to strongly promote human rights and democratization. This 
conference also involved representatives from the UN, national human rights 
institutions, and academia. The main criticism was that ASEAN did not 
publish any draft of the ASEAN Charter for civil society to debate. The HLTF 
did meet with them and promised to take their concerns into account, but 
they did not plan to release the draft to the public before it was signed by the 
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leaders. The Charter was actually leaked14 two weeks before the 13th Summit 
where the ASEAN leaders were supposed to sign it. However, by that time it 
was too late for the civil society to voice any more of its concerns or hoped 
that the HLTF would again revise the draft before the signing. In this regard, 
artificial lifeworld maintenance proves to be a challenge and represents 
underlying normative struggle until it gains acceptance and blends into the 
existing lifeworld.     
Chapter 2 already discussed norm diffusion and the role of 
‘transnational advocacy networks’ as norm entrepreneurs. The non-state 
actors have been actively promoting human centric norms and attempting to 
influence the decision-making process in ASEAN. Some parts of the lifeworld 
was questioned by the official track, but the creation of artificial lifeworld 
also resulted in problematizing other parts of the current lifeworld which 
again needed evaluation and common agreement among ASEAN agents. This 
process occurs from time to time, resulting in occasional inclusion of the civil 
society in the decision-making process in ASEAN (although not to the 
satisfying degree from the civil society viewpoint). The robustness of human-
centric norms might not yet be as high as the traditional state-centric 
governing core norms, but norm contestation is an ongoing process.  
Consistently contested norm fuels the re-evaluation, which might result in 
                                                          
14
 A Thai newspaper, Pracha Thai, obtained the draft and posted it for online download. Thailand 
was the first to receive the draft since the parliament had to endorse any agreement before it could be 
signed (in accordance with a provision in the 2007 Thai Constitution). The Charter was then leaked to 
the media. 
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the legitimization and codification of the said norm. The fact that there has 
been vigorous debate concerning human rights in the 1990s was due largely 
to these norm entrepreneurs who took advantage of “window of opportunity” 
formed by the international pressure.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter sets out how ASEAN has established its rules of the game 
prior to the drafting of the ASEAN Charter. The EPG is fundamentally 
different from the HLTF because the former’s role identity is not of national 
delegate but of experts. Therefore, they consulted freely with the NGOs and 
CSOs, and incorporated their opinions in the EPG report. However, the HLTF 
members are aware of their role identities as national delegates, and adhere 
to their leaders’ demands much more strictly. 
Generally, the negotiating environment in ASEAN setting was 
conducive to the use of argumentative rationality, but power relationship did 
not always recede into background. The national delegates sought advice 
from their leaders, circumventing the public sphere. Working to widen the 
scope of the public sphere by promoting competing norms to the state-
centric lifeworld is the civil society, whose role in creating artificial lifeworld 
also influenced the normative contestation process. 
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The following chapter will then explore in detail the first selected main 
provision in the ASEAN Charter: the dispute settlement mechanism. It will 
explore the norm of peaceful settlement of conflict in ASEAN, how it 
remained an uncontested part of the lifeworld, and how the norm of non-
involvement of ASEAN to address bilateral conflict between members 
became problematic and needed to be clarified in the Charter. This will be 
explained through selected case studies of how ASEAN has been dealing with 
regional conflicts prior to and after the ASEAN Charter was in place.  The 
HLTF members had to decide the most effective way for ASEAN to resolve 
the conflicts between its members in the future, and chose between 
preserving the former traditional norm of non-involvement of ASEAN in 
conflicts and empowering ASEAN with a more robust dispute settlement 
mechanism.  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in the ASEAN Charter 
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5.1 Introduction 
 This chapter aims to explore how Chapter VIII Settlement of Disputes 
of the ASEAN Charter was formulated by the HLTF. Peaceful settlement of 
conflict in ASEAN was codified in its key documents prior to the ASEAN 
Charter and ASEAN leaders helped mediate a number of disputes, but the 
Charter has an added value of increased authority and legitimacy of the 
Secretary-General and the ASEAN Chairman to act as mediators. The HLTF 
did not envision this at the beginning of the drafting process. In order to 
illustrate how ASEAN has been managing conflict prior to the drafting of the 
ASEAN Charter, existing regional dispute settlement mechanisms in both 
economic and political areas will be explored against the backdrop of 
unquestioned parts of the lifeworld. The core norm reevaluated during the 
drafting process before the HLTF agreed on increased authority of the ASEAN 
representatives was non-involvement of ASEAN in unresolved bilateral 
conflict between members unless requested. The mode of communication 
during the drafting, how the members ‘ruled in’ or ‘ruled out’ some of the 
options will illustrate how the norm was interpreted in less strict sense and 
how the norm of increased ASEAN’s involvement in the conflict was finally 
codified instead. This was tested in the latest round of Thai-Cambodian 
border dispute, where the Secretary-General and the Chairman exercised 
their authority in mediation based on the Charter.      
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5.2 Peaceful settlement of conflict in ASEAN  
  When it comes to intramural conflict settlement, a regional institution 
has a range of options to prevent, contain or terminate the incident. The 
strategies range from norm-setting, assurance, community-building, 
deterrence, non-intervention, isolation, intermediation, enforcement and 
internationalization (Alagappa 1997, 427). Through norm-setting, regional 
organization members have come to share a common understanding and 
expectations of an appropriate behaviour. The founding fathers of ASEAN: 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore envisioned an 
association of neighbouring countries co-existing peacefully from the onset 
when they came together on the inaugural meeting in 1967. If institutions 
are structures of norms (Goertz 2003), non-recourse to the use of force and 
peaceful settlement of conflict were emphasized from the very beginning. 
Both were firmly localized, arising from the need to focus on nation-building 
and domestic development without having to worry about dealing with 
external threats and  bolstered further by members’ adopting of similar 
norms in the UN Charter.  
The 1967 Bangkok Declaration states that of the aims of the 
organization is “to promote regional peace and stability through abiding 
respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of 
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the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter” 
(ASEAN 1967). There was no need to reinterpret the norm to suit local actors 
or congruence building since non-recourse to the use of force (and therefore 
settling disputes without the use of force) has been robust in terms of clarity, 
durability and concordance. Adhering to common norms forged through a 
continuing process of dialogue capable of producing resilient relationships 
able to withstand any shift to adversity in interstate ties has been a way 
ASEAN addressed the issue of peace and security in the region. This was 
backed up by close working relationships between ministers and officials 
(Leifer 1999, 28) and created a basis of peer-group pressure for newer 
members.   
Non-intervention is used when a regional institution (or other 
members who are not direct disputing parties) does not seek to become 
involved in a particular conflict. It is closely linked to how ASEAN has been 
refraining from addressing unresolved bilateral conflicts. Deterrence 
strategies involving collective security and collective defense implies 
intervention, a direct and active involvement in a conflict through the 
application of a regional organisation's collective political, economic and 
military resources to contain and terminate conflict (Alagappa 1997, 427). 
What a regional organization chooses to do in a given circumstance depends 
on their past experiences acting as a kind of strategy repertoire. In other 
words, the social learning process through which the common stock 
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knowledge was developed would guide its decision. This will influence the 
actors to opt for a way that does not go against or collide with the region’s 
established core norms. Dialogue, consultation and deferring are all 
unintrusive methods consistent with mutual respect and tolerance. ASEAN 
members earlier on chose not to include intervention (collective security and 
defense) based on their cognitive prior as discussed in the previous chapter. 
The norm-setting process codified in the Bangkok Declaration, the TAC, and 
the ZOPFAN all took care to exclude interference in any form.  
Intermediation (or mediation) is a process of conflict management 
where disputing parties seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help 
from an individual, group, state, or organization to settle their conflict or 
resolve their differences without resorting to physical force or invoking the 
authority of the law (Bercovitch and Houston 1993; Dryzek and Hunter 1987). 
Successful third-party mediation requires two preconditions: 1) mediation 
must be acceptable to the adversaries in the conflict and 2) the parties 
concerned must show their desire to seek resolution by co-operating 
diplomatically with the third party. Intermediation was spelled out in the TAC, 
but it was never used since members have preferred to talk about the 
problem bilaterally, shelving it in some cases until a more opportune or 
accommodating situation arrives. In some cases where disputing parties 
agreed for mediation or good offices, they did not invoke the regional 
mechanism set out in the TAC or ask the ASEAN Secretary-General to 
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mediate as a representative of ASEAN. Member countries were more willing 
to use mediation and good offices in solving economic disputes since they 
were deemed less sensitive and also less intrusive to national sovereignty.  
The first successful exploitation of mediation was the management of 
the dispute between Malaysia and the Philippines over Sabah in 1968 (Tuan 
1996, 69), just a year after ASEAN was formed. The personal intervention of 
Indonesia’s President Soeharto led to a private meeting between foreign 
ministers of Malaysia and the Philippines in Jakarta. They agreed to settle the 
dispute outside the ASEAN framework and the relationships between the 
two countries were normalized soon afterwards. The crisis did not escalate 
into full military confrontation. President Soeharto was not acting on behalf 
of the larger regional framework, and this has become a norm for other 
disputes when the parties opted for mediation. They were executed by heads 
of state/government or Ministers who were accepted by the disputing 
parties.  
ASEAN stepped up and tried to fulfill a role of mediator when a coup 
erupted in Cambodia in 1997. Prince Norodom Ranariddh was overthrown by 
co-Prime Minister Hun Sen and fighting between forces loyal to the two 
Prime Ministers spreaded into Cambodia’s western provinces bordering 
Thailand, posing threats to international peace and security. The crisis in 
Cambodia made some ASEAN members question the norm of non-
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involvement of ASEAN in bilateral disputes. Deputy Prime Minister Anwar 
Ibrahim of Malaysia acknowledged that ASEAN’s “non-involvement in the 
reconstruction of Cambodia contributed to the deterioration and final 
collapse of national reconciliation” (Peou 1998, 32). Consensus emerged at 
the summit of the Asian Regional Forum (ARF) that ASEAN should take the 
lead in addressing the crisis. A Troika of three Foreign Ministers (Ali Alatas of 
Indonesia, Prachuab Chaiyasan of Thailand, and Domingo Siazon of the 
Philippines) was founded for a mediatory role. The Troika was meant to 
represent ASEAN; however, this did not mean that all member countries 
were united in their position regarding the crisis. For example, Vietnam was 
quite supportive of Hun Sen’s action.  
Hun Sen accepted the Troika on the basis of strict non-interference 
abided by the Troika, limiting the Troika’s role and influence by referring to 
the core norm in the region. At the second meeting, Hun Sen criticized 
ASEAN for interfering in Cambodia’s internal affairs, again invoking the norm 
of non-interference and linking it to the Troika’s legitimacy. He earlier 
declared, “… on the subject of democracy and human rights, they must not 
teach us” (Peou 1998, 33). 
By straight-locking the Troika, Hun Sen consolidated his power until 
political pragmatism won over and a number of ministers returned from exile 
to work with him. However, this did nothing to Cambodia’s international 
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reputation at the time. Failing to have any significant effect on events in 
Cambodia, ASEAN chose to internationalize the problem again by declaring 
that it would not grant Cambodia ASEAN’s membership until after the 
elections had taken place. It also supported a UN decision to leave 
Cambodia’s seat vacant until after the elections. ASEAN had internationalized 
its regional crisis before when Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1979, appealing 
for the UNSC pressure until the war was brought to an end. On a regional 
level, ASEAN attempted its best to promote dialogue between factions by 
hosting a number of peace conferences (mainly led by Indonesia and 
Thailand) but little concrete outcome was produced.  
In 1998, Japan which was Cambodia’s largest donor at the time 
advanced the Peace Plan. The Troika endorsed this at a consultative meeting 
of the “Friends of Cambodia”. The group included developed countries 
involved in the Paris Agreement which settled the earlier dispute between 
Vietnam and Cambodia. Both Hun Sen and Ranariddh accepted the Plan, 
resulting from strategic calculations of economic benefits rather than the 
credibility of the Troika. The elections and the trials occurred as a result of 
the Peace Plan, albeit accused of being just a ‘show’, paved a way towards 
Cambodia’s eventual membership in ASEAN and bolstered the organization’s 
notion of inclusivity. 
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From past experiences, ASEAN as an organization thus has had limited 
role in mediating disputes. Although mediation and good offices were 
employed, it was done by individuals or groups of Ministers (who may have 
to collaborate with external powers for increased efficiency) and not in 
official capacity as a representative or official affiliated with ASEAN. Non-
involvement of ASEAN to address unresolved bilateral conflict between 
members, then, has been a norm. Needless to say, enforcement is never a 
strong point in the region. The mediating process if originated in the region is 
voluntary with no binding obligations to the parties involved. Cooperative 
security practiced in the region foregoes the vehicle of sanctions and works 
on the basis of suasion through peer-group pressure underpinned by the 
assumption of self-interest (Leifer 1999, 27). 
Through the norm-setting process and relevant conflict management 
in the past, non-recourse to the use of force and peaceful settlement of 
dispute were already a part of ASEAN’s lifeworld when the ASEAN Charter 
was set to happen as explained in previous Chapters. They were the 
uncontested part of the lifeworld during the negotiation, since the HLTF 
members did not raise question against these norms even once. 
Consequently, there was no conflicting frame of reference or dispute in 
validity claim of non-use of force in settling the conflict at the onset of the 
drafting. The norm that was more heavily questioned was non-involvement 
of ASEAN to address unresolved bilateral conflict between members, as 
176 
 
clearly acknowledged by Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia during the 
political crisis in Cambodia. The formation of ASEAN Troika on Cambodia led 
to the establishment of the ASEAN Troika as an ad hoc body at the ministerial 
level “in order that ASEAN could address more effectively and cooperate 
more closely on issues affecting regional peace and stability” (ASEAN 2000). 
Growing frustration about the thwarted role of ASEAN in managing the 
Cambodian crisis facilitated the contestation of non-involvement of ASEAN to 
address unresolved bilateral conflict between members’ validity claim. It 
became a problematic part of the ASEAN lifeworld that the HLTF had to set 
right in the Charter.     
  
5.3 Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in ASEAN 
 Following Alagappa’s classification (1995), Caballero-Anthony (2005, 
55) divides conflict management mechanisms in ASEAN into two types: 1) 
formal mechanisms and 2) informal or normative mechanisms. The formal 
mechanisms are then divided into 1) the institutionalized framework of 
discussions and consultations, namely the ASEAN Summits, the AMM, the 
ASEAN PMC and the SOM; 2) the institutionalized bilateral mechanisms and 
processes such as Joint Border Commission between two neighbouring 
countries; and 3) the legal instruments such as the TAC and ZOPFAN. 
Caballero-Anthony (2005, 65) sees that, in essence, the informal mechanism 
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of conflict management in ASEAN is the ASEAN Way. Core norms in the 
ASEAN Way provide guidelines for ASEAN should a conflict arise. She 
highlights its usefulness as a mechanism to manage conflict and identifies 
some of its elements, including diplomacy of accommodation, networking, 
and agreeing to disagree. These practices stem from core norms in the 
ASEAN Way such as mutual respect, tolerance, and quiet diplomacy. In an 
attempt to highlight ASEAN’s contribution in conflict management, Rajshree 
Jetly (2003, 55) also emphasizes the importance of informal mechanism of 
either reaching consensus through mutual consultations and negotiations or 
deferring consideration of contentious issues to diffuse conflict. Antolik 
(1990) summed “ASEAN Diplomacy” up as talking to each other, speaking 
with one voice, and standing together. Consultative process and an 
appearance of unity and solidarity have been characterizing ASEAN interstate 
conduct.   
 The institutionalized “formal” dispute settlement mechanisms in 
ASEAN all incorporate these “informal” mechanisms. Institutionalized 
regional dispute settlement mechanisms specified in the key Treaty prior to 
the ASEAN Charter negotiation will be explored in order to illustrate the tools 
available to ASEAN before the final result of the Charter ends up enhancing 
them even though the first draft did not mention anything about the 
empowered role of the Secretary-General and the ASEAN Chairman in 
conflict management.       
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5.31 Dispute settlement mechanisms in economic area 
 The regional dispute settlement mechanism for economic issues in 
ASEAN initially referred to the 1992 Framework Agreement on Enhancing 
ASEAN Economic Cooperation. It states in Article 9 that “any differences 
between Member States concerning the interpretation or application of this 
Agreement… shall, as far as possible, be settled amicably between the parties. 
Where necessary, an appropriate body shall be designated for the settlement 
of disputes”. This article was expanded by a Protocol on Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism in 1996, which was then replaced by the ASEAN Protocol on 
Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism of 2004. Also known as the 
Vientiane Protocol, the ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism remains key in resolving economic disputes in ASEAN. First and 
foremost, it encourages the use of consultations. The principle of 10-X which 
allows regional economic initiatives to proceed without the concurrence of 
all members also plays a crucial part in conflict prevention. Member states 
can abstain so long as they are not damaged by non-participation and 
excluded from future participation (Jetly 2003, 57). It enshrines the core 
norm of equal sovereignty as well as mutual respect and tolerance.    
Good offices, conciliation or mediation can begin at any time if agreed 
by both parties. Article 4(3) of the Vientiane Protocol states that the 
Secretary-General of ASEAN may, acting in an ex officio capacity, offer good 
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offices, conciliation or mediation with the view to assisting Member States to 
settle a dispute (ASEAN 2004a). If the Member State to which the request for 
consultations is made does not reply within 10 days after the date of receipt 
of the request, or does not enter into consultations within a period of 30 
days after the date of receipt of the request, or the consultations fail to settle 
a dispute within 60 days after the date of receipt of the request, the matter 
shall be raised to the SEOM if the complaining party wishes to request for a 
panel (ASEAN 2004a, Article 5(1)). Member states can still seek recourse to 
other fora for the settlement of disputes, but a party opting for that must do 
it before its disputant makes a request to establish a panel. A panel can also 
be requested when good offices, conciliation or mediation are terminated, 
although all that may continue while the panel process proceeds if agreed by 
both parties. However, the SEOM can decide by consensus not to establish a 
panel.  
The panel, once established, will examine the relevant provisions in 
agreements that are covered by the Vientiane Protocol cited by the parties to 
the dispute. It will then objectively assess the case and make findings. The 
SEOM can decide whether to adopt the panel report or not (ASEAN 2004a, 
Article 6(1)). If a party has decided to appeal, the report shall not be 
considered for adoption by the SEOM until after the completion of the 
appeal (ASEAN 2004a, Article 9(1)). Article 12 of the Vientiane Protocol 
authorizes the ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM) to set up the Appellate 
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Body. The Vientiane Protocol even specifies the timeframe for parties to the 
dispute (60 days) from the SEOM adoption of the panel report unless the 
parties agree on a longer time period (ASEAN 2004a, Article 15(1)). Any party 
required to comply with the findings and recommendations will have to 
provide the SEOM with a status report of their progress in the 
implementation of the report adopted by the SEOM. The SEOM, assisted by 
the ASEAN Secretariat, will keep under surveillance the implementation of 
the finds and recommendations. Article 17 provides for the ASEAN Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism Fund contributed initially by all Member States to 
meet the expenses of the panel, the Appellate Body, and any related 
administration costs (ASEAN 2004a). Any drawdown from the Fund shall be 
replenished by the parties to the dispute.  
 It can be seen that ASEAN has a formal legal settlement mechanism 
regarding disputes arising from economic instruments. It is voluntary and 
cannot be initiated without consent from both parties, but it is concrete and 
quite detailed and specific regarding the time frame. The institutionalized 
dispute settlement mechanism in political area is a different case.   
 
5.32 Dispute settlement mechanism in political area 
 Prior to the ASEAN Charter, the 1976 TAC provides the sole formal 
mechanism for disputes in non-economic area. It is similar to the dispute 
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settlement mechanism in the Vientiane Protocol in the sense that both 
disputing parties must grant consent before it can be invoked, but with less 
detail and no time frame is provided. Chapter IV Pacific Settlement of 
Disputes of the TAC envisages that disputes threatening peace should be 
referred to a High Council consisting of ministerial level representatives from 
each member states (called the High Contracting Parties) who will 
recommend the appropriate means of settlement of the disputes. The 
ministerial level representatives need not be lawyers or legal experts, which 
at the end could render the process more political than legal (Caballero-
Anthony 1998, 50). We could only speculate its effectiveness since it has 
never been used by the members.     
First and foremost, the disputing parties shall refrain from the threat 
or use of force and attempt to settle the disputes among themselves through 
friendly negotiations (ASEAN 1976, Article 13). If desired or if direct 
negotiations fail, the disputes can be settled through regional process by 
constituting a High Council. The process can only be invoked if the parties to 
the dispute agree. The High Council can then recommend to the parties in 
dispute appropriate means of settlement or act as mediator, inquirer, or 
conciliator provided that the disputing parties agree. Member States could 
always recourse to peaceful settlement of disputes prescribed by the UN 
Charter including the use of the ICJ (ASEAN 1976, Article 17). The dispute 
settlement mechanism as specified in the TAC depends wholly on the 
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disputing parties’ willingness to employ it, although other members not party 
to the dispute can offer assistance to settle the dispute. Even when the 
mediation is sought, parties to a dispute are not strictly bound in any way to 
accept the means the High Council recommends. There is no enforcement, 
and the High Council is meant to be resorted to when direct negotiations fail. 
In the case where negotiations do not bear fruits, the members choose to 
defer or shelve the conflict rather than to invoke the High Council. Members 
opt to use informal dispute settlement mechanism which still conforms to 
the core norms in the ASEAN Way. 
The ASEAN Troika was set up to support and assist the ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers and was meant to carry out its work in accordance with the TAC “in 
particular the core principles of consensus and non-interference” (ASEAN 
2000). Its TOR was adopted at the 33rd AMM in July 2000 following the 
proposal of Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai of Thailand at the 3rd ASEAN 
Informal Summit in Manila on November 28, 1999. The proposal was raised 
against the backdrop of inability of ASEAN to address the East Timor crisis in 
the 1990s in any meaningful way (Haacke 2005a, 204). Earlier on in 1975 
when Indonesia invaded East Timor, ASEAN countries also sidelined the issue 
as Indonesia’s internal affairs. The Troika concept was later proposed by the 
UN-Secretary-General to the Chairman of ASEAN Standing Committee to help 
resolve the political deadlock in Burma to no avail. The aim of such an 
initiative would be to ultimately bring about dialogue between the ruling 
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junta and the opposition movement, the National League for Democracy 
(NLD), headed by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (Sen 2000). Myanmar came out 
most strongly against the proposal of the ASEAN Troika in both cases, and 
the TOR eventually endorsed in 2000 was a watered-down compromise. 
Since the ASEAN Troika cannot represent ASEAN beyond the issues assigned 
by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers, its scope is very limited. The TOR also states 
that the Troika “shall refrain from addressing issues that constitute the 
internal affairs of ASEAN member countries” (ASEAN 2000, 3.2). It is an ad-
hoc body which means that its mandate is decided (via consensus) by the 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers on a case-by-case basis. The ASEAN Troika 
comprises the Foreign Ministers of the present, past and future chairs of the 
ASC, which would rotate in accordance with the ASC Chairmanship. The 
composition could be adjusted upon the consensus of the Foreign Ministers 
(ASEAN 2000, 3.1). Although limited in scope and authority, the concept of 
the ASEAN Troika represents an increasing doubt in the ASEAN level 
regarding the frame of reference of the degree ASEAN should be involved in 
conflict settlement. The process culminated in the Charter drafting process.  
Disputing parties did make use of third-party dispute settlement 
mechanism outside of the region. For example, the dispute over Pedra 
Blanca between Malaysia and Singapore and that of Ligitan and Sipadan 
between Malaysia and Indonesia have been referred to the ICJ (Caballero-
Anthony 1998, 62). It seems that the member states only have particular 
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aversion to institutionalized dispute settlement mechanism within the region 
when it comes to political disputes and do not want the issues to be raised at 
an ASEAN level. They could; however, raise them elsewhere in an 
international level.  
Not invoking the formal mediation the TAC prescribes, the informal 
mediator’s role is based on goodwill of the disputing parties and his identity 
is very much attached to his country. The role of the Secretary-General has 
been very minimal in conflict management. There was no precedent that an 
ASEAN official affiliated in the first instance to the Secretariat acting on 
behalf of ASEAN could play the role of a mediator. This has changed in the 
ASEAN Charter’s Chapter VIII Settlement of Disputes. Non-involvement of 
ASEAN to address members’ conflict was revisited and reevaluated during 
the drafting of the ASEAN Charter, with an aim for a more effective dispute 
settlement mechanism regarding non-economic issues. 
 
 
5.4 Formulating Chapter VIII Settlement of Disputes in the ASEAN Charter 
 5.41 Enshrining peaceful settlement of disputes: ‘ruling out’ the 
mechanisms  
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 Codifying the norm of peaceful settlement of dispute is not the main 
task for the HLTF since the TAC has explicitly codified it since 1976. They did 
not have to engage in truth-seeking behaviour since the norm of peaceful 
settlement of dispute is clear on what it prohibits: the use of force. Their 
aims were not to break one another’s will, since there was no one who 
questioned or challenged this norm. They proposed the case which was 
already cast in universalizable rules endorsed as jus cogens or peremptory 
norm. There was no conflicting frame of reference, and they agreed to 
highlight it in the ASEAN Charter. Initially, the High Council spelled out in the 
TAC was still meant to be the main dispute settlement mechanism in political 
and security area without any other embellishments. According to one of the 
drafters, it does not matter how many cases the mechanism manages to 
settle, the achievement is the lack of the cases brought to attention (Woon 
2009). However, it was envisioned in the working draft prepared by the ASEC 
that enforcement mechanisms shall be established along side with dispute 
settlement mechanisms (that will have binding adjudication). The HLTF had 
to finalize how it should be done and forged the way forward. There was no 
mention anywhere regarding the empowered role of the Secretary-General 
or the ASEAN Chairperson. The Secretary-General’s role as a mediator is 
already highlighted in the 2004 Vientiane Protocol, but that only applies to 
disputes arising from economic issues. There is no dispute settlement 
mechanism in the socio-cultural pillar, but it was envisioned at the beginning 
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of the drafting process that there should be an institutionalized mechanism 
similar to that in the Vientiane Protocol.        
The HLTF from the first meeting had decided it must find the most 
effective way for ASEAN to resolve the conflicts between its members in the 
future. Non-recourse to the use of force and peaceful settlement of conflict 
was an essential part of ASEAN’s lifeworld as previously discussed. Its 
legitimacy was not questioned by the members. The problematised issue in 
the negotiating process regarding the provisions in Chapter VIII Settlement of 
Disputes was another part of the lifeworld: non-involvement of ASEAN to 
address unresolved bilateral conflict between members. The contested 
validity claim lied between preserving ASEAN’s distance from members’ 
disputes and increasing the role of ASEAN in solving the conflict. In deciding 
which would be the most suitable way forward, the actors evaluated the 
validity of each option with reference to agreed norms – the unquestioned 
part of the lifeworld. The provision codified must not go against the settled 
norms: non-recourse to the use of force, peaceful settlement of conflict, non-
interference and non-intervention, quiet diplomacy, and mutual respect and 
tolerance.  
At an extreme end is the proposal to set up an ASEAN Court of Justice. 
The proposal for an ASEAN Court of Justice was first brought up by Tun Musa 
Hitam, Chairperson of the EPG at the first meeting of the HLTF at the ASEAN 
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Secretariat in Jakarta in February 2007 (Summary Record of the First 
Meeting). As a matter of fact, the EPG Report does not mention the Court 
since the proposal could not garner enough support from other EPG 
members. The EPG Chair; nonetheless, still saw it as his duty to try to 
persuade the HLTF because the Court would be desirable as the “right” way 
forward in dispute settlement mechanism. The EPG member from Cambodia 
also used similar method when he appealed to moral highground of the HLTF, 
asking them to “put... personal interests aside and look at our 
recommendations objectively” (Summary Record of the First Meeting). To 
persuade the HLTF to agree over a course of action (or to even agree to 
consider the proposal seriously), the EPG Chair and his supporters embarked 
on cooperative arguing and tried to elaborate the views of both themselves 
and their counterparts. The HLTF member from Malaysia pushed forward for 
the ASEAN Court of Justice, in line with the EPG Chair. They are from the 
same country, and the Malaysian national delegate also saw the Court as 
beneficial to ASEAN and Malaysia as one of the members. However, the 
institutional setting for the HLTF meetings did not exactly benefit the use of 
arguments by the EPG, which was included only in the First Meeting. ASEAN 
institutional setting does not privilege authority based on expertise or moral 
competence due to the norm of sovereign equality which emphasizes same 
standing and rights of all national delegates regardless of their backgrounds. 
It was agreed that the HLTF members are accountable to their respective 
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Foreign Ministers and heads of state/government, not the EPG members 
(Summary Record of the First Meeting, Annex 5). The EPG was recognized to 
be a panel of experts, but the HLTF had a strong shared understanding that it 
did not have to abide by the experts’ advice. Rosario Manalo, the HLTF chair 
from the Philippines made it clear that the directives of the leaders were 
more important (Summary Record of the First Meeting), and therefore the 
EPG was not their “audience”. It needed no consent from the EPG to proceed.  
The HLTF had a dialogue with the Civil Society Organisations on March 
27, 2007 in Manila. Among other concerns, those from the non-official 
diplomacy track (specifically the ASEAN-ISIS) have expressed desire to be 
included in the process of dispute settlement (Summary Record of the Third 
Meeting, Annex 8). The HLTF was quick to note to the civil society 
organizations that it would not be bound by any of the proposals although it 
would try to incorporate the elements deemed workable. It was clear that 
the HLTF did not want the civil society to become their audience.  
The HLTF met with the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (AIPA) on 
May 17, 2007 in Penang, Malaysia. AIPA is consisted of representatives from 
Parliaments of the member countries. Among other proposals, AIPA 
suggested that ASEAN should look into having an ASEAN Tribunal and should 
try to include it in the Charter (Summary Record of the Seventh Meeting, 
Annex 9). Again, the proposal for an arbitration body was raised. The HLTF 
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responded that there were already existing dispute settlement mechanisms 
for the security and economic pillars, but the concept of an ASEAN Tribunal 
was still an idea that was open to discussion. It did not refuse the proposal 
outright.  
The fact that the HLTF only answered to the leaders was reinstated 
again in the Fifth Meeting when the Chairperson raised an issue that the 
media was providing “inaccurate news” to the public. By being “inaccurate”, 
she meant the general lack of participation from other stakeholders since the 
HLTF already met with the civil society organizations. There was consensus 
across the board for the media strategy for the ASEAN Charter (Summary 
Record of the Fifth Meeting, Annex 2). The first point is that “the HLTF is 
accountable to the leaders through the Foreign Ministers”. The HLTF agreed 
that they “must not inform the media before they inform their Ministers on 
the progress or on controversial questions”. Employing critical constructivist 
framework, we can see that all things being equal, the foreign policy 
representations constructed by state officials have prima facie plausibility 
compared to other representations because these officials are themselves 
constituted as the legitimate voices of "the state" (Weldes 1998, 221). The 
officials also strived to be perceived in that way. They would work out an 
agreed press line so that they could speak with one voice. This implies that 
no HLTF member should speak out individually to the press. The Ministers 
preferred the Charter to remain in secrecy by instructing the Chair of HLTF 
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not to give any interview (Summary Record of the Eighth Meeting, Annex 18). 
They also ordered that the draft of the Charter should not be submitted to 
the press. This demonstrates, time and again, that the institutional setting of 
the Charter drafting was quite closed. 
All in all, the proposal of the court was ruled out at the First Meeting. 
The court also clashed with other unquestioned parts of the lifeworld such as 
quiet diplomacy, since the judgment would be public and binding. The HLTF 
members gave an intersubjective meaning to the court as undesirable, ‘too 
much’ (mentioned by a high-level ASEAN Secretariat official requesting to be 
anonymous in an interview with author in Bangkok in 2011). This was also 
the case for expulsion as one of the “enforcement mechanisms”. The EPG 
concluded that expulsion should only be considered by the ASEAN Council in 
exceptional circumstances, and the EPG Chair appealed in the First Meeting 
that the HLTF should really include this as one of the options to deal with 
deviant behaviour. He stated that “if we say under no circumstances can 
expulsion be considered, then we will be the laughing stock of the rest of the 
world” (Summary Record of the First Meeting). The arguments were again, to 
persuade that the “right” course of action for the common good of an 
organization be upheld. It was countered strongly by the HLTF member from 
Myanmar. Bearing the mandate from his Prime Minister in mind, he put 
forward that “the issue of expulsion is not in the interest of preserving the 
unity and solidarity of ASEAN” and that “(ASEAN) need to give a clear and 
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strong signal of mutual understanding that we are united”. This was, indeed, 
plebiscitary reason. No members would want to counter “unity and solidarity” 
argument. Unity, after all, has been ASEAN’s identity (Summary Record of the 
Twelfth Meeting, Agenda 4; also mentioned by an ex-Senior Officials’ 
Meeting leader requesting to be anonymous in an interview with author in 
2011). The HLTF Member from Myanmar still reasoned and argued, but to 
persuade others of the preferred course of action from Myanmar’s point of 
view, not to elaborate on each other’s understanding.  
This point was crucial for Myanmar and it did not prepare to change 
its standpoint. Myanmar made sure the First Meeting recorded that “the 
issue of expulsion has no place in the ASEAN Charter” and that the EPG’s 
recommendation that the decision to suspend a member may be decided in 
its absence is “contrary to the democratic principles and the outward-looking 
nature of our organization” (Summary Record of the First Meeting, Annex 7). 
For Myanmar, it is unjustifiable for members to “gang up” and decide the 
fate of another equal member, rendering this practice “undemocratic”. 
Myanmar’s argument of democratic principles to which ASEAN should 
adhere was actually related to the core norm of sovereign equality and there 
was less emphasis on people’s participation. This was a direct draw from a 
shared lifeworld, appealing to a common understanding and experiences of 
the HLTF members. However, Myanmar chose to justify its reason for not 
having expulsion as an option for ASEAN in terms of democracy even though 
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it has been under attack regarding this issue more than any other member 
countries. It ‘understood’ that referring to democracy was expected due to 
criticisms in the past. Myanmar’s rhetorical action was still heavily influenced 
by other members’ past expectations and interactions. Myanmar was denied 
the hosting of an ASEAN Summit in 2006 due to human rights abuse (Davis 
2012), just a year before the negotiation on the ASEAN Charter started. It did 
not wish that to happen again and did not want to be seen as an outcast no 
matter from within or from outside the organization. Due to consensus-
based procedure resulting from the norm of sovereign equality, any proposal 
strongly opposed by a member (or a group of members) could not be 
included in the text.  
Competitive arguing was at work when Myanmar countered the EPG 
Chair’s proposal. It was far more detrimental for ASEAN to be perceived as 
lacking unity and solidarity than to be able to expel delinquent members. 
This was in part due to national interests since Myanmar would be an early 
target given its past regime records. Withdrawal was also out of the question. 
It was reasoned by Cambodia that ASEAN should avoid the case of the 
League of Nations whereby too many members withdrew. The EPG chair also 
rebutted the argument that ASEAN might end up like the League of Nations if 
withdrawal is allowed, stating that the League of Nations’ existence and 
demise happened in a different historical context than what ASEAN is facing. 
However, his arguments did not manage to convince other HLTF members.  
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The HLTF agreed with Myanmar’s use of arguments. It cannot proceed 
anyway without consensus from all national delegates. Another main reason 
that the EPG Chair’s appeal to moral high ground regarding the issue of 
setting up the ASEAN Court and the proposal of expulsion did not work is 
because both proposals were delegitimized already during the EPG meetings. 
The fact that they were not backed by consensus from other EPG members 
went against the practice generated from sovereign equality and mutual 
respect and tolerance. The EPG Chair’s expertise and credibility as an 
individual (he used to serve in the UN Human Rights Commission) did not 
have so much weight when compared with the lack of consensus from other 
nine EPG members. Again, this was due to ASEAN’s institutional setting that 
prioritizes sovereign equality (and thus neutral chair’s authority) more than 
the experts’ authority.  
The HLTF members were unable to settle another controversial issue 
regarding whether the Charter should include the clause rejecting 
“unconstitutional or undemocratic changes of government of ASEAN 
Member states” (Summary Record of the Eighth Meeting, Annex 16). Non-
interference was reinstated as rules of the game early on when Sihasak 
Phuangketkeow of Thailand emphasized that it is “at the heart of ASEAN”. 
The EPG chair on the other hand sees that non-interference should be 
adapted to the changing situation in ASEAN since undemocratic and 
unconstitutional change of government is unacceptable. The HLTF resolved 
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to refer it to the Foreign Ministers. Even though all members participating in 
the First Meeting agreed with Myanmar that suspension, expulsion, and 
withdrawal should not be considered, the fact that the EPG Chair was 
adamant to it led the members to conclude that this was still a controversial 
issue that needed a higher authority to settle it. The HLTF submitted the 
questions that needed guidance from the Foreign Ministers, asking whether 
there should be specific provisions in the Charter relating to suspension, 
expulsion, and withdrawal of member states. They also asked about the 
dispute settlement mechanism: seeing that the TAC was still meant to be the 
dispute settlement Mechanism for the Security Community, and the ASEAN 
Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism existed for the Economic 
Community, should there be any overarching dispute settlement 
mechanism? 
The Foreign Ministers chose the option that only stated adherence to 
the rule of law, good governance, the principles of democracy and 
constitutional government (Summary Record of the Eighth Meeting, Annex 
18) when they commented on the First Draft of the ASEAN Charter on July 28, 
2007. The Ministers agreed that inclusion of all members was more 
important than finding ways to “punish” delinquent ones. The initial 
intention of the HLTF to strengthen the enforcement element of dispute 
settlement mechanisms was snubbed due to the drafters’ own willingness to 
have the decision made for them due to underlying ‘rules of the game’ 
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established early on in the negotiation process. In the eighth meeting, the 
HLTF followed up the decisions of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers at their 
Retreat in Siem Reap on March 2, 2007 and excluded suspension, expulsion 
and withdrawal from the text for good.  
Even with the Minister’s reinstating the principle of democracy, it 
became clear that democracy was seen and accepted as a rhetorical 
argument among the newer members of ASEAN known as the CLMV 
(Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) when they collectively voiced 
concerns regarding the democratic values reinstated in the Charter. The 
Cambodian member was concerned about “overloading” the Charter with 
democracy without having a clear common understanding of what 
democracy is all about (Summary Record of the Thirteenth Meeting). The 
Vietnamese member agreed that there was a lack of common understanding 
on democracy, and suggested that democracy, good governance, and rule of 
law stated in the Charter should all be read together. The Lao Member 
pointed out redundancy and inconsistency in the use of terms in these 
provisions, echoing the Cambodian member’s opinions. They collectively 
engaged in competitive arguing to persuade other HLTF members of their 
preferred course of action, which was to decrease the mention of democracy 
in the text. Their actions signified that democracy was still not a very robust 
norms, lacking especially in specificity and concordance, bolstered by the fact 
that the Ministers authorized the exclusion of undemocratic changes to 
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governments from the text. This communicated to the HLTF that deviation 
from the democratic norms would not be dealt with by ASEAN since it 
clashed with non-interference and non-intervention. It was the wavering 
robustness of the norm that constituted the main argument for the CLMV. 
Although the CLMV actions might look like truth-seeking behaviour (clarifying 
and exploring each other’s understanding of normative principles), but the 
immediate intention of the CLMV was not to invoke common and better 
understanding of how democracy meant.  
The older members attempted to counter the CLMV arguments. The 
Philippine HLTF emphasized her position that the Philippines were earnest in 
reflecting ASEAN democratic values everywhere in the Charter, rebutting the 
argument that democracy was too “redundant” (Summary Record of the 
Thirteenth Meeting). She stated that the emphasis on democracy should be 
taken as a sign of strength rather than weakness of ASEAN. The Indonesian 
HLTF Member supported the Philippine Member by arguing that there are 
repetitions of other values in the Charter such as non-interference (Summary 
Record of the Thirteenth Meeting). Repeating the democratic values in 
different parts in the Charter should be seen in positive light while repeating 
non-interference throughout could give the wrong signal that Member States 
do not yet completely trust one another. This argument was not well-
received in the Meeting (Summary Record of the Thirteenth Meeting). Non-
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interference is regarded as a cardinal principle in the organization since it is 
part of the unquestioned lifeworld.  
The HLTF Member of Myanmar again reiterated that there was no 
need to repeat the democratic values. The Malaysian HLTF Member’s 
position was that adherence to principles of democracy should be seen as a 
principle (Summary Record of the Thirteenth Meeting, 5), and strengthening 
democracy seen as purpose, thereby having no qualms that democratic 
values are frequently mentioned in the text. The Singaporean HLTF Member 
also rebutted the Vietnamese proposal, saying that there was no “new added 
value” in trying to harmonize separate parts about democratic values 
(Summary Record of the Thirteenth Meeting, 6). There was really no 
consensus on whether there are too many mentions of democracy in the text. 
In the end, the Thai HLTF Member stated that it was important to keep these 
democratic values in the Charter (Summary Record of the Thirteenth 
Meeting, 6). Since there was no consensus to delete more democracy 
mentioning from what was already endorsed by the Ministers, the proposal 
remained the same and the CLMV failed to push their positions through. 
Democracy was often mentioned in the Charter’s text, but the lack of 
participation and willingness from the four members during the codification 
signifies that the norm still lacks robustness. However, democracy might as 
well be seen as gaining ground since it withstood normative contestation in 
the negotiation and still remained in the text. 
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      The HLTF was by no means passive when they submitted the 
controversial issues to the Foreign Ministers. The questions that needed 
guidance were almost always accompanied by the HLTF opinions (Koh 2009, 
60, 64). This reiterates the point that the HLTF did not interact with the 
Ministers in the first-party context where they had to quietly follow orders 
and norm had little to no influence on the decisions. However, it was clear 
that they would not go blatantly against what the Foreign Ministers 
suggested (Koh 2009; Ong 2009, 214). The green light from the Foreign 
Ministers was welcomed to bolster the legitimacy of their own conclusions. If 
they truly function in the third-party context, they should recognize that the 
negotiation outcome in itself is legitimate, and need not seek for higher 
stamp of approval from elsewhere. This also reveals power structure in 
negotiation setting ASEAN, one the negotiators impose on themselves. Most 
of the time, they operate in the third-party context except when there are 
controversial issues that cannot be agreed upon despite long negotiations. 
 
 
5.42 Enshrining peaceful settlement of disputes: ‘ruling in’ on the 
mechanisms          
The next legacy (which was achieved through consensus) from the 
EPG Report was met with more enthusiasm from the HLTF: the EPG 
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envisioned that the Secretary-General should be empowered (Summary 
Record of the First Meeting; Report of the EPG on the ASEAN Charter, 5). This 
was justified by attributing its benefits to a more empowered and organized 
ASEAN. They reason that the Secretary-General represents ASEAN to the 
world (Report of the EPG on the ASEAN Charter, 23, 36-37). The image of 
ASEAN depends largely on what the international community perceives its 
representative. From the draft model of the ASEAN Charter Chapter VI 
Dispute Settlement included in Annex 9 of Summary Record of the First 
Meeting of the HLTF, there was no mention of the enhanced role of the 
Secretary-General or the ASEAN Chairperson. However, this proposal was 
successfully pushed through by Singapore with support from many levels 
(mentioned by a retired Singaporean Ambassador in an e-mail 
correspondence with author in 2011).  
The EPG viewpoint was later heavily supported by the High Level Task 
Force on ASEAN Economic Integration (HLTF-EI). The HLTF met with the HLTF-
EI in a Joint Session on April 7, 2007 in Myanmar. The HLTF-EI wished for 
enhanced role of the ASEAN Secretary-General to monitor compliance and 
for the 2004 Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism to be enshrined in the 
Charter. The HLTF-EI made it clear as well that the Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism for economic issues would not be opened to private business or 
individuals to bring their cases against any Member Government any time 
soon (Summary Record of the Fifth Meeting, Annex 14). This is in line with 
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the HLTF’s position that the ASEAN dispute mechanism belongs only to the 
state domain.   
It was noted, time and again, that nothing in the draft Charter is final 
until all members have agreed to the text (Summary Record of the Sixth 
Meeting, Agenda 1). If the HLTF member was uncertain about any of the 
Article negotiated, he would request a footnote be put in place until he can 
go back and consult with home authorities. This happened when Indonesia 
did not fully agree on referring the unresolved disputes to the ASEAN Summit, 
and requested a footnote stating that the paragraph was to be subject to 
approval by home authorities of Indonesia. In the case of a serious breach of 
the Charter or non-compliance, Myanmar had requested that referring the 
matter to the ASEAN Summit may be revisited if necessary. Indonesia and 
Malaysia also expressed reservations. In such cases, the paragraph would be 
understood by all other members as unsettled. Generally, the HLTF 
understood that the negotiated text was not set in stone until it submitted 
the text for the signing in November 2007. It was stated in the “working 
methodology” (Summary Record of the Second Meeting, Agenda 7) that 
“every part of the draft Charter including the skeleton is not final and is 
subject to possible improvement”. This means that the HLTF generally 
entered the negotiation prepared to change their opinions. Thus, the use of 
arguments was still possible except for some issues that were deemed 
detrimental to national interests such as Myanmar’s objection of expulsion 
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clause. No matter how much leverage a country may wield outside, its 
representative has equal rights in the drafting. Myanmar was adamant and 
was not willing to change opinion at that time. 
When the ASEAN Foreign Ministers concluded during their Working 
Dinner on March 1, 2007 that suspension, expulsion and withdrawal needed 
not be mentioned in the ASEAN Charter, they also suggested that the HLTF 
should draft a provision regarding dispute settlement mechanism for specific 
situation, implying that the TAC might not be sufficient. However, they did 
not propose anything on increasing the role of the Secretary-General or the 
Chair in mediating the disputes. The members discussed the role of the Chair 
in detail for the first time in the Sixth Meeting, including his role in providing 
good offices. ASEAN’s involvement in members’ bilateral disputes must not 
interfere with the unquestioned part of the lifeworld.  
    The HLTF met with Senior Officials of the ASEAN Political-Security 
Community (ASCCO) on May 11, 2007 in Jakarta. There was a specific 
proposal from the Director of the Resources Development Bureau of the 
ASEC, Mr. M. C. Abad, Jr. that every ASEAN Member State should commit to 
be well disposed towards offers of assistance in times of bilateral disputes 
that threaten to disrupt regional harmony. He referred back to the TAC which 
already mentions this and reasoned that it could help create a good balance 
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with the principles of non-interference to maintain peace and harmony in 
ASEAN (Summary Record of the Eighth Meeting, Annex 10).   
 Amidst the support from various sectors, the provision that the 
Secretary-General should have a role of monitoring compliance actually came 
from the man himself. Ong Keng Yong (who served as a Singaporean 
diplomat before assuming his position at the ASEC) was quoted by a Thai 
high-level official who assisted one of the HLTF members and requested to 
be anonymous in an interview with author to say (jokingly) that he, following 
the “expected” role of ASEAN Secretary-General, was more of a general 
secretary. The HLTF at that time was working on a provision for the ASEAN 
Ministerial Coordinating Council (AMCC) and intended to have this body 
ensure compliance and progress of implementation of the Summit decisions 
including their recommendations in case of non-compliance. The Secretary-
General on the other hand proposed a formulation along the lines of the EPG 
Report for the role of the Secretary-General of ASEAN in facilitating and 
monitoring progress in the implementation of all ASEAN sectoral agreements 
including cases of non-compliance (Summary Record of the Tenth Meeting, 
Annex 5). The HLTF again resolved to ask for guidance from the Foreign 
Ministers. The option was vesting monitoring compliance with the AMCC or 
with the Secretary-General. The HLTF first came up with the AMCC (changed 
later to ASEAN Coordinating Council – ACC) because of the norm of sovereign 
equality which requires all ten members to have representatives present. 
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Vesting monitoring compliance with the Secretary-General implies more 
involvement of ASEAN (since the Secretary-General represents ASEAN 
directly and not national interests) in dispute settlement between members.  
 In the ninth meeting, Professor Tommy Koh replaced Rosario Manalo 
as the HLTF Chairperson and informed the meeting that he would sit apart 
from his national delegation in order to serve as a neutral Chairman 
(Summary Record of the Ninth Meeting, Agenda 2). Later, he conveyed the 
“suggestion” from the Foreign Minister of Singapore that the HLTF should try 
to minimize the number of pending issues that will be submitted for 
guidance of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers. His reasons were time constraints 
(the HLTF must finish drafting the Charter in time for the signing at the 13th 
ASEAN Summit) and that the Ministers needed to discuss other important 
issues. By “important issues”, he actually meant the provision on the Human 
Rights Body in the Charter and implied that there should be a give-or-
take/trading in that area, which was actually more important for some newer 
members. Delegates perceived that a compromise was necessary most of the 
time since they hoped to achieve desired results ‘in the next round’. This was 
cooperative bargaining through clarifying wants of other parties and himself 
and searching for optimal compromise solution. The Chair succeeded in 
making other members realize that time constraint was really a condition, 
and the solution was to settle a number of issues without referring them to 
the Ministers. Other members did not have any problem with the Chair 
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pushing the Singaporean position in the negotiation due to the impression of 
an “honest broker” of the Chair. The Singaporean HLTF who was understood 
to represent national interests of Singapore should have been the one 
conveying his Foreign Minister’s ideas, but he remained silent in this regard. 
The HLTF then concluded that the AMCC shall coordinate implementation of 
agreements and decisions of the Summit, and the Secretary-General shall 
facilitate and monitor progress in the implementation of ASEAN agreements 
and decisions, including reporting on cases of non-compliance. This was, 
again, the Singaporean position from the beginning since Singapore 
supported the Secretary-General’s proposal. By trading one issue area for 
another, Singapore succeeded in pushing its position through and reserved 
the Ministers’ judgment for human rights body which was far more 
controversial. This was facilitated by the institutional setting, which 
privileged neutral authority more than expertise. Thus, the new Chair’s 
conveying of his own Foreign Minister was met by little questioning, and his 
credibility held. The Chair reverted back to the original Secretary-General’s 
arguments regarding the empowerment of the position so that the 
Secretary-General could play more than coordinating and facilitating role, 
and managed to convince other members of the Secretary-General’s future 
role and function from then on. On the issue of non-compliance, Singaporean 
Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s viewpoint is that “ASEAN must develop into 
a rules-based organization with necessary mechanisms to ensure 
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compliance… There must be measures to redress cases of serious breaches 
to promote a culture of compliance” (Summary Record of the Thirteenth 
Meeting). The HLTF Chair promoted this message and the HLTF members 
agreed that non-compliance would be referred to the ASEAN Summit by the 
affected members or by the Secretary-General. Unresolved disputes will also 
be referred to the ASEAN Summit for its decisions. Indonesia’s and 
Myanmar’s early reservations were altered which signify that in this issue 
they entered the negotiation prepared to change their minds. Exclusion of 
ASEAN from being involved with members’ disputes was reconstructed. 
However, the core norm of non-interference and non-intervention was also 
still very robust to the point that involvement of ASEAN cannot happen 
without the disputing parties’ consent and the ASEAN Summit remained the 
supreme decision-making body in cases of non-compliance.     
 Singapore’s integrative (cooperative) bargaining resulted in a 
compromise solution. The HLTF chose the least intrusive way to settle the 
disputes that still allowed ASEAN’s increased involvement. The best possible 
solution would be to have the Secretary-General initiate the mediation, 
which was not endorsed. In summary, there were two main controversial 
areas in ruling in on the mechanisms: 
 1) Non-involvement of ASEAN to address unresolved bilateral conflict 
between members VS ASEAN’s increased role in the disputes. At the extreme 
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end, the Chairman or Secretary-General should be able to offer good offices, 
conciliation or mediation without being requested by disputing parties. The 
core norm of non-involvement of ASEAN was reevaluated against the 
backdrop of unquestioned part of the lifeworld represented by the TAC. The 
TAC explicitly prescribes that the High Council cannot be invoked without the 
disputing parties’ consent. The Charter still follows this, but vests the 
mediating and monitoring compliance role in an ASEAN’s representative. The 
High Council can be argued to represent ASEAN, but it must comprise all ten 
ministerial level officials including those from the disputing parties. The 
Secretary-General; on the other hand, does not represent any specific 
country’s interests. Reevaluating the norm of non-involvement of ASEAN led 
to a controversy regarding the practice to execute it: should ASEAN opt for a 
Tribunal or a Court?    
2) Arbitration VS adjudication. Adjudication or the proposal to set up 
an ASEAN Court would be legal-binding to parties who agree to submit the 
case. Although the judicial process cannot begin without the parties’ consent, 
it is the most concrete (and public) form of dispute settlement mechanism. 
Moreover, the HLFT already embraced the practice of consultation and 
consensus-seeking derived from the core norm of mutual respect and 
tolerance as the operational rule from the onset. The adjudication involves 
voting and decision on individual basis which sidelines the importance of 
consultation and consensus. It was then agreed that ASEAN “is not quite 
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ready yet for a formal court” (Woon 2009, 74). If the parties ask for help 
themselves, it becomes more difficult for them to back out of the 
recommendations. In Walter Woon’s words, it is “far better that well-
intentioned relatives wait to be asked at a time when the parties are ready to 
be assisted” (2009, 72). This is more preferable than “butting in”. Therefore, 
the HLTF settled for arbitration as a loose form of dispute settlement 
mechanism, but it will only be established when there is no other mechanism 
specifically provided for disputes concerning the interpretation or application 
of this Charter and other ASEAN instruments. The possibility of setting up 
arbitration is most applicable to the socio-cultural pillar which still lacks any 
specific dispute settlement mechanism. Other (non-economic) disputes are 
meant to be resolved based on the TAC, but with more empowered role of 
the Secretary-General and the Chairman 
 
 
5.43 Final result in the ASEAN Charter: the institutionalized dispute 
settlement mechanism and the way forward 
  Non-recourse to the use of force and peaceful settlement of conflict 
was codified explicitly since the first article. The Article 1(1) of the ASEAN 
Charter (ASEAN 2008) states that the purposes of ASEAN are “to maintain 
and enhance peace, security and stability and further strengthen peace-
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oriented values in the region”. Chapter VIII then was set aside to deal with 
settlement of disputes. It prescribes that ASEAN Member States endeavor to 
resolve peacefully all disputes in a timely manner through dialogue, 
consultation and negotiation and that there should be dispute settlement 
mechanisms in all fields of ASEAN cooperation. The disputing states may 
agree to resort to good offices, conciliation or mediation requested from the 
Chairman of ASEAN or the Secretary-General of ASEAN. Article 25 of the 
ASEAN Charter (2008) states that appropriate dispute settlement 
mechanisms including arbitration shall be established for disputes which 
concern the interpretation or application of the Charter and other ASEAN 
instruments.  
In other disputes not involving the interpretation or application of any 
ASEAN instrument, the TAC prevails. Economic disputes shall be settled in 
accordance with the ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism as discussed in 4.31. Therefore, institutionalized dispute 
settlement mechanisms in ASEAN was similar to the situation prior to the 
ASEAN Charter, except for increased role of the Secretary-General and the 
Chairperson in mediating and providing good offices to consented parties. In 
settling economic disputes, the Secretary-General can offer good offices 
which the disputing parties should graciously accept. The ASEAN Charter 
mentions that the disputing parties may request the Chairman or the 
Secretary-General to provide good offices, conciliation or mediation. It does 
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not specifically authorize the Chairman or the Secretary-General to initiate 
the services, but there is no explicit prohibition which allows some flexibility 
as will be shown in the case below.  
Unresolved disputes shall be referred to the ASEAN Summit for its 
decision as well as non-compliance. The Secretary-General will monitor the 
compliance and submit a report to the Summit. A member state which is 
affected by non-compliance with the findings, recommendations or decisions 
resulting from an ASEAN dispute settlement mechanism may refer the 
matter to the ASEAN Summit for a decision. The ASEAN Summit is the highest 
decision-making organ in ASEAN, and still retains its authority in this area. 
However, it is by no means a judicial body. According to Article 28 of the 
ASEAN Charter (2008), Members States have the right of recourse to the 
modes of peaceful settlement contained in Article 33(1) of the UN Charter or 
any other international legal instruments to which they are parties. This is 
still in line with what the TAC prescribes for disputes which do not concern 
the interpretation or application of any ASEAN instrument.    
Since the ASEAN Charter prescribes for the establishment of dispute 
settlement mechanisms for disputes which concern the interpretation or 
application of the Charter and other ASEAN instruments in Article 25, ASEAN 
Foreign Ministers later signed the Protocol to the ASEAN Charter on Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism on 8 April 2010 in Hanoi. The Protocol is now 
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awaiting ratification from all members. So far none has ratified yet, 
preventing the Protocol from entering into force. If ratified, the Protocol 
which applies to disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the 
ASEAN Charter as well as the instruments where there are no specific dispute 
settlement mechanisms will allow the Complaining Party to request for the 
establishment of an arbitral tribunal to resolve the dispute when 
consultation fails (2010). Moreover, it can raise the matter to the ACC if the 
Responding Party opposes to the establishment of the tribunal. It has to be 
noted that the arbitral tribunal will not cover the areas that already have 
institutionalized dispute settlement mechanisms prescribed by the ASEAN 
Charter such as economic agreements or those that do not concern the 
interpretation or application of ASEAN instruments. The former was already 
covered by the ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
while the latter has to rely on the TAC and good offices or mediation from 
the Secretary-General or the ASEAN Chairman.  
The structure of the organization according to the ASEAN Charter 
(2008) which provides the legal and institutional framework of the dispute 
settlement mechanism as of now comprises of various organs. These ASEAN 
organs work together and serve as a framework whereby dispute settlement 
within the organization could take place (see Forum-Asia 2010; Hernandez 
2007).  
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1) ASEAN Summit 
According to Forum-Asia (2010, 9) guidebook on engaging ASEAN and 
its human rights mechanism, ASEAN Summit is “the supreme policy-making 
body of ASEAN. This organ deliberates, provides policy guidance and takes 
decisions on key issues pertaining to the realization of the objectives of 
ASEAN, important matters of interest to Member States and all issues 
referred to it by the ASEAN Coordinating Council, the ASEAN Community 
Councils and ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies.” The guidebook (Forum-Asia 
2010, 9-10) further concludes that: 
The ASEAN Summit also instruct the relevant Ministers in each of the 
Councils concerned to hold ad hoc interministerial meetings and 
address important issues concerning ASEAN that cut across the 
Community Councils; authorize the establishment and the dissolution 
of Sectoral Ministerial Bodies and other ASEAN institutions; appoint 
the Secretary-General of ASEAN; and address emergency situations 
affecting ASEAN by taking appropriate actions.  
Given that the first Summit only occurred in 1976 and was not held 
regularly until after the Fourth Summit held in Singapore in 1992 when a 
decision was made to hold a formal summit every two years and an informal 
summit also every two years in between the formal summits (Hernandez 
2007, 10), the ASEAN Charter aims to have the leaders collaborate even more 
closely by holding the Summit twice a year. Unresolved issues including 
dispute settlements and non-compliance with the findings of dispute 
settlement mechanisms are to be referred to the ASEAN Summit.  The 
Charter maintains member states’ right of recourse to the modes of dispute 
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settlement listed in the United Nations Charter (Centre for International Law 
2011). 
2) ASEAN Coordinating Council (ACC) 
Forum-Asia (2010, 10) summarizes that “ASEAN Coordinating Council 
is an organ that is composed of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers. This organ will 
prepare the meetings of the ASEAN Summit, coordinate with the ASEAN 
Community Councils to enhance policy coherence, efficiency and cooperation 
among them, coordinate the reports of the ASEAN Community Councils to 
the ASEAN Summit, consider the report of the Secretary General on the 
functions and operations of the ASEAN Secretariat and other relevant bodies, 
to approve the appointment and termination of the Deputy Secretaries 
General upon the recommendation of the Secretary General, and last but not 
least undertake tasks provided for in the ASEAN Charter or such other 
functions as may be assigned by the ASEAN Summit”. It can be seen that the 
ACC assists the Summit in preparing the agenda, including unresolved issues 
such as disputes. The ASEAN leaders participating in the Summit can also 
assign other coordinating tasks regarding dispute settlements for the ACC to 
assist with. 
3) ASEAN Community Councils 
The Forum-Asia (2010, 10) guidebook summarises that “ASEAN 
Community Councils is comprised of the ASEAN Political-Security Community 
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Council, ASEAN Economic Community Council, and ASEAN Socio-Cultural 
Community Council. In each ASEAN Community Council meeting, each 
Member State of ASEAN designates its national representation. According to 
Article 9 of the ASEAN Charter (2008), this organ should ensure the 
implementation of the relevant decisions of the ASEAN Summit, coordinate 
the work of the different sectors under its purview, and on issues which cut 
across the Other Community Councils, and last but not least submit reports 
and recommendations to the ASEAN Summit on matters under its purview.” 
The ASEAN Community Councils assist the Summit in the implementation of 
the leaders’ decisions including those relating to the disputes resolution 
pertaining to each Community Council’s responsibility if there are such cases. 
4) ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Body 
According to Forum-Asia (2010, 10) guidebook summary of ASEAN 
structure, “each ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Body has four general functions: 
1) function in accordance with their respective established mandates; 2) 
implement the agreements and decision of the ASEAN Summit under their 
respective purviews; 3) strengthen cooperation in their respective fields in 
support of the ASEAN integration and community building; and 4) submit 
reports and recommendations to their respective Community Councils.” The 
ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Body assists the Community Councils and their 
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tasks are indirectly related to dispute settlement to support the process of 
trust-building among the member countries. 
5) Secretary-General of ASEAN and ASEAN Secretariat 
“The Secretary-General and the staff have the obligation to refrain 
from any action which might reflect on their position as ASEAN Secretariat 
officials responsible only to ASEAN” (Forum-Asia 2010, 11). In other words, 
the Secretary-General acts as a representative of ASEAN in his official 
capacity. Moreover, “the Secretary-General and the staff cannot seek or 
receive instruction from any government or external party outside of ASEAN” 
(Forum-Asia 2010, 11). This ensures neutrality especially when the Secretary-
General is acting as a mediator in any dispute. “The Secretary-General and 
the staff must also uphold the highest standards of integrity, efficiency, and 
competence in the performance of their duties” and “the ASEAN Summit 
appoints the Secretary-General of ASEAN for a non-renewable term of office 
of five years” (Forum-Asia 2010, 11). He will be assisted by four Deputy 
Secretaries-General, who will be accountable to the Secretary-General. As a 
matter of fact, the Secretary-General used to be the Secretary-General “of 
the ASEAN Secretariat” until after the Fourth Summit which granted 
ministerial rank to the office and made its occupant “the Secretary-General 
of ASEAN” (Hernandez 2007, 11). Although the Leaders agreed to open this 
post to competition and to break the traditional rotational occupancy of 
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major ASEAN positions (such as the Chair of the ASEAN Standing Committee), 
in the end, the practice of alphabetical rotation akin to the EU Presidency 
prevailed (Hernandez 2007, 11). However, the Charter bestows greater 
authority upon the Secretary-General especially as an important part in 
dispute settlement mechanism. This will be discussed in the case of the 
Cambodian –Thai border dispute in the next section. 
6) Committee of Permanent Representatives (CPR) to ASEAN 
According to Forum-Asia (2010, 11) guidebook summary, “each ASEAN 
Member State appoints a Permanent Representative to ASEAN, with rank of 
Ambassador based in Jakarta. Collectively, they constitute a Committee of 
Permanent Representatives, who will support the work of the ASEAN 
Community Councils and ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies. They liaise with 
the Secretary-General of ASEAN and the ASEAN Secretariat on all subjects 
relevant to its work, and facilitate ASEAN cooperation with external partners. 
They also coordinate with ASEAN National Secretariats and other ASEAN 
Sectoral Ministerial Bodies and perform such other functions as may be 
determined by the ACC”.  It can be seen that the CPR is a liaison between its 
own national Foreign Ministry and the ASEAN Secretariat. In the case that the 
party to the dispute would need the service of the Secretary-General as a 
mediator, it could also employ the CPR to communicate with the Secretariat. 
7) ASEAN National Secretariats 
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According to the Forum-Asia (2010, 11) guidebook summary, “each 
ASEAN Member State shall establish an ASEAN National Secretariat which 
will serve as the national focal points, be the repository of information on all 
ASEAN matters at the national level, coordinate the implementation of 
ASEAN decisions at the national level, contribute to ASEAN community 
building. Beside these, they also coordinate and support the national 
preparations of ASEAN meetings and promote ASEAN identity and awareness 
at the national level”. ASEAN National Secretariats must work closely with 
the CPR in order to communicate with the ASEAN Secretariat in relevant 
matters. 
8) ASEAN Foundation 
Forum-Asia (2010, 11-12) guidebook states that “this organ will 
support the Secretary-General of ASEAN and collaborate with the relevant 
ASEAN bodies to support ASEAN community building by promoting greater 
awareness of the ASEAN identity, people-to-people interaction, and close 
collaboration among the business sector, civil society, academia and other 
stakeholders in ASEAN. It will be accountable to the Secretary-General of 
ASEAN, who will submit report about this body to the ASEAN Summit 
through the ACC”. Although the ASEAN Foundation only plays supportive role 
to the dispute settlement, it can have indirect impact in promoting greater 
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understanding among people which can lead to greater unity and less 
animosity in the region. 
5.44 Testing the setting that arguments will prevail: Chapter VIII in 
retrospect    
1) Whether overlapping role identities are likely to increase the 
likelihood that arguing leads to persuasion. As previously discussed, every 
HLTF member was sure of their role identities as national delegates. They 
were there to represent their respective national interests. Although they 
were sure about their appropriate roles, they were uncertain about the 
preferences of their negotiating partners. They had to clarify that doubt 
among one another, which led to some leeway for arguments to be used. 
However, due to their strict adherence to role identities, the arguments were 
competitive rather than cooperative. When Philippines had overlapping 
identities of both Chairperson and national delegate, they were less 
persuasive than when Singapore separated its duties. It can be said that in 
ASEAN institutional setting which privileges neutrality over expertise, 
overlapping role identities are not likely to increase the likelihood that 
arguing leads to persuasion.   
2) Whether a closed negotiation setting is more conducive to 
persuasion. Except for the first meeting that the HLTF met with the EPG, the 
negotiation was set in a closed space without any public access. Even when 
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the EPG was invited to participate, the HLTF members shared a common 
understanding that the EPG was not their audience. The closed setting did 
not encourage the members to “speak out of the box” since they were 
national delegates with mandates in mind. Only the EPG Chair engaged in 
cooperative argument, but to no avail.    
3) Whether an institutional setting that privileges authority based on 
expertise and/or moral competence or leadership of a neutral chair is more 
conducive to persuasion. Institutional norms and procedures of ASEAN do not 
particularly privilege authority based on expertise. It was not perceived that a 
legal expert in the HLTF possessed more authority than a non-expert from 
another country. There was indeed a request for ASEAN Senior Law Officials 
Meeting (ASLOM) to be made legal advisory committee for all ASEAN sectors, 
but they were not involved in the drafting. The HLTF assigned a member who 
was a legal expert to “scrub” the text, but it was for technical purposes and 
he was not permitted to change any of the text (since any change must 
receive consensus from all members). On the other hand, leadership of a 
neutral chair played a far more important role in the negotiation. When the 
second HLTF Chair (Professor Tommy Koh) conveyed his Prime Minister’s 
message to the meeting, it was not perceived as such which was different 
from when the Philippine Chair also acted as a national delegate. Professor 
Koh employed integrative bargaining successfully since he exercised his 
power/authority as the Chair (and convinced other members in the second-
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party context) and was actually reinstating Singaporean position. Therefore, 
in the last criteria it can be said that in ASEAN negotiating context, the use of 
neutral chair is more conducive to persuasion that the use of experts.  
It was codified that the disputing parties should be the ones 
requesting the mediation, conciliation, and good offices. However, in practice 
it actually depends on the practitioner to make use of the flexibility since the 
Charter does not explicitly prohibit ASEAN Secretary-General or the Chairman 
from offering it. This will be shown in the following case of dispute after the 
ASEAN Charter entered into force.    
   
5.5 The Cambodian-Thai border dispute: testing ASEAN’s limits 
5.51 Background 
The Cambodian-Thai conflict has been ongoing since the dispute over 
Preah Vihear in 1959. The ICJ judgment on June 15, 1962 on the case 
concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia V. Thailand) found that it 
was situated in territory under the sovereignty of Cambodia (ICJ 1962). 
Thailand complied by withdrawing military forces, but was of the opinion 
that the ICJ did not rule on the exact borderline (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Thailand 2009). Cambodia has always referred to 1:200,000 made by the 
French which was not fully accepted by Thailand. Due to the disagreement 
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regarding the territorial map, the two countries have engaged in on and off 
border dispute. Thailand and Cambodia signed the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) on the Survey and Demarcation of Land Boundary in 
2000 which set up a Thai-Cambodian Joint Commission on Demarcation for 
Land Boundary, or “the Joint Boundary Commission” (JBC). The Deputy 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Adviser to the 
Royal Government in charge of State Border Affairs of the Kingdom of 
Cambodia shall be the Co-Chairmen (MOU 2000, Article 2). It also prescribes 
that any dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of this 
Memorandum of Understanding shall be settled peacefully by consultation 
and negotiation (MOU 2000, Article 8). 
The latest clashes began in 2008 because Cambodia has submitted 
claims to have Preah Vihear registered as world heritage site by the UNESCO 
without consulting with Thailand. Thailand understands that according the 
2000 MOU, there should not be any change to the environment including 
submitting the case to the UNESCO until the demarcation work is done. Also, 
during the ministerial meeting between Thailand and Cambodia in 2003, 
both countries agreed to cooperate in restorations. Cambodia attempted to 
submit the case to the UNSC which postponed it. Both countries tried to 
negotiate again and involved the General Border Commission (GBC) which is 
the JBC’s military counterpart in July 2008. It comprises Thailand’s Supreme 
Commander (who is also Minister of Defense) and Cambodia’s Deputy Prime 
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Minister and Minister of National Defense. However, no fruitful results were 
achieved. The clashes still occurred along the border in 2009 and 2010, 
involving injuries from landmines and the loss of soldiers’ lives from both 
sides.   
After the clash in February 2011 which involved gunfires and extended 
fighting, Cambodia submitted the case to the UNSC again. Thailand; however, 
saw that the 2000 MOU precluded third-party intervention and referred to 
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon who spoke during the ASEAN-UN Summit 
earlier in October 2010 that third countries should not interfere in the Thai-
Cambodian territorial dispute (Mass Communication Organisation of 
Thailand 2010). The UNSC called for ceasefire on February 14 and expressed 
support for ASEAN’s active efforts regarding the situation between Cambodia 
and Thailand, and encouraged the parties to continue to cooperate with the 
organization in this regard (UN News Centre 2011). It can be seen that 
Cambodia tried to internationalize the problem while Thailand was still 
reluctant and preferred bilateral mechanisms which were in place since 2000. 
Together with Cambodia’s relentless efforts of internationalization, the 
ASEAN Secretary-General’s involvement has made it more difficult to limit 
the conflict only within bilateral dispute settlement mechanisms such as the 
JBC and the GBC, and raised the issue to the ASEAN level. 
5.52 The role of the Secretary-General in the conflict 
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Article 11(9) of the ASEAN Charter states that “each ASEAN Member 
State undertakes to respect the exclusively ASEAN character of the 
responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff, and not to seek to 
influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities”. This guarantees the 
neutrality of the Secretary-General and privileges neutral chair in negotiation. 
After the Charter entered into force, the Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan 
took it upon himself to provide mediation. Knowing full well that he could 
not initiate the mediation without the invitation from disputing parties, he 
made use of personal connections and consultative-based approach. 
When at last the UNSC suggested that Cambodia and Thailand should 
use regional dispute settlement mechanism, Surin and the Indonesian 
Chairman of ASEAN were proactive regarding the involvement of ASEAN. In 
an interview with author, Surin Pitsuwan (2011) admitted that his approach 
to the Thai-Cambodian Border Dispute was first through personal connection, 
but he was able to do that “with the support from the Charter”. He could not 
explicitly act ‘ex officio’ since both parties did not formally ask him for 
mediation. Thailand was initially averse to any meddling from outside. Surin 
emphasizes the importance of quiet diplomacy, which has to be 
improvisational and flexible enough. He met Hunsen in August, taking 
initiative in the first step of acting as a mediator.   
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Abhisit Vejjajiva, the then Prime Minister, hinted that he might meet 
Hunsen at the ASEM Meeting on October 3, 2010 in Brussells. Surin conveyed 
this to Hunsen after convincing him that appointing Thaksin (who was ousted 
from his Prime Minister position in a coup earlier) as a government’s advisor 
would be detrimental to the negotiation. Thailand was set on revoking its 
ambassador during the tension between the borders. Hunsen complied with 
the Secretary-General’s suggestion and said that Thaksin resigned from the 
advisory position himself. Kasit Piromya, Thailand’s Foreign Minister at that 
time, made it public that diplomatic relations with Cambodia were still intact. 
They resumed the negotiation, and tried to work in bilateral terms once 
again. 
By February 2011; however, it rapidly became clear that the 
consultative process Thailand tried to adhere did not bear fruits when 
Cambodia internationalized the issue. Seeing that the matter outgrew 
bilateral negotiation, Surin openly called on both parties in February 2011 to 
allow ASEAN to help mediate after his personal initiation. Thailand and 
Cambodia expressed willingness to avoid further armed clashes along their 
common border (ASEAN 2011). Having been backed up by the Secretary-
General who made sure that this seemed like a “request” from both parties, 
Indonesia agreed to send observers to the areas of both sides of the borders. 
As a matter of fact, other members sent observers to Indonesia in Timor-
Leste (1999) and Aceh cases (2003-2005), and Indonesia will based the TOR 
224 
 
for the observers on these experiences. This progress will be informed to the 
UNSC. Surin also signified that the ASEAN Chairman’s efforts are not ad hoc, 
and that the ASEC was building on capacity enhancement to manage similar 
challenges in the future (ASEAN 2011). 
On April 28, 2011, Cambodia requested the ICJ to interpret its 
judgment in 1962 concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear. Thailand was 
lukewarm to the prospect of observers during the ASEAN Summit in May 
2011 due to its own internal disagreement and Cambodia’s internalization of 
the issue to the ICJ. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Security Division 
of the Office of the Prime Minister agreed with Indonesia’s proposal, but 
their military counterparts were reluctant (Thepchatree 2011). However, it 
generally welcomed Indonesia’s efforts. The ICJ authorized a provisional 
measure of demilitarized zone again in 2012.  
There is a possibility that in the end Indonesian observers will have to 
work with Thai and Cambodian ‘observers’ in a joint working group. However, 
this is due to Indonesia’s end of chairmanship (and therefore its legitimacy to 
act according to the ASEAN Charter) rather than pure unwillingness from 
Thailand and Cambodia. Both parties agreed to follow the ICJ’s order and 
withdraw the troops at the 8th GBC Meeting in late 2011. The date is still to 
be decided. With efforts from the Secretary-General and the ASEAN 
Chairman as well as the UN encouragement for the parties to use regional 
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organization, ASEAN has become more involved with its members’ dispute. 
As Cambodia succeeded Indonesia as ASEAN Chairman in 2012, the ASEAN 
Secretary-General was set to work with its leader to settle the dispute 
peacefully. Cambodia already pledged to take the Chairmanship “with 
responsibility” (Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Cambodia to the 
United Nations 2011) and welcomed the Secretary-General’s further 
involvement.     
 
5.6 Conclusion 
Dispute settlement in ASEAN was ‘beefed up’ from prior to the ASEAN 
Charter where members relied on the Vientiane Protocol and the underused 
TAC and Troika. The clearest change lies in empowering the Secretary-
General and the Chairman of ASEAN as mediators, conciliators, or providers 
of good offices. ASEAN is not a stranger to mediation, but it is due to the 
Charter that the ASEAN representative can undertake this duty with 
increased legitimacy.   
Although it can be argued that the HLTF members reached only a 
compromise and not the best possible way forward since the initiation to 
request their services lies with disputing parties, the norm of non-
involvement of ASEAN to address unresolved bilateral conflict between 
members was reevaluated and was interpreted in a less strict manner as 
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seen from the case above. It is clear from the Secretary-General’s and the 
Indonesian Chairman’s understandings that they are not going to remain 
passive in settling the conflict. The Secretary-General took the initiative in 
mediating the conflict by personal approach at first, then gradually publicized 
the issue and raised it to ASEAN level. The Chairman was also proactive in 
proposing to send observers to the area, and the Secretary-General 
emphasized on the disputing parties’ willingness so as not to clash with the 
unquestioned part of the lifeworld.        
Compromise is a result of bargaining, in this case an integrative one. 
The HLTF Chair did not threaten other members or employed other mode of 
communication that can be concluded as distributive bargaining. He 
maximized Singaporean wants, but also via the want-satisfaction of others. 
The negotiaion setting during the drafting process also privileged authority 
from neutral chair more than expertise or moral competence. This facilitated 
Singapore's actions as well as other members' acceptance of its proposal. 
However, in this case, the leadership did not lead to more arguing since 
Singapore was still prioritizing its national interests. The proposal that 
clashed too much with the settled core norms were ruled out such as the 
ASEAN Court of Justice. Expulsion, suspension and withdrawal were ruled out 
by Myanmar's and Cambodia's rhetorics accompanied by a stamp of approval 
from the Foreign Ministers.   
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Due to the fact that the HLTF members were clear about their role 
identities, there was less need to argue. The HLTF members operated in a 
closed setting, but willingly submitted the issues that they could not settle 
themselves to the higher authority, the Foreign Ministers. The EPG Chair 
attempted at cooperative arguing in a number of issues, but the HLTF 
members were not convinced due to their shared understanding that they 
would only be accountable to their leaders as well as the institutional setting 
which did not privilege authority based on expertise or moral competence.  
Without the increased role of the Secretary-General and the ASEAN 
Chairman in mediation, the Charter will only codify exisiting dispute 
settlement mechanisms. The change was forged through by Singapore's 
integrative/cooperative bargaining that convinced other members not to 
submit the issue to the Foreign Ministers then followed through with its 
position of supporting an increased role of the Secretary-General. On the 
other hand, concrete punishment for deviant behaviour was ruled out by 
Myanmar's and Cambodia's competitive arguing. This highlights that ASEAN 
is still lacking in terms of enforcement, but then having hard ‘punishment’ in 
place also goes against the unquestioned part of the lifeworld which are non-
interference and non-intervention and quiet diplomacy. In the case of non-
compliance, ASEAN leaves the matter to the Secretary-General who has the 
authority through the Charter to monitor state compliance with ASEAN 
agreements and report this to the ASEAN Summit. 
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Chapter 6 
Human Rights and its mechanism in the ASEAN Charter 
6.1 Introduction 
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 This chapter aims to explore how human rights which remained 
elusive in ASEAN until recently were incorporated into the ASEAN Charter. 
Human rights are included in the text as early on as the Preamble, Article 1 
Purposes, and Article 2 Principles. The ASEAN Charter codified human rights 
more explicitly than any other formal documents produced by ASEAN, 
culminating in Article 14 which establishes an ASEAN human rights body 
(AHRB) as a regional mechanism. Given that the norm of human rights has 
been met with skepticism in the past, human rights codification in ASEAN 
needs to be analyzed further to see how one of the most questioned parts of 
the lifeworld has become exactly the opposite, providing the backdrop and 
point of reference for the negotiation. The validity claim of human rights 
norms was sustained while the problematic part which the actors needed to 
reposition themselves was whether a mechanism should be in place and 
what should constitute its function. A number of delegates saw that adopting 
the norm in principle were sufficient without Article 14 establishing a 
regional mechanism. Adherence to minimal institutionalism stemming from 
the core norm of non-interference and non-intervention as well as non-
involvement of ASEAN in controversial issues was reevaluated during the 
negotiation process. Given the region’s past state-centric values coupled with 
lingering preference for non-binding mechanism, it is not surprising that 
human rights mechanism codification in the ASEAN Charter was the most 
controversial in the drafting process. However, the role of non-state actors in 
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promoting and sustaining a normative space for the debate to grow is not to 
be neglected despite the relatively closed atmosphere of the negotiating 
context.  
 
6.2 Human rights in ASEAN 
6.21 Human rights development in post-Cold War Southeast Asia  
Human rights concerns have come to the forefront once again since 
the end of the Second World War. Gross violations and atrocities in various 
parts of the world, including the Holocaust, generated political momentum in 
the post-war years for the establishment of an international human rights 
protection system (Donnelly 2007; Haas 2008; Tang 1995, 3). While the 
League of Nation Covenant does not mention human rights, the United 
Nations emphasizes the concept throughout the Charter and makes 
promoting the norm in various parts of the world one of its mission as 
resulted in series of the UN talks beginning in the 1980s. This served as a 
beginning point in international norm diffusion which Southeast Asian 
countries would come to experience in the next decade. 
Whereas the vast atrocities in the West serve as catalyst to norm 
acceptance, lesser sense of geographical continuity (and thus the sense of 
community and solidarity) explained Southeast Asia’s lukewarm attitude to 
231 
 
human rights in the beginning. This would gradually change when the 
process of norm learning took place and ASEAN later faced international 
pressure as well as the sweeping crisis within its own region.  
In Asia, there was no explicit concept of human rights before the 
experience with the Western liberal discourse (Freeman 1995, 15). Especially 
in East Asia, Confucianism emphasizes social relations and obligations 
stemmed from those relations, e.g. respect towards the elders or duty to the 
family (Roy 2001, 219). Perceptions of human rights are also reflective of 
social and class positions in society (Ghai 1995, 55). Traditionally, East Asian 
states such as Japan and Korea associated inequality with order and equality 
with chaos. People were not believed to born equal (Roy 2001, 235): the 
ruling class and men were more superior than the underlings and women. 
Before the modern-state era, countries under absolute monarchism such as 
Thailand view “rights” as legitimacy and authority of the King (and/or the 
elites). They also have duties to those under their rulings (Distapichai 2006; 
Naksakul 2012). For the serfs, rights pertain to communal well-being and 
their obligations according to their positions and statuses. Thus, rights are 
not conceptualized for any particular individual (Apornsuwan 2006; Chamarik 
2001). It can be seen that the cognitive prior in the region has been about the 
state and society stability, not individual security.  The cognitive prior at that 
time was not particularly receptive to human-centric values.    
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Unlike non-recourse to the use of force and peaceful settlement of 
conflict which was emphasized by the ASEAN leaders and enshrined in the 
inaugural meeting, human rights and its human-centric values have been 
struggling in Southeast Asian state-centric diplomacy. The ASEAN Declaration 
of 1967 is aware of the “ideals of peace, freedom, social justice and 
economic well-being”, but when it later mentions justice and freedom, it is 
that of the states. ASEAN had until very recently little to say or do in the area 
of human rights (Acharya 1995, 167). 
Rapid economic development in the region before the crisis of 1997 
fueled the debate of Asian values (Mohamad 2002, 233). In the 1993 World 
Bank policy research report, nine Asian countries (four are ASEAN members – 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand) are characterized as high-
performing Asian economies (World Bank 1993). It is concluded that one of 
the factors behind this rapid growth is government intervention, which runs 
opposite liberalism championed by Western economies. This greatly supports 
the ‘strong state’ argument (VS weaker non-governmental organizations and 
civil society). The state was seen as ‘the provider’. Strong role of government 
in fostering economics was advocated and in turn sustained state-centric 
values in the region. The economic and development rights are superior to 
civil and political rights since economic development is supposed to improve 
human welfare.  
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Asian values as maintained by the three most prominent advocators 
namely Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore are the ways they attempt to 
respond to liberal/Western values (human rights included). Various aspects 
of life are claimed to be governed by these cultural values. Malaysia 
spearheaded by the Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad espoused the ‘East’ 
or the ‘South’ against the ‘wicked West’, maintaining the moral high ground 
over what he saw to be false democracy and corrupted way of life. In 
essence; however, it has sustained authoritarianism since freedom of speech, 
association and assembly was heavily regulated as can be seen from the 
Internal Security Act which was used to suppress the opposition. For 
Mahathir (1996, 9), “the West’s interpretation of human rights is that every 
individual can do what he likes, free from any restraint by governments…” 
which leads to breaking rules and codes in the society. Indonesia, on the 
other hand, has been mostly qualifying the norm by reserving the rights to 
interpret it according to local culture and custom. Rather than falling back on 
to traditional values embedded in the region such as Confucianism or Islam 
like Malaysia, Indonesia led by Suharto appealed to the UN human rights 
system to argue for sensitivity to economic, social and cultural context 
regarding human rights implementation (Suharto 1992; Langlois 2001, 17-18). 
ASEAN leaders also articulated the Asian values discourse in a number of 
international settings such as the UN-sponsored Asia-Pacific Regional 
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Conference on Human Rights and the UN World Conference on Human 
Rights in 1993.   
The appeal to a particular context where human rights could be 
restricted clashed with the universalism of the norm international actors 
sustained, spearheaded by the UN and supported by the civil society 
organizations (advocacy networks) worldwide. The World Conference on 
Human Rights in Vienna between 14 and 25 June 1993 reaffirmed the 
inherently universal character of all human rights. According to the 1993 
Vienna Declaration,   
All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and 
interrelated. The international community must treat human rights 
globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the 
same emphasis. While the significance of national and regional 
peculiarities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds 
must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their 
political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
 
Although it seemed as if the Declaration provided a leeway in 
qualifying human rights according to particular backgrounds of the states, it 
is clear that the universalism of human rights should come first as promoted 
Customary International Law. Ali Alatas, Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, 
addressed the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, claiming 
that the universal validity of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms 
were to be recognized. However, the rights of individual are balanced by the 
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rights of the community. Alatas (and Indonesia) was at that time an 
influential player in ASEAN interstate affairs, and his claims were more or less 
agreed by fellow AEAN members. The rights of society and the rights of the 
nation must be taken into account. Therefore, at the national level, 
expression and implementation of human rights “should remain the 
competence and responsibility of each government” (Alatas 1993, 232). This 
also highlights greatly the running principle of non-intervention. 
Several Asian states sought to redefine the concepts of human rights 
by questioning the applicability of universal human rights in different cultural, 
economic and social settings (Tang 1995, 1). A Senior Foreign Ministry official 
from Singapore (Kausikan 1993, 9) commented that the promotion of human 
rights by all countries “will always be selective, even cynical, and concern for 
human rights will always be balanced against other national interests… such 
as the territorial integrity of the state or the fundamental nature of their 
political systems”. He sees that even in non-Asian countries, universal human 
rights cannot be applied “universally”. In an attempt to respond to an ever 
growing pressure of international human rights campaign from Western 
states, international agency such as the UN, and active international and 
regional NGOs, they have come up with their own version of the concept. 
Kausikan (1993) sees that the need for Asian states’ response stems from the 
emerging global culture of human rights as demonstrated in international 
human rights law, the UN Declaration on human rights, the UN Charter, as 
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well as the emphasis of human rights in the foreign policy of the major 
powers, the US and many European countries, which turn human rights into 
an international issue.  The Asian states then tried to build congruence with 
this external norm since human rights were not yet formally adopted in 
interstate discourse at that time. They did not reject the norm outright, but 
tried to highlight existing core norm they value such as non-interference and 
mutual respect and tolerance.  
This was evidenced at the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World 
Conference on Human Rights where Asian states announced in the Final 
Declaration of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on 
Human Rights (1993) or the Bangkok Declaration that 
while human rights are universal in nature, they must be considered in 
the context of a dynamic and evolving process of international norm-
setting, bearing in mind the significance of national and regional 
particularities and various historical, cultural and religious 
backgrounds. 
 
The statement does not denounce the universality of human rights 
outright, but qualify it by employing the argument of diversity. As summed 
up by Singaporean Foreign Minister at that time, “universal recognition of 
the ideal of human rights can be harmful if universalism is used to deny or 
mask the reality of diversity” (Wong 1993, 2). 
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Other Southeast Asian government positions at that time were indeed 
similar. For example, Myanmar saw that (the human rights declaration) 
‘should reflect that the international community is composed of societies 
with diverse historical, economic, social, religious and cultural values; the 
documents should also reflect the consensus view of the entire international 
community; the question of universal observanced and promotion of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms has been rightly placed within the context 
of international cooperation; so that the UN mechanisms is rationalized and 
avoid duplication of work’ (ACFOD 1993). It saw that the regional mechanism 
or documents were unnecessary.  
6.22 The role and impact of NGOs and CSOs 
As opposed to the stance taken by the governments, some 240 
representatives of more than 110 NGOs from 26 countries across the Asia-
Pacific region came together to propose their stance in the 1993 ‘Bangkok 
NGO Declaration on Human Rights’. The ‘Asian reality’ seen by the NGOs was 
that the governments in the Asia-Pacific region were “guilty in one way or 
another of violations of the basic human rights of their citizens” (ACFOD 1993, 
5). It was a sweeping claim, but nonetheless clearly represented their 
viewpoints towards the governments. The NGOs agreed that “The human 
rights are of universal concern and are universal in value, the advocacy of 
human rights cannot be considered to be an encroachment upon national 
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sovereignty” (Asian Human Rights Commission 1993). Participating NGOs also 
formulated separate Joint Statement on Universality of Human Rights stating 
that “the universal nature of human rights is beyond question; their 
promotion and protection are the duty of all States, regardless of their 
cultural, economic, or political systems” (ACFOD 1993, 96). The Joint 
Statement emphasizes that universal human rights standards are rooted in 
many cultures. Therefore, the Asia-Pacific governments, ASEAN members 
included, should not use ‘specific’ cultural or historical background as 
excuses not to comply to universal standards of human rights. The NGOs 
participating in the Asia Pacific NGO Conference on Human Rights also issued 
another Joint Statement on Regional Human Rights Instruments and 
Mechanisms (ACFOD 1993, 189). They recommended a regional human rights 
charter with the emphasis on principles of universality, indivisibility, and non-
selectivity of human rights. The collective efforts initiated by the NGOs 
participating in the Conference with distinguished standpoint from the 
governments both brought the region up to the global human rights agenda 
as well as highlighted how the perception of human rights in the region was 
different from international standards. This signified to the countries that the 
human-centric set of norms cannot be ignored or simply swept under the 
carpet. The governments in the region must start to seriously consider the 
human-centric norms.  
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In an attempt to influence the implementation of human rights in the 
region, the NGOs have been using the power of networks (Renshaw 2011, 
185) termed transnational advocacy networks by Keck and Sikkink (1998). 
The networks might deploy four main types of tactics: information politics 
(generation and dissemination of salient information), symbolic politics (use 
of symbols, narratives, etc. to connect with a variety of audiences), leverage 
politics (alliances with stronger actors), and accountability politics (holding 
actors to promises and avowed principles) (Keck and Sikkink 1998). In the 
context of ASEAN post-Vienna Conference, we are looking at the network of 
non-state actors spearheaded and supported by certain NGOs and CSOs. The 
Asian Network of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights (ANNI) comprising of some of the largest and best resourced 
NGOs in the region was established to encourage the operation of effective 
National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) which comply with the Paris 
Principles: in particular, that are transparent, accountable, independent 
institutions which have a mandate to protect a wide range of human rights 
and which are led by human rights commissioners who are representative of 
society including women and those from diverse racial and religious 
backgrounds (Renshaw 2011, 198). The ANNI engages with the NGOs and 
INGOs such as the International Service for Human Rights, International 
Womens Rights Action Watch (Asia Pacific), Asia Pacific Human Rights 
Information Centre (HURIGHTS-OSAKA). By promoting human rights norm 
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diffusion mainly through information politics tactic, the network has also 
promoted the general awareness and helped preventing the norm 
contestation or debate from disappearing. Countries with existing NHRIs can 
influence or serve as model for countries without one on the roads towards 
the establishment of regional human rights mechanism (Burdekin 2007). 
The NGOs and CSOs operating in the network were also active in 
promoting the norm in the region through series of talks, meetings, 
campaigns, and joint workshops with government officials. These were all 
tactics of creating an artificial lifeworld according to Deitelhoff and Müller 
(2005). They employed ‘Track II’ diplomacy which was more informal and 
open than ‘Track I’ or official forum where delegates must act in their official 
capacity. At least, the norm must enter or diffuse into the unofficial 
diplomacy track, in the hope that Track II could then influence Track I. Track II 
institutions that have been working closely with the network of NGOs and 
CSOs include the ASEAN-ISIS. This regional network of think-tanks 
cooperated with the NGOs and CSOs such as the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary 
Organization (AIPO) to promoted human rights especially the establishment 
of a regional human rights mechanism (Working Group on an ASEAN Human 
Rights Mechanism 2005). Carolina Hernandez, Director of the Institute of 
Strategic and Development Studies (ISDS), the Philippines’ member of 
ASEAN-ISIS, brought up the idea for an ASEAN-ISIS Colloquium on Human 
Rights (AICOHR) (Kraft 2006). The AICOHR was another important instrument 
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in Track II diplomacy where government officials can meet with non-state 
actors in an unofficial capacity. Herman Kraft (2006) noted that the AICOHR 
was important because it put forward 
the idea that human rights can be discussed in a public forum in an 
open and candid manner without having to worry about political 
repercussions. It became part of the process which made human 
rights and the language of human rights an increasingly acceptable 
part of the political discourse in ASEAN.   
Since the lifeworld at that time did not allow much space for human-
centric values, the non-state actors strive to create normative space so that it 
would be easier to consider the norm validity claim. They defined the terms, 
disseminated the information, tried to ‘teach’ the official track.   
On the civil society front, Solidarity for Asian People’s Advocacy (SAPA) 
has been at the forefront in rallying for human rights. SAPA formed the SAPA 
task force on ASEAN and human rights. It has been calling on ASEAN to 
uphold human rights in many instances, i.e. enforced disappearances. It has 
released its own human rights report as an alternative source of information 
from the governments. SAPA also engaged with the EPG vigorously, writing 
letters to them regarding what the organization would like to see in the 
ASEAN Charter (SAPA 2006). As cited in Gerard (2014), the submissions were 
based on civil society forums held at the national level, and also a two-day 
meeting that was held prior to the meeting with the EPG (Chandra 2005). The 
SAPA submissions recommended incorporating environmental sustainability, 
human rights and human security into the ASEAN Charter (Gerard 2014, 89). 
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SAPA also proposed that ASEAN processes be streamlined, and some 
practices reformed, i.e. consensus decision-making process and non-
intervention norm (Gerard 2014, 89). By seeking to engage with the EPG who 
was the working group with the task to draft recommendations for the HLTF 
on the ASEAN Charter, SAPA broadened and extended the shared 
understanding about the rule of the game, about what can be negotiated. 
Although the HLTF did not have to include the EPG’s recommendations 
verbatim, SAPA expected that the interaction between the EPG and the HLTF 
might yield results. At the very least, the CSO network has been reiterating 
and circulating the human-centric norm among official track of diplomacy, 
supplementing the artificial lifeworld where negotiators could draw upon. 
Gerard (2014, 78-79) further explains that, 
SAPA has formed other task forces related to human rights such as the 
SAPA Task Force on ASEAN and Burma to promote the 
democratization of Myanmar and the SAPA Task Force on ASEAN and 
Freedom of Information. By grouping CSOs around specific ASEAN 
processes, and then organizing these task forces under the SAPA 
Working Group on ASEAN, the SAPA network has functioned in 
unifying CSOs in their attempts to influence ASEAN policy, thereby 
overcoming officials’ criticisms that Southeast Asian CSOs are too 
divided and disparate to warrant engagement. All in all, SAPA has 
been a crucial organizing force for Southeast Asian CSOs seeking to 
target ASEAN. It has also played the lead role in the organization of 
the ASEAN Civil Society Conference, which has become the central 
parallel summit for groups seeking to influence ASEAN policy. 
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Other examples of these human rights related activities from the 
NGOs and the CSOs include when The Law Association for Asia and the 
Pacific (LAWASIA) Human Rights Standing Committee organized a series of 
meetings among human rights activists and parliamentary human rights 
committees in the region to discuss proposals for a human rights mechanism 
in Southeast Asia starting from 1995. The meetings eventually led to the 
formation of the working group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism in 
1996, which composed of human rights advocates from both governments 
and non-governmental sectors (Cheeppensook 2006; Medina 2006). 
The Regional council on Human Rights in Asia, an NGO found in Manila 
in 1982, met in Jakarta and issued a Statement on the Promotion of Human 
Rights in the ASEAN Region and a Declaration of the Basic Duties of ASEAN 
Peoples and Governments. It also sent a copy to ASEC. The statement 
emphasizes universality of human rights and seeks to change exploitative 
structures meaning authoritarian governments. 
Moreover, LAWASIA even drafted a Pacific Charter of Human Rights 
(with a provision for the creation of a Pacific Human Rights Commission) and 
tried to persuade governments to adopt it, but failed. Had the charter been 
adopted, the Pacific would have had a separate regional human rights 
mechanism from Asia, the one that was not created by governments. 
LAWASIA lobbied the governments to support its resolution to have a 
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regional seminar at the intergovernmental level to "examine the possibility of 
some kind of regional institutions and arrangements for the promotion and 
protection of Human Rights..." (Plantilla 2000). 
The Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism started to 
interact with government officials when it met ASEAN foreign ministers in 
1996, and with senior officials from 1997 onwards (Medina 2006).  However, 
the mechanism for human rights was endorsed in the Joint Communique in 
the annual ASEAN Ministerial Meetings after the economic crisis. According 
to Johnston (2003), a crisis or threatening environment is needed to motivate 
actors to pay attention to counterattitudinal information. By keeping the 
human-centric norm on the ground, providing a normative space in the 
region where it was formerly unreceptive, the NGOs and CSOs network have 
been collaborating with institutions in Track II diplomacy to foster an artificial 
lifeworld – the shared ‘language’ of human centric norms – whereby the 
official delegates could negotiate. Since the cognitive prior in the region was 
not particularly receptive to the norm, the 1997 economic crisis was 
a ’window of opportunity’ as will be elaborated further in the next section.  
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6.23 The effects of the 1997 economic crisis on human-centric norm: 
Increased acceptance and codification15 
The 1997 economic crisis occurred from several complicated causes 
(Phongpaichit and Baker 1998; Wade 1998; Chandrasekhar and Ghosh 1998). 
They will be discussed briefly in order to provide the background for this 
turning point, although it is beyond the scope of the thesis to explore them 
all. The striking feature of the crisis was the virulence with which the crisis 
spread through the region (Smith 1999, 20). The pull-out of international 
capital, which was the main cause of economic growth in Southeast Asia due 
to US increasing interest rates in mid 1990s, interacted with structural 
weaknesses of the financial sectors in the region. At that time, some 
Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand and Indonesia had their 
currencies pegged to the US dollar, which led to foreign exchange risk in the 
financial sector. This invited speculative attacks, draining funds out of Thai 
(and Korean) currencies and stock markets. Higher US interest rates made 
the US more attractive in terms of investment destination and also raised the 
value of the US dollar, making many ASEAN member countries’ exports less 
competitive because their commodities’ prices were more expensive when 
compared to that of the US (Higgot 1998; Karunatilleka 1999; Morita, 
Raychaudhuri and Chatterjee 2000). Thus, their export growth slowed in 
                                                          
15
 This section makes use of Chapter 3 of my MPhil thesis: Kasira Cheeppensook, ‘The ASEAN 
Way on Human Security’, MPhil thesis in International Relations, University of Cambridge, 2006.  
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1996, aggravating their current accounts which were already at deficit. Free 
movement of capital adopted at the beginning of the decade also 
contributed to Southeast Asia’s financial vulnerabilities of depending too 
much on foreign short-term capital flows. The closely integrated economies 
and financial markets in the region coupled with poor regulation in the 
economic sector helped spread the contagion (Dornbusch, Park and 
Claessens 2000).   
When Thai baht was floated on July 2, 1997, subsequent devaluations 
followed in other neighbor countries like Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, 
and Singapore. The repercussions of the Asian economic crisis were also felt 
elsewhere in advanced economies after a period of stability in 1998.16  The 
economic impact within the region itself was vast: rapid falls in currency’s 
values against the dollar, increased interest rates resulted in decreasing 
funds available for borrowing, and increased corporate bankruptcies resulted 
in high rates of unemployment (Karunatilleka 1999, 24-27; Ching 1999). For 
example, from the beginning of July to mid-September 1998, Indonesia’s 
currency had declined approximately by 80% against the US dollar. Stock 
prices had fallen sharply by more than 50% in all five major ASEAN countries: 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, with 
Indonesia’s stocks market declining almost by 100% (Evan 1998).   
                                                          
16
 The stock market falls in Asia led to market declines across the globe. Falling international trade 
resulting from decreasing imports had implications for countries like the US and Japan. 
247 
 
The crisis posed grave social and political impact to the region which 
has enjoyed the so-called Asian values induced growth for the past three 
decades. The crisis forced the governments to reduce wage rates and 
employments, resulting in decreasing purchasing power and high 
unemployment rates. ASEAN countries that were hardest hit by the crisis 
included Thailand and Indonesia. The pre-crisis unemployment rate in 
Thailand was as low as 2% in 1996. With the onset of the crisis, the 
unemployment rate increased to 5.2% in 1998 (UNESCAP 2002, 10). Other 
social repercussions included higher crime rates and increasing suicide rates 
(Lotrakul 2003). These social repercussions could have been cushioned off 
should the government had any meaningful social safety nets programs. 
However, they were not adequately provided, illustrating the failure on the 
part of the government to provide security for people’s livelihoods. Real 
wages decline also provided a setback for rising living standards and poverty 
alleviation which used to sustain the rationale of political stability through 
economic development in the pre-crisis era, and thus the rationale to 
prioritize social and economic rights over political and civil rights which was 
decided by the state.  
The clarity, durability and concordance of human-centric norms, 
human rights included, were better in the post-crisis era, in part from non 
state actors continuous efforts in maintain the artificial lifeworld. The crisis 
served as a turning point where people started to question a part of the 
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lifeworld formerly incorporated state-centric values, along the similar line of 
what the Holocaust did to the West. The development of human rights norm 
codification in ASEAN is therefore two-folded. Human-centric norms must 
first find its way to the interstate discourse as can be seen from Dr. Surin 
Pitsuwan’s proposal to set up the ASEAN-PMC Caucus on Human Security 
when he was Thailand’s Minister of Foreign Affairs (1998c). Since 1998, 
human rights norm continues to cascade until the contentious part of the 
lifeworld is not whether or not human rights should be incorporated in the 
codification of the ASEAN Charter, but whether there should be a regional 
legally binding mechanism to deal with the protection and promotion of 
human rights. The debate moved from the emphasis on the norm’s inherent 
character to its implications on regional cooperation as well as the authority 
and responsibility of the regional mechanism. 
The thesis does not intend to make a sweeping claim that ASEAN has 
fully incorporated the norm without any reference back to the particular 
historical and cultural background. ASEAN still maintains its usual reservation 
and is still reluctant to embrace the compete universality of human rights. 
Nonetheless, member countries actually made conscious effort not to appear 
hostile to the concept. Opposing to human rights concept could reflect badly 
upon them. This will be demonstrated later in the chapter.  
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6.3 The development of human rights mechanism in ASEAN  
 Until recently, Asia is the only one region without any regional human 
rights mechanism. It was deemed a disappointment (Leary 1990, 13) since all 
other major parts have all devised their regional systems. Again, even though 
some countries in ASEAN suffered from colonization, it was on a different 
scale from what Africa (which even has a regional Charter on Human Rights 
in place) experienced. For example, Thailand was never fully colonized, and 
other decolonized ones were quick to establish their independence with 
ferocious emphasis on non-intervention. As explained in earlier chapters, this 
core norm in the ASEAN Way also contributes to adherence to minimal 
institutionalism as well as avoidance of legally binding mechanism. 
Nevertheless, there has never been a lack of effort from outside the region to 
encourage the establishment of human rights regional mechanism.      
In 1982 the UN held the Seminar on National, Local and Regional 
Arrangements for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in the 
Asian Region at Colombo. Sixteen Asia-Pacific member-states were 
represented. This is the first UN-organized workshop on regional 
arrangement on human rights for Asia-Pacific. It took eight years before the 
UN started to sponsor the yearly intergovernmental workshop on regional 
arrangement on human rights for the Asia-Pacific in 1990 (Plantilla 2000). 
The workshop considered the advisability of establishing an Asian Human 
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Rights Commission (Welch, Jr., and Leary 1990, p. 16). The result was that 
government representatives from Asian countries attending the seminar did 
not recommend the establishment of such a commission.  
 However, in response to the World Conference on Human Rights, the 
1993 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting endorsed the idea that there should be a 
regional human rights mechanism, in line with paragraph 36 of the Vienna 
Declaration. The Declaration (1993) highlights the role played by national 
institutions as part of the human rights architecture. Indonesia and Thailand 
started preparatory steps towards national human rights institutions (Thio 
1999, 61-75).  
In 1996, ASEAN declared that no regional human rights mechanism 
could be set up unless each member country forms its own national human 
rights commission, or at the very least, the human rights ‘focal point’ such as 
a parliamentary committee (Working Group on an ASEAN Human Rights 
Mechanism 2005, para. 2). It seemed like a typical ‘one step forward, two 
steps backward’ diplomatic move. ASEAN was generally reluctant to establish 
a region-wide mechanism in the pre-crisis era.  
After the Vision 2020 was in place in order to forge closer cooperation 
in light of the crisis, Thailand’s Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai called for the 
development of an ASEAN permanent Human Rights Commission in May 
1998 as a part of realizing the goals. The talks regarding the establishment of 
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a regional human rights mechanism floated about in the air without any real 
commitment yet. Since ASEAN operation is based generally on consensus and 
mutual agreement, it is keen to move all ten members forward without 
singling or leaving some behind. However, the prospects of having national 
human rights institution in every country as a prerequisite to a regional 
mechanism seemed quite farfetched at the time when some of the newer 
members still wanted to focus on how to do better economically.    
The emphasis, it seems, has always been on the promotion of human 
rights and limitations of derogations to sovereignty. In an interview with 
author in 2011, an ex-SOM Leader requesting to be anonymous stated that 
the sentiments among leaders from his experience are that a regional Human 
Rights Commission can be developed “if it is not harmful to national 
interests”. On the other hand, some seem to think that ASEAN has been on 
the right path. In an interview with author, a retired high-level official in the 
ASEAN Secretariat requesting to be anonymous saw that ASEAN has 
cooperated on human rights issues since 1993 and did not back down. It is a 
“step up” and a “positive sign” that ASEAN appears more and more 
cooperative regarding this issue. Indeed, ASEAN has come a long way since 
its inception in 1967 where state-centric security was enshrined and human-
centric norms are at best under ‘human development’. However, overall it 
has adamantly qualified the universal characteristics of human rights, fearing 
intervention from outside. It is not surprising that the older Members with 
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the established NHRIs are more comfortable with the concept, but 
convincing the newer Members proved to be hard work. Human rights 
codification and the debate on the AHRB was the most controversial issue in 
the drafting process.  
 
6.4 Codifying human rights and other human-centric norms in the ASEAN 
Charter 
6.41 Human rights in Preamble, Article 1 Purposes and Article 2 
Principles 
Human rights are mentioned explicitly in the Preamble, Article 1, and 
Article 2. It is useful to note that ASEAN rarely mentions human rights as a 
conceptual framework in its agreement before the ASEAN Charter (and 
avoids the use of human security – another human-centric norm), although it 
often uses terms such as human development, people-centred, and 
community. Human rights were not codified in the inaugural Declaration. It is 
now set up first and foremost that ASEAN accepts and is willing to enshrine 
the concept in its formal codifications of norms. This emphasizes the point 
that the validity claim of human rights is intact, also due to the concerted 
efforts of the NGOs and the CSOs in the region. It has become an 
unquestioned part of the lifeworld through the long process of norm 
interaction since ASEAN first experienced it directly in the 1990s. Artificial 
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lifeworld created and continuously maintained can also be the source 
Members draw upon when deciding on a particular matter (Deitelhoff and 
Müller 2005) although it was not home-grown (hence, the term artificial). 
The contentious issue was whether any concrete mechanism to execute the 
norm should exist (and later, the extent of the mechanism’s authority and its 
function).   
In an interview with author, a Thai high-level official requesting to be 
anonymous confirmed that members are generally benign about including 
the concept in the Charter. However, there was an underlying understanding 
that each member country retained the right to decide how to approach the 
issue. The Thai official attended many drafting meetings, and saw that 
members were careful not to ‘copy’ the UN. They wanted to have a 
distinctive voice for ASEAN. Human security, another human-centric value, 
was excluded from the Charter (and any other formal ASEAN document, for 
the matter). Thailand which is the only country in Southeast Asia attempting 
to incorporate human security in its policy resulting in the establishment of 
Ministry of Human Security and Social Development tried to pushed for the 
concept as a number of its leaders as well as Minister of Foreign Affairs have 
been doing since after the economic crisis (Pitsuwan 1998c), but the 
Philippines and Indonesia saw that it should be excluded. Thailand is the only 
country in Southeast Asia with the Ministry of Social Development and 
Human Security. It can be said that Thailand already embraced the norm at 
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the domestic level and tried to influence the actors at the international level, 
acting as a norm entrepreneur. This effort failed partly due to the fear that 
human security would be a free card to intervention from outside the region. 
Other member countries thought that the concept could be used as a pretext 
for humanitarian intervention (as mentioned by a Thai high-level official 
requesting to be anonymous in an interview with author in 2011). The core 
norm of non-intervention and respect for national sovereignty is very robust 
and precluded any codification of opposing norms. It is interesting that to 
concede with AIPA’s wishes, the HLTF agreed that ‘the elements of human 
development and human security would be in the Charter’ (Summary Record 
of the Seventh Meeting). This seemed to be another rhetoric since the 
inclusion of human security was after all opposed by the majority of drafters. 
However, the HLTF agreed only to the ‘elements’ pertaining to the concept 
and not the ‘term’ itself.   
6.42 ASEAN Human Rights Body in Article 14  
The Seventh HLTF Meeting during June 25-28, 2007 in Indonesia is the 
first time the drafters discussed human rights body in detail. Singapore and 
Thailand was represented by alternates (Walter Woon and Manasvi 
Srisodapol, respectively). The Secretary General was also present. There were 
meetings with non-state actors prior to the negotiation. The HLTF decided 
during the first day that it would have dialogue sessions with the NHRIs from 
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Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand including Mr. Marzuki 
Darusman, the Co-Chair of the Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights 
Mechanism in the morning of June 27 (Summary Record of the Seventh 
Meeting). In response to AIPA’s proposal earlier in May, the HLTF reassured 
the civil society again that it would follow through with drafting an enabling 
provision for a human rights body as well as propose terms of reference for 
this new body (Summary Record of the Seventh Meeting, Annex 9). 
In the afternoon of June 28, 2007, the HLTF held a closed 
brainstorming session to discuss the idea to establish an ASEAN Human 
Rights Commission. What was agreed without dispute and remained 
unchanged regarding the AHRB’s function is the composition of the organ, 
which is ten eminent persons, one each from the Member States. This in turn 
reflects the core value of sovereign equality which remains an unquestioned 
part of the lifeworld. At that time, the name for the AHRB was undetermined 
and several titles have been put forth during the discussions including the 
Forum, Board, Body, Agency, and Mechanism (Summary of the Seventh 
Meeting, Annex 10). This actually showed uncertainty on the part of the HLTF 
regarding the AHRB’s function. Nonetheless, they decided that the exact title 
can be determined later on. The TOR for an AHRB was initially drafted by the 
ASEC based on the HLTF discussions. The HLTF members see that the AHRB 
should promote and protect human rights as a fundamental mission.  
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The idea that ASEAN should still develop and articulate its own 
definition and concept of human rights and fundamental freedom survived. 
For ASEAN, there is no one legitimate, universally applicable concept of 
human rights. An “ASEAN’s approach” to the promotion and protection of 
human rights calls for “a balance between rights and responsibilities of 
individuals and the State” (Summary Record of the Seventh Meeting, Annex 
10).  
The AHRB’s responsibilities as conceived by the HLTF members only 
endorse the legacy of 1993 when the drafted TOR maintains that it is the 
primary role of each ASEAN Member State to promote and protect human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with national law and policy. 
The TOR barred any sovereignty derogation or pooling of the sovereignty 
which could happen when a regional mechanism is set up. It also states that 
the AHRB shall resist external influence attempting to interfere in the human 
rights issues of any ASEAN Member State. The guiding principles, 
unsurprisingly, include respect for national independence, sovereignty, 
equality, and territorial integrity of all ASEAN Member States as well as non-
interference in the internal affairs of the members. The AHRB shall respect 
the right of every ASEAN Member State to lead its national existence free 
from external interference, subversion, and coercion (Summary Record of 
the Seventh Meeting, Annex 10).  
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Despite of the brainstorming, the drafted TOR was not included in the 
Charter. (Summary Record of the Seventh Meeting, Annex 9). Nonetheless, it 
still reflected the majority of the views of the drafters regarding the functions 
of an external body such as the AHRB. It reflected the shared understanding 
they drew from the lifeworld. Because the artificial lifeworld created by the 
NGOs and CSOs can only open the normative space for the negotiators to 
debate the norm but the universality of the norm promoted is not culturally 
transmitted within the region, the actors only arrive at the constructed 
meaning that human rights should still be promoted on the backdrop of 
member states’ concerns. Human rights as a concept should be promoted 
and protected with regard to the rights and responsibilities of the Member 
States. Even though the establishment of the AHRB was recommended by 
the Ministers after the Second Meeting, its function should not in any way 
trample with the core norm of equal sovereignty and non-interference. Other 
practices stemmed from the core norm of the ASEAN Way that still forms the 
unquestioned part of the lifeworld are also maintained in the TOR namely 
that decision-making must be through friendly consultation and consensus. 
Everything must move forward “at a pace comfortable to all” (Summary 
Record of the Seventh Meeting, Annex 10). 
Although the HLTF Members agreed that drafting the TOR was not 
their responsibilities, drafting the clause establishing the AHRB for the 
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Charter caused the rift among the HLTF during the Eighth Meeting. On the 
evening of July 26, the members of the HLTF were divided into three camps: 
1) the CLMV questioned the creation of an ASEAN Human Rights 
Commission since there were some uncertainties in the last Meeting and 
they doubted whether it is necessary after all.  
2) Indonesia and Thailand were in favour of creating one; and  
3) Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore occupied the 
middle ground (mentioned by a Thai high-level official requesting to be 
anonymous in an interview with author in 2011). 
The HLTF discussed the possibility of recommending to the ASEAN 
Foreign Ministers the following draft provision [“ASEAN shall/may establish 
an ASEAN human rights body, at a time acceptable to all ASEAN Member 
States to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms of 
the people in ASEAN.”] The bracket indicates that consensus has not yet 
been reached. 
On July 28, 2007, the Chairperson (at that time Rosario G. Manalo) 
informed the HLTF that her Foreign Minister had rejected the formulation. 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore also informed the meeting that their 
Foreign Ministers had also rejected the formulation as falling below their 
instruction given in Siem Reap (Koh 2009, 59). The Chairperson put forth her 
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new draft formulation as follows: “ASEAN shall establish an ASEAN Human 
Rights Commission to promote and protect human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of the people of ASEAN. Participation in the Commission is open to 
Member States ready to do so” (Summary Record of the Eighth Meeting). 
The proposal was supported by Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand and again 
rejected by the CLMV. According to the Singaporean HLTF member, “strong 
words were exchanged and emotions ran high” (Koh 2009, 59). Talks on 
establishing the AHRB proved to be the most controversial in the drafting 
process of the Charter where most of the time the negotiating atmosphere 
was amicable and peaceful. 
The Secretary-General stepped in to mediate and proposed a new 
draft formulation stating that [“In conformity with the purpose and principles 
of the ASEAN Charter relating to the protection and promotion of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, ASEAN shall cooperate to establish an 
ASEAN human rights body/organ/commission.”] The HLTF member from 
Myanmar requested that the above draft formulation be put in brackets 
because Myanmar still has some reservations (Summary Record of the Eighth 
Meeting, Addendum 1). Together with the contentious issues regarding 
rejection of unconstitutional government (as dealt with in 5.42), the HLTF 
submitted the clause on AHRB to the Foreign Ministers in the Second 
Progress Report on July 30, 2007. 
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Following the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ consideration of the HLTF’s 
Second Progress Report, the Chairperson briefed the HLTF Members on key 
decisions of ASEAN Foreign Ministers. The HLTF are to use the following text: 
“In conformity with the purposes and principles of the ASEAN Charter 
relating to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, ASEAN shall establish an ASEAN human rights body.” Again, the 
controversy was settled in the second-party context sought willingly by the 
HLTF members when they could not reach an agreement. In both 
contentious issues, the authoritative role of the Ministers was evident in 
settling the outstanding conceptual conflict (whether there should be a 
clause rejecting unconstitutional government and whether there should be a 
concrete mechanism like an AHRB) while the neutral mediator (the 
Chairperson) was essential in bringing about the agreement on technicalities 
among national delegates (whether there are too many repetitions of the 
concept in the Charter text and that the TOR should have the approval from 
the Ministers). 
This was evidenced in the Ninth Meeting where there was a 
disagreement on how much the Charter should touch upon the function of 
the AHRB. However, the Secretary-General’s attempt to water down the 
clause and bridge the gap before the issues were submitted to the Ministers 
was not as successful because the contentious issue at that time was still on 
the framework level and not the technicalities.    
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The Ninth Meeting saw the change of chairmanship from the 
Philippines to Singapore, with Professor Tommy Koh replacing Ms. Rosario 
Manalo. (Ms. Manalo resumed her position as the Philippines national 
delegate). The modus operandi also changed accordingly since Koh informed 
the Meeting at the very beginning in his opening remarks that he would sit 
apart from his national delegation (Walter Woon) in order to serve as a 
neutral Chairman (Summary Record of the Ninth Meeting, Agenda 2). In an 
interview with author, a Singaporean high-level official who requested to be 
anonymous mentioned that this was Koh’s intention from the beginning 
since he felt that he and Woon could focus on the task better this way. Woon 
also served as the ‘cleaner’ or ‘scrubber’ of the text based on his legal 
background. In an e-mail correspondence with author, a retired Singaporean 
Ambassador who requested to be anonymous confirmed this. He mentioned 
that Koh would not be able to play a role of mediator as well if he did not 
detach himself from the national delegate’s duties.  
The HLTF Member from Viet Nam reconfirmed the principal position 
of Viet Nam that the future AHRB would have consultative status. The HLTF 
Member from the Philippines stated that there were no instructions from the 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers on the functions on the proposed human rights 
body (Summary Record of the Ninth Meeting). Since both sides remained 
rhetorical while other Members felt that they should first talk to their 
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respective Foreign Ministers or Leaders, the Ninth Meeting ended without 
any settled compromise.   
The Tenth Meeting was held in Chiang Mai during September 10-14, 
2007. The HLTF Member from Philippines, Ms. Manalo, (formerly acted as 
the Chairperson) said that the body’s function would include monitoring (in 
line with the AIPA) and that its TOR should be taken up by a group of experts 
after the Charter has been signed. On the other hand, Cambodia, Laos, 
Myanmar and Vietnam (in other words, the CLMV) took the position that the 
TOR must be finished by the HLTF as a package with the enabling provision 
and that the AHRB would only have consultative status (Koh 2009, 62). The 
Philippines were among the few in the brainstorming session during the 
Seventh Meeting who saw that the AHRB should have more authority. The 
CLMV felt that they could better ‘control’ what the AHRB would be able to do 
if they were also involved  in the drafting.  
While the atmosphere deteriorated, the new Chairperson organized a 
working dinner on September 12, hoping that the colleagues would feel 
more relaxed “in a dinner setting”. He hoped an informal environment would 
break the impasse between the two groups. This was not the case. According 
to the Chairperson, disagreement over the AHRB led to “strong words… one 
colleague threatening to pack his bag and go home… Rosario Manalo was so 
worked up that she went into the men’s toilet by mistake!” (Koh 2009, 63).    
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The mode of communication during the Tenth Meeting and 
particularly during that dinner was characteristically competitive bargaining 
since threats were issued. (When asked who ‘the colleague’ was, all 
interviewees refused to answer). The dinner adjourned without any common 
ground. On the morning of September 13, the Chair found that the HLTF 
members had gathered themselves into two different rooms. The CLMV were 
on the ground floor and Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Thailand on the upper floor. Singapore then assumed the role of mediator. 
The Chair and his national delegate spent the whole morning going back and 
forth between the two groups, trying to compromise.  
Finally, at around noon, the two sides agreed to accept a compromise 
consisting of two elements: 
1) the inclusion of an additional paragraph in the Charter on the AHRB 
that “the ASEAN human rights body shall operate in accordance with the 
terms of reference to be determined by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers which 
becomes Article 14(2) in the ASEAN Charter; 
2) an informal discussion on the ASEC’s concept paper on “Possible 
Elements for Inclusion in the TOR of an AHRB.”   
When the Third Progress Report was submitted to the ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers on September 26 in New York, it was stated that the text 
represents the consensus views of the HLTF (Summary Record of the 
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Eleventh Meeting, Annex 3). At the request of the Foreign Minister of 
Singapore, the HLTF was to submit no more than two issues to the IAMM. 
The HLTF Chairman informed his colleagues of this suggestion. Koh was 
careful to appear only as a messenger and appealed that this would be more 
efficient for the drafting process as a whole. It was different from when the 
Chairperson was also the national delegate which could be seen as only 
representing Philippines national interests.  
The HLTF requested the Foreign Ministers to adopt a second 
paragraph of the Article on the AHRB in the Charter (Summary Record of the 
Eleventh Meeting, Annex 3) as achieved through the compromise and 
mediation by the Singaporean Chair and his national delegate. This 
confirmed (as dealt with in the previous chapter) that the HLTF did not 
operate in the first-party context, but relied on the authority of the Foreign 
Ministers to approve and therefore legitimize their compromise. It is the self-
imposed second-party context. Article 14(2) in the ASEAN Charter reads “This 
ASEAN human rights body shall operate in accordance with the terms of 
reference to be determined by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting”. Since 
then, the High Level Task Force was set up at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ 
Retreat in Singapore in February 2008 to draft the TOR. The ASEAN 
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) was established as 
the ASEAN Human Rights Body according to what the Charter prescribes. It 
remains strictly intergovernmental in the sense that national sovereignty will 
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not be compromised in any way; therefore; it cannot receive any complaints. 
The AICHR further codifies human rights norm in ASEAN Human Rights 
Declaration while still opted for a typical reservation. Item 7 in the General 
Principles reads  
All human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and 
interrelated. All human rights and fundamental freedoms in this 
Declaration must be treated in a fair and equal manner, on the same 
footing and with the same emphasis. At the same time, the realization 
of human rights must be considered in the regional and national 
context bearing in mind different political, economic, legal, social, 
cultural, historical and religious backgrounds.    
 
This only confirms the points that ASEAN still maintains its point of 
view or tenet regarding the concept of human rights. Although they 
recognize that human rights are universal and indivisible, they also state that 
the realization of the concept must be considered in the context where there 
are different backgrounds among the countries. This is still a reservation 
leaning towards state-centric agenda. As discussed above, the NGOs and 
CSOs have had important role in the region interacting with track II 
diplomatic officials, attempting to socialise them as well as disseminating 
information opening up the normative space, thus providing an artificial 
lifeworld for the debate related to human rights. However, because the 
artificial lifeworld is not culturally transmitted, implicit to the understanding 
of the actors like existing state-centric lifeworld manifested through the 
ASEAN Way, the actors still do not define themselves in terms of absolute 
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human rights defender. They do recognize the importance of the norms in 
the provided normative space, but universal human rights without any 
reservations is still not ‘who they are’.   
6.43 Testing the setting that arguments will prevail: Article 14 in 
retrospect 
1) Whether overlapping role identities are likely to increase the 
likelihood that arguing leads to persuasion. The HLTF members did not have 
other role than national delegates. Again, separating the identity of national 
delegate from the chair proved to be useful in inducing compromise. When 
Koh assumed the role of mediator, his national delegate also helped him. 
However, Koh made sure that the parties knew that the initiative came from 
him (mentioned by a Singaporean high-level official requesting to be 
anonymous in an interview with author in 2011). Therefore, separate role 
identities are likely to increase the likelihood that arguing leads to persuasion. 
This is in line with the findings of Chapter VIII formulation in the previous 
chapter.    
2) Whether a transparent or closed negotiation setting is more 
conducive to persuasion. The HLTF met a lot more external actors than when 
they were considering Chapter VIII. However, this did not change the fact 
that the HLTF still operated in closed negotiating environment most of the 
time because it was not the purpose to negotiate with the civil society. 
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Similar to when the HLTF Members did not consider the EPG as their 
audience to seek approval from, they did not try to impress the civil society 
group more than appearing accommodating and polite. When I was doing my 
research at the Institute of ASEAN Studies in Singapore during the field trip, I 
had a chance to watch the video recording of the Meeting between the HLTF 
and the civil society group (it is the only video recording allowed in all the 
HLTF Meetings). The HLTF made sure that the ‘rule of the game’ was known 
to the civil society group, i.e. they cannot guarantee the external request 
would find its way into the text, disclosing the text is unfortunately ‘very 
difficult’ and that they have to seek approval from the Ministers. If this 
constitutes transparent setting (since the video recording is deposited in a 
library and the Meeting was attended by various non-state groups), it did not 
encourage the members to “speak out of the box” more than the closed 
setting. All in all, the HLTF adhere to its rule of the game closely regardless of 
the nature of the space. 
3) Whether an institutional setting that privileges authority based on 
expertise and/or moral competence or leadership of a neutral chair is more 
conducive to persuasion. This also confirmed the findings when Chapter VIII 
was studied. Institutional norms and procedures of ASEAN do not particularly 
privilege authority based on expertise. The role of neutral chairmanship is 
more important to the negotiation. Some of the AIPA’s request was in the 
Charter namely good governance and the uphold of the principle of human 
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rights, but it was caused by the Ministers’ approval more than the expert 
opinion and justification from AIPA. The civil society wished that the AHRB 
should have more authority in its monitoring capacity, but the AIHCR 
established as a result of Article 14 was strictly intergovernmental. On the 
other hand, neutral chairmanship was more conducive to persuasion 
although Koh was able to achieve only the lowest common denominator. 
However, at that time, a compromise was better than stagnancy caused by 
two groups of the HLTF Members in separate rooms. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
Human rights as a concept was codified with reservation derived from 
the core norm of equal sovereignty and non-interference which constitute 
the unquestioned lifeworld. The artificial lifeworld created by non-state 
actors originally to provide a normative space stuck through although it is 
arguably less robust than the lifeworld derived within the region which was 
tried and test. However, ASEAN was less reluctant in establishing a more 
concrete regional mechanism, which is a deviation from their former 
practices as explained earlier. In the communication to reach the common 
agreement, the role of a neutral Chairman proved to be essential, but 
secondary to seeking advice from external authority which is already ‘rules of 
the game’. 
269 
 
Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
7.1 Summaries of findings and research question revisited 
 At the very beginning of the research project, central research 
questions were posed to find out how the ASEAN core norms manifested in 
the ASEAN Way have been affected through the process of norm 
contestation in the development of the ASEAN Charter and to discover 
whether ASEAN is conducive to the use of arguments or communicative 
action. The thesis posits to answer the questions through an analytical 
framework of critical constructivism incorporating the concept of 
Habermasian lifeworld as shared background knowledge to explain how 
norms are legitimized and codified through communication mode during the 
negotiation in the form of arguing and bargaining. It was argued that the core 
norms in the ASEAN Way constitute important parts of lifeworld, since 
lifeworld itself is more than a set of norms. The concept incorporates implicit 
knowledge the actors fall back to and draw upon as well as the way they 
define themselves. Further distinction was made between arguing and 
bargaining since actors sometimes reason when they argue. Forms of arguing 
and bargaining supplement the understanding of how actors act in a 
negotiation.    
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Along the journey to answer the research questions, two main 
provisions that proposed unprecedented practices in ASEAN interstate 
conduct were chosen: Chapter VIII dispute settlement of conflict and Article 
14 establishing human rights body. The ASEAN Way consists of six core 
norms, i.e. 1) sovereign equality; 2) non-recourse to the use of force and the 
peaceful settlement of conflict; 3) non-interference and non-intervention; 4) 
non-involvement of ASEAN to address unresolved bilateral conflict between 
members 5) quiet diplomacy; and 6) mutual respect and tolerance. After the 
analysis of both main provisions, it can be seen that the ASEAN Charter 
upholds sovereign equality, non-recourse to the use of force and the 
peaceful settlement of conflict, and non-interference and non-intervention 
most explicitly. Sovereign equality, non-recourse to the use of force and the 
peaceful settlement of disputes already constitute parts of the ASEAN 
lifeworld, and actors did not question the norms validity claims. They moved 
on to discuss the problematic part of the lifeworld, non-interference and 
non-intervention, when they were discussing both provisions. They discussed 
how far ASEAN representatives should be able to get involved in mediating 
disputes between member countries, and how much authority the human 
rights body should have. The norm of non-interference was questioned 
before by member countries representatives such as Mahathir and Surin 
Pitsuwan, making it susceptible to doubts. At the end, non-interference was 
codified in the Charter throughout from the beginning, signifying that the 
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actors are still satisfied to define themselves and perceive one another this 
way. Non-interference is still part of their lifeworld. Non-involvement of 
ASEAN to address unresolved bilateral conflict between members was 
weakened through the negotiation and norm contestation in formulating 
Chapter VIII. It is not as robust as before since ASEAN represented by the 
Secretary-General and the Chairman has more authority in mediation. The 
EPG actually envisioned that the Secretary-General should be empowered, 
and Singapore by the HLTF Chair used cooperative bargaining, trading one 
issue area for another (in this case Secretary-General empowerment for 
referring the topic of human rights body to the ASEAN Foreign Ministers). 
The Secretary-General at that time (a Singaporean) proposed a formulation 
similar to the EPG report regarding the role of the Secretary-General of 
ASEAN in facilitating and monitoring progress in the implementation of all 
ASEAN agreements including cases of non-compliance. The Singaporean 
Chair then echoed this proposal, trading one issue area for another as 
mentioned above. From a critical constructivist viewpoint, one or more 
actors might try to assume narrative or representation of the situation. In 
this case, Singapore by gathering support from the HLTF-EI and employing 
cooperative bargaining was successful in persuading other actors. Since 
reality cannot exist independently, actors constantly construct the meaning 
of the norm within the context. They render incorporating democracy in the 
Charter time and again ‘redundant’, empowering Secretary-General 
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‘necessary’, non-interference ‘central’ and so on (mentioned by a Thai high-
level official requesting to be anonymous in an interview with author in 
2011). Since non-intervention and non-interference is still robust and already 
codified, ASEAN cannot act without request from disputing members. 
However, the Cambodia-Thai border dispute was analysed to show the 
leeway the Charter afford to the officials in practice. 
Quiet diplomacy and mutual respect and tolerance were questioned 
during the negotiation to include the clause of expulsion and withdrawal. 
Myanmar employed competitive arguing when the delegate countered the 
EPG Chair’s proposal. By appealing to the rhetorics of unity and solidarity, 
Myanmar was successful in protecting its own national standpoint. The 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers also decided that suspension, expulsion and 
withdrawal need not be mentioned in the ASEAN Charter. The HLTF, 
although not required by their TOR, always looks upon the ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers as an added source of legitimacy. Viewing this from critical 
constructivist point of view, we can see that although delegates viewed and 
understood one another as equals during the negotiation in the sense that 
smaller states were able to question and raise opinions, the negotiators 
impose external source of legitimacy upon themselves – the Foreign 
Ministers. Power relations thus exist during the drafting, not necessarily 
always among the drafters themselves, but distinctively between the drafters 
and the ASEAN Foreign Ministers. Threats to ‘walk out’, ‘go home’ among the 
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drafters were often met with (good-natured) ridicule (Bwa 2009) or some 
mediation to bring back the deviant delegate so that the negotiation could 
continue. However, the drafters willingly submit issues they cannot agree 
among themselves (albeit with their comments) to the Foreign Ministers to 
decide. Once the Foreign Ministers make the decision, that is that. The 
drafters did not deviate from what the Foreign Ministers deem ‘the right 
thing to do’ or ‘the right thing to include in the Charter’, not even once. 
‘Unmasking’ power relations or dominant and subordinate social realities 
along the critical constructivist line reveals that when in doubt, the Foreign 
Ministers’ narrative and constructed meaning of the norm is more powerful 
than that of the drafters, even though the Foreign Ministers were not 
involved directly with the task of drafting the ASEAN Charter.  
Quiet diplomacy and mutual respect and tolerance relate closely to 
the practice of consensus which was deemed an essential mode of decision 
making as demonstrated in every meeting. Therefore, both are still intact. 
The CLMV employed competitive arguing again when they opposed inclusion 
of democracy in the Charter. They attempted to clarify the understanding of 
this normative principle, but their intentions were not to invoke common and 
better understanding. They did not prepare to change their views.      
The effect of the 1997 economic crisis was used to serve as a turning 
point in norm evolution. Its effects are two-folded. It provided an 
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opportunity for human centric norms to be considered, bolstered by artificial 
lifeworld created and maintained by the non-state actors. Artificial lifeworld 
was needed for norm grafting of human rights because it was perceived that 
the norm originated from elsewhere. On the other hand, peaceful settlement 
of dispute and non-recourse to the use of force was an unquestioned part of 
the lifeworld and actors need not clarify the norm before negotiating. 
The economic crisis also led to ASEAN Vision 2020 which is among the 
first documents that pave the way towards the ASEAN Charter. It made 
ASEAN realize that it needs to cooperate more closely. In contextualizing the 
development of the Charter, ASEAN is viewed as a social setting where 
negotiation – social communication - took place. Still, even though power 
relations between the Foreign Ministers and the drafters are revealed, the 
second research question remains. Is ASEAN conducive to communicative 
action for norm endurance? In an ASEAN context, the setting that induces 
the use of arguments can be summarized as below. The criteria is adapted 
from Risse and Kleine (2009) as discussed in detail earlier in Chapter 2: 
1) ASEAN does not favour overlapping role identities. When the 
identity of national delegate was separated from the identity of Chairperson, 
it was received more favorably. Most of the time the HLTF members do not 
feel uncertain about appropriate behaviour since they subscribe to the 
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established ‘rules of the game’ where they seek advice from the Foreign 
Ministers when in doubt. This decreases the need to argue.  
2) Most of the time, the HLTF Members operated in closed 
environment except for when they seek advice from the Foreign Ministers. 
They met and interacted with non-state actors and other officials, but do not 
think of them as “audience” to receive consent from. When meeting with 
non-state actors, they operated in more transparent space. However, they 
are quite certain of the preferences and needs of the non-state actors as well 
as their agenda. This also decreases the need to argue.  
3) ASEAN institutional norms and procedures do not privilege 
authority based on expertise and/or moral competence but prefer neutral 
Chairmanship. This corresponds to proposition 3b stating that the more 
institutional norms and procedures require neutral chairs of negotiations in 
centralized settings, the more leadership is conducive to the prevalence of 
arguing. It can be seen when Koh assumed Chairmanship and delegated the 
national representation to his colleague. He was able to act as honest broker, 
achieve compromise and solve the stalemate during human rights 
mechanism codification. However, the inductive social setting by no means 
guarantee that arguments will be used instead of bargaining. It only increases 
the opportunity that arguments can be used and lead to persuasion. 
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This can also explain why, despite very accommodating environment 
for communicative rationality such as empathy, perceived equality, and 
shared common lifeworld, actors did not engage in cooperative arguing 
during the negotiaion. Cooperative arguing will work best when power 
recedes to the background. Employing critical constructivist framework, this 
might be difficult since there might be one or more actors attempting to 
dominate the discourse or the construction of meaning. Threats were used 
occasionally to signify dissatisfaction and coerced others to comply to 
particular wants. The only exception of cooperative arguing usage was when 
the EPG Chair was invited to attend the First Meeting. He argued and 
justified to achieve better course of action and understanding. However, the 
Chair did not possess the drafting power as the HLTF members. 
All in all, even when the negotiating environment accommodates the 
use of communicative rationality, the actors might choose not to. The 
preferred mode of communication during the drafting of the ASEAN Charter 
was competitive arguing (rhetorics) and cooperative bargaining by trading off 
and clarifying one’s preferred course of action.  The actors would appeal to 
common, attractive norms such as equality, solidarity and unity in order to 
protect their standpoint in competitive arguing (as in where Myanmar 
opposed expulsion clause) or appeal to the idea that some issues should be 
traded off in exchange for the next round compromise in cooperative 
bargaining (as in where Singapore appeals to the members regarding the 
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empowerment of Secretary-General). Competitive bargaining was used a lot 
less in the HLTF negotiation. Apart from the disputes surrounding human 
rights mechanism codification, the use of competitive bargaining was 
deemed too costly since they still have other governing negotiating style in 
place such as appear non-hostile in order to ‘win the next round’ (mentioned 
by a Thai high-level official requesting to be anonymous in an interview with 
author in 2011).  
 
7.2 The main contribution of the thesis to ASEAN studies and social 
constructivism  
  There is a gap in existing literature on the formulation process of the 
ASEAN Charter especially how the two main provisions which constitute 
unprecedented practice in ASEAN were developed. The reason that the 
development of the Charter which entails the negotiating process is a 
difficult subject to study is partly because the primary sources are difficult to 
access. This project began in 2009, only a year after the Charter was ratified. 
Throughout 2007 when the Charter was being negotiated, the process was 
shrouded in secrecy most of the time. It really happened behind closed doors. 
The fieldwork was conducted in 2011 when the request to access the archive 
at the Secretariat was approved. By being able to access the Records of all 
thirteen Meetings for the first time, the thesis hopes to shed light on how the 
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ASEAN Charter came to look like it does with special regard to Chapter VIII 
dispute settlement mechanism and Article 14 which establishes human rights. 
Elite interviews were also generally difficult to secure since ASEAN officials 
prefer to look at the end result as a common effort without singling any one 
out.   
These two provisions were deemed most important in the research 
design since they prescribe unprecedented practices in more than four 
decades since the organization’s conception in 1967. Other provisions codify 
existing robust norms and practices such as consensus, national sovereignty, 
and non-intervention and non-interference. However, Chapter VIII bestows 
increased authority to the Secretary-General and Chairman, and Article 14 
prescribes a regional concrete mechanism dealing specifically with human 
rights in the region that used to strictly adhere to minimal institutionalism. 
The core norm of non-involvement of ASEAN in member’s unresolved 
disputes was weakened as a result of norm contestation when a part of the 
lifeworld was questioned.  
 Habermasian lifeworld is a relatively new framework in studying 
ASEAN. As discussed in the analytical framework, lifeworld goes beyond a set 
of regional norms. For the operationalization purposes, the thesis maintains 
that core norms in the ASEAN Way constitute instrumental parts in the 
shared, common lifeworld in ASEAN. A part of lifeworld can become 
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problematic by consistent questioning from members in the society, and the 
members must come together to debate the norm validity claims, to see if it 
is still relevant. Unproblematic part of the lifeworld remains at the backdrop 
of the negotiation, providing common background where negotiators can 
draw upon. Lifeworld still does not end there. It incorporates culturally 
transmitted pattern of understanding, implicit background knowledge, the 
way the actors perceive themselves and others. However, this must be 
employed critically, in a self-reflective way. If asked ‘why do you do this?’, 
‘why do you believe such-and-such?’ – based on the lifeworld, the answer 
might ultimately incorporate something like ‘because this is who I am’ – this 
is who we are (Frank 2000). This explains why ASEAN leaders and officials in 
general take offense when the ASEAN Way is under attack, why they often 
fall back on this mantra when asked about regional solutions to regional 
problems, why they still deem it relevant. It is part of who they think they are 
and how they would expect other members to behave. But this can also 
change if the meaning is reconstructed anew. We must not treat norms 
embedded in the ASEAN Way as a rather fixed concept along conventional 
constructivist line. The actors construct the meaning of the norm, and their 
role can also constitute change. Norms can always be contested, leading to 
change in meaning or implementation. This is true in the case of non-
involvement of ASEAN. Before the Charter explicitly grants the authority to 
the Secretary-General and the Chair to mediate disputes, one or more ASEAN 
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countries might offer themselves as mediators to the disputing parties. That 
act is in their own capacity, not because they represent ASEAN. However, 
after the Charter members could expect more involvement from ASEAN 
Secretary-General or Chairman in a dispute. Even though disputing parties 
have to endorse their efforts, we can expect to see more initiatives coming 
from ASEAN representatives since the legal framework already endorses it as 
in the Cambodian-Thai border dispute where the Secretary-General offered 
himself and was heavily involved. The meaning of the norm change through 
construction – negotiation, and so involvement of ASEAN in disputes is not 
taboo any more. 
The thesis adds value to the field by also analyzing the concept of 
‘artificial lifeworld’. When the lifeworld derived from shared experiences 
have limited normative space to accommodate arguments or discussions of 
new norms, non-state actors who are often norm entrepreneurs try to 
construct, promote, and maintain a new set of shared understanding through 
interactions with government officials, meetings and workshops so that the 
new norm can find its way into existing discourse or discussion. The thesis 
showed that this was evident in human rights codification. It set up ASEAN as 
a social setting where negotiation took place, and analyze the criteria which 
induce persuasion from arguments as summarized above. ASEAN have 
interacted with numerous NGOs and CSOs, but during the drafting the HLTF 
was quite silent to the demand that the Charter text be open to review by 
281 
 
non-state actors. ‘Entities Associated with ASEAN’ (see Annex II) which is 
annex to the ASEAN Charter lists the Working Group for an ASEAN Human 
Rights Mechanism as ‘other stakeholders’, but the ‘stakeholders’ seem to 
work in parallel to the official track given that the AICHR stemming from the 
provision to establish the HRB has much less authority and mandate than 
what the Working Group has been setting out. Nonetheless, the role of NGOs 
and CSOs have been important in disseminating the information and 
socializing track II diplomacy especially the ASEAN-ISIS (also listed in ‘Entities 
Associated with ASEAN), constructing an artificial lifeworld where a 
normative space does not exist before. By illuminating the process of norm 
contestation in ASEAN Charter development, the thesis hopes to provide a 
distinct contribution to ASEAN studies as well as social constructivism and 
norm studies. 
Last but not least, critical constructivist account of ASEAN in particular 
and Southeast Asian in general is still sparse, none exists on the analysis of 
the development of the ASEAN Charter. The thesis hopes to fill this 
intellectual and academic gap by revealing the power structure behind the 
drafting of the ASEAN Charter, apart from how the core norms were affected 
through the process of norm contestation, arguing and bargaining. It might 
be seen as ‘normal procedure’, Foreign Ministers presiding over the 
negotiation and act as advisors. However, the drafters consciously rested the 
ultimate decision-making with them regarding ‘difficult’ issues that they 
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cannot decide on their own, and thus forsook the chance to engage in 
communicative action even though all the conditions proposed by Habermas 
was present. The social setting has also influenced the avoidance of 
communicative action as discussed above. Viewing the HLTF TOR might lead 
us to conclude that the HLTF had authority to decide on what to include in 
the Charter based on what the EPG proposed, but a closer look reveals that 
the opinion of the Foreign Ministers was valued as a way out of a ‘deadlock’, 
instead of engaging in more dialogue. The opinions (or in some cases 
‘directives’) from the Foreign Ministers are much more valued to the 
detriment of other non-state stakeholders in the region. This can be argued 
as ‘reality’ in ASEAN, but we have to bear in mind that constructions of 
reality could enact and reify relations of power. Identifying the structure is 
the first step towards recognition of the situation and towards change. 
Dominant and subordinate structure is usually taken for granted, but once 
we problematize power relations and conceptualize that social reality 
including the meanings of norms are constantly contested, existing situation 
does not have to be legitimized through the study. Employing critical 
constructivist framework proposes to do the opposite: to explore venue for 
change.   
 Regarding the policy contribution, the thesis proposes that ASEAN as a 
social setting for negotiations value neutral chairmanship or leadership more 
than the opinion of experts. If the Chair is seen as neutral, it can induce the 
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use of more arguments. This proposal of course should be studied further 
and applied to different kinds of negotiations with different actors. However, 
neutral leadership appeals directly to the embedded core norm of sovereign 
equality and non-interference and non-intervention. It could be useful in 
conducting a negotiation since overlapping identities such as those of 
chairman and national delegate would be less favourable and receive less 
cooperation than separating the role identities. In his own words, Koh feels 
that, ”I think I made the right decision to act as a neutral chairman... If I were 
not a neutral chairman, I do not think it would have been possible for me to 
act as an honest broker in Chiang Mai and to broker a compromise 
acceptable to the two opposing groups of colleagues” (Koh 2009, 67). 
 
7.3 Possible avenues of future research  
Change in one set of norms may open possibilities for, and even 
logically or ethically require changes in, other norms and practices. The thesis 
demonstrates that non-involvement of ASEAN in members’ disputes was 
weakened as a result of norm contestation while others are still intact. It 
could be studied further which norms or practices are affected since the 
Charter was in place for five years as of now. Moreover, the AICHR and its 
ASEAN Declaration on human rights should be another rich venue for 
evaluation of human rights norm in the region.    
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 Another area that could be of interest is other concepts which were 
omitted from the EPG recommendations and the HLTF negotiations. Many 
are very good ideas that could be useful if realized, such as 
1) Special Fund 
The Chapter IX regarding budget and finance was completed during 
the HLTF 6th meeting. Having been recommended by the Foreign Ministers, 
the HLTF omitted the clauses regarding the Special Fund. There would be no 
specific provisions on funding the Special Fund for Development in order to 
narrow the development gap among member countries as suggested by the 
EPG. As a matter of fact, there is no provision regarding any funding in the 
ASEAN Charter. The Chapter simply proceeds to say that the operational 
budget of the ASEAN Secretariat shall be met by ASEAN member states 
through equal annual contributions which shall be remitted in a timely 
manner.  
2) ASEAN Union 
During HLTF’s First Progress Report to the ASEAN Foreign Ministers, 
the Ministers decided that the term “ASEAN Union” recommended by the 
EPG should not be mentioned in the Charter. The EPG actually saw this as a 
potential surgery to the former principles and objectives. According to the 
EPG Report (2006),  
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The principles and objectives enshrined at ASEAN’s founding have 
served us well and are integral to ASEAN’s future success. At the same 
time, the Charter should update ASEAN’s principles and objectives in 
line with the new realities confronting ASEAN, and to strengthen 
regional solidarity and resilience. The EPG recommends that these 
principles and objectives be reflected in the Charter which broadly 
cover the following areas:… Expressing the resolve to realise an ASEAN 
Community and ultimately an ASEAN Union. (Emphasized by author.) 
The concept of the ASEAN Union remains elusive since Members do 
not want ASEAN to become integrated along the line of the EU. However, it is 
interesting to see where ASEAN will look upon becoming a Community in 
2015.   
 
7.4 Final remarks 
The ASEAN Charter might appear to be a giant compromise of will 
from the first look, some propositions watered down in order to achieve 
consensus. However, it is also the most recently developed structure of 
norms which are binding to the Members, where members would now be 
expected to comply ‘as a rule’. If norm evolution and the study of norms are 
an ongoing process, it is interesting to see whether norms which were 
codified would withstand questioning in the future. Robust norms put in 
place through reason-based argumentation usually signify ‘true’ 
internalization rather than adaptive behaviour, but that mode of 
communication has become rare in a negotiating context that power never 
truly recedes to background and lets communicative rationality shine. Critical 
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constructivism aiming at ‘unmasking the power’ is employed as an 
overarching framework linking how norms and rules manifested in the 
ASEAN Way have gone through the contestation process during the 
development of the ASEAN Charter via arguing and bargaining against the 
backdrop of implicit knowledge conceptualized as the lifeworld. Although 
non-interference was also contested, it became codified in full since it is still 
deemed relevant when actors come together to give it meaning in a 
negotiating context. At the end, non-involvement of ASEAN in disputes is 
altered through cooperative bargaining, empowering the Secretary-General 
and the Chair in initiating mediation. Other unquestioned norms recede into 
the unproblematic part of the ASEAN lifeworld. 
On the final note, there is an underlying insinuation of hope. 
Habermas’ theory of communicative action and the overall framework of 
critical social constructivism affords the international hope by asserting that 
social integration can be achieved through dialectical interaction. It is 
possible for international actors to institute real, cooperative change (Hardy 
2014). It is through continued dialogue – conceptualized as a collective 
process of interpretation – that state actors collect and coordinate their 
understandings – their experience and wisdom – which is lifted to the 
intersubjective level as a collective overlap in lifeworlds, and is expressed in a 
given social practice (Lose 2001). Critical constructivism highlights role of 
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actors towards change. The thesis adds on the interpretivist, communicative 
turn in international relations. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A 
The ASEAN Declaration 
(Bangkok Declaration) 
Bangkok, 8 August 1967 
 
The Presidium Minister for Political Affairs/Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Indonesia, the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, the Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs of the Philippines, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Singapore and 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand: 
MINDFUL of the existence of mutual interests and common problems among 
countries of South-East Asia and convinced of the need to strengthen further 
the existing bonds of regional solidarity and cooperation; 
DESIRING to establish a firm foundation for common action to promote 
regional cooperation in South-East Asia in the spirit of equality and 
partnership and thereby contribute towards peace, progress and prosperity 
in the region; 
CONSCIOUS that in an increasingly interdependent world, the cherished 
ideals of peace, freedom, social justice and economic well-being are best 
attained by fostering good understanding, good neighbourliness and 
meaningful cooperation among the countries of the region already bound 
together by ties of history and culture; 
CONSIDERING that the countries of South-East Asia share a primary 
responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability of the 
region and ensuring their peaceful and progressive national development, 
and that they are determined to ensure their stability and security from 
external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their 
national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their 
peoples; 
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AFFIRMING that all foreign bases are temporary and remain only with the 
expressed concurrence of the countries concerned and are not intended to 
be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence and 
freedom of States in the area or prejudice the orderly processes of their 
national development; 
DO HEREBY DECLARE: 
FIRST, the establishment of an Association for Regional Cooperation among 
the countries of South-East Asia to be known as the Association of South-East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
SECOND, that the aims and purposes of the Association shall be: 
1. To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural 
development in the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality 
and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and 
peaceful community of South-East Asian Nations; 
2. To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice 
and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region and 
adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter; 
3. To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of 
common interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and 
administrative fields; 
4. To provide assistance to each other in the form of training and research 
facilities in the educational, professional, technical and administrative 
spheres; 
5. To collaborate more effectively for the greater utilization of their 
agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade, including the study of 
the problems of international commodity trade, the improvement of their 
transportation and communication facilities and the raising of the living 
standards of their peoples; 
6. To promote South-East Asian studies; 
7. To maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing international 
and regional organizations with similar aims and purposes, and explore all 
avenues for even closer cooperation among themselves. 
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THIRD, that to carry out these aims and purposes, the following machinery 
shall be established: 
(a) Annual Meeting of Foreign Ministers, which shall be by rotation and 
referred to as ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. Special Meetings of Foreign 
Ministers may be convened as required. 
(b) A Standing committee, under the chairmanship of the Foreign Minister of 
the host country or his representative and having as its members the 
accredited Ambassadors of the other member countries, to carry on the work 
of the Association in between Meetings of Foreign Ministers. 
(c) Ad-Hoc Committees and Permanent Committees of specialists and 
officials on specific subjects. 
(d) A National Secretariat in each member country to carry out the work of 
the Association on behalf of that country and to service the Annual or Special 
Meetings of Foreign Ministers, the Standing Committee and such other 
committees as may hereafter be established. 
FOURTH, that the Association is open for participation to all Stats in the 
South-East Asian Region subscribing to the aforementioned aims, principles 
and purposes.  
FIFTH, that the Association represents the collective will of the nations of 
South-East Asia to bind themselves together in friendship and cooperation 
and, through joint efforts and sacrifices, secure for their peoples and for 
posterity the blessings of peace, freedom and prosperity.   
DONE in Bangkok on the Eighth Day of August in the Year One Thousand Nine 
Hundred and Sixty-Seven. 
 
For the Republic of Indonesia:  For the Republic of Singapore: 
               ADAM MALIK    S. RAJARATNAM 
       Presidium Minister for       Minister of Foreign Affairs 
             Political Affairs 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs 
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                For Malaysia:    For the Kingdom of Thailand: 
           TUN ABDUL RAZAK               THANAT KHOMAN 
       Minister of Defence and         Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Minister of National Development 
 
For the Republic of the Philippines: 
              NARCISO RAMOS 
     Secretary of Foreign Affairs 
 
Source: ASEAN, The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration) Bangkok, 8 
August 1967, [http://www.asean.org/news/item/the-asean-declaration-
bangkok-declaration] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
323 
 
Appendix B 
Terms of Reference of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) on the ASEAN 
Charter 
 
Background 
1. At the 11th ASEAN Summit, held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, ASEAN 
Leaders signed the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the 
ASEAN Charter on 12 December 2005. 
2. The Declaration calls for, among other things, the establishment of an 
Eminent Persons Group (EPG), comprising highly distinguished and well 
respected citizens from ASEAN Member Countries, with the mandate to 
examine and provide practical recommendations on the directions and 
nature of the ASEAN Charter relevant to the ASEAN Community as envisaged 
in the Bali Concord II and beyond, taking into account, but not limited to, the 
principles, values and objectives contained in this Declaration. 
Purpose 
3. The EPG will examine ASEAN in all areas of its cooperation activities, codify 
and build upon all ASEAN norms, principles, values and goals as contained in 
ASEAN's milestone agreements, treaties and declarations, as well as 
undertake a thorough review of the existing ASEAN institutional framework 
and propose appropriate improvements if so required. It will put forth bold 
and visionary recommendations on the drafting of an ASEAN Charter, which 
will serve as the legal and institutional framework for ASEAN, aimed at 
enabling the building of a strong, prosperous, and caring and sharing ASEAN 
Community that is cohesive, successful and progressing in the 21st century. 
Scope of Work 
4. The scope of the EPG includes but is not limited to the following : 
4.1 Take stock of ASEAN's 38 years of existence to identify its major 
achievements and shortcomings, and assess current ASEAN cooperation as 
well as propose improvements in the following areas: 
A. Political and security (the ASEAN Security Community) 
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B. Economic and finance (the ASEAN Economic Community) 
C. Functional (the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community) 
D. External relations, bilaterally and inter-regionally 
E. Narrowing the development gap among ASEAN Member Countries, 
in the context of the ASEAN Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI), and the 
UN's Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
F. ASEAN structure, including decision-making process, administrative 
modalities, sources of funds, working methods, cross-sectoral coordination, 
conduct of meetings, documentation of meetings, roles of the Secretary-
General and the ASEAN Secretariat 
4.2 Recommend desirable key elements of an ASEAN Charter, 
including, among others : 
A. Vision of ASEAN beyond 2020 
B. Nature, principles and objectives of ASEAN 
C. Membership of ASEAN 
D. Areas for enhanced ASEAN cooperation and integration 
E. Narrowing the development gap among ASEAN Member Countries 
F. Organs of ASEAN and their functions and working methods 
G. ASEAN administrative structure (mechanisms, roles of the 
Secretary-General and the ASEAN Secretariat) 
H. Legal personality of ASEAN 
I. Effective conflict resolution mechanisms 
J. External relations 
4.3 Recommend a strategy for the ASEAN Charter drafting process : 
A. National consultations 
B. Region-wide consultations of all relevant stakeholders in ASEAN in 
the ASEAN Charter drafting process, especially representatives of the civil 
society 
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C. Public information 
Composition and Chairmanship 
5. The EPG shall consist of 10 eminent persons, one from each of the 10 
Member Countries, who are nominated by their respective Governments and 
appointed by ASEAN Leaders at the 11th ASEAN Summit under the Kuala 
Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter. 
6. The EPG Members shall elect a Chairman at its Coordination Meeting in 
Kuala Lumpur on 12 December 2005. 
7. The EPG Members participate in all EPG activities in their personal and 
independent capacity, and not as representatives of their respective 
Governments or countries. 
8. Each EPG Member shall have at least one assistant. The assistant may be 
assigned by the EPG Member to attend an EPG meeting on his behalf when 
the EPG Member is unable to attend. The EPG who cannot attend an EPG 
meeting shall inform the EPG Chairman well in advance. 
Frequency of Meetings 
9. The EPG will decide on the frequency and venue of meetings. 
Agenda 
10. The agenda of each EPG meeting shall be prepared by the Chairman in 
consultation with all EPG Members, based on the TOR of the EPG and the 
work programme to be developed by the EPG. 
11. The agenda will be circulated to every EPG Members at least two weeks 
before an EPG meeting. 
Decision-Making 
12. All decisions of the EPG shall be based on consultation and consensus. 
13. All pertinent decisions of the EPG shall be kept in a summary record of 
each EPG meeting for reference. 
Secretariat Support 
14. The Secretary-General of ASEAN will assign two of his senior staff 
members to act as resource persons of the EPG. 
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15. The Secretary-General of ASEAN will brief the EPG on pertinent ASEAN 
issues as and when requested by the EPG. 
16. The ASEAN Secretariat shall, together with the EPG assistants, prepare a 
summary record of every EPG meeting. They will also assist the EPG 
Members in drafting the EPG Report. 
Funding 
17. Funding support for the participation of EPG Members and their 
assistants, including air tickets and hotel accommodations and per diem, will 
come from each of the ASEAN Member Countries concerned. 
18. The ASEAN Member Country hosting an EPG meeting will provide 
logistical services and administrative assistance for the meeting, such as the 
local transport of EPG Members and their assistants as well as the resource 
persons from the ASEAN Secretariat, meals, arrangement of facilities and 
documentation, etc. 
Reporting 
19. The EPG Report shall be submitted to each of the ASEAN Leaders by the 
EPG Chairman before the 12th ASEAN Summit in the Philippines, scheduled 
in December 2006. 
20. The EPG shall decide how to inform the general public of its views and 
recommendations after the EPG Report has been presented to ASEAN 
Leaders at the 12th ASEAN Summit. 
Amendment 
21. These Terms of Reference can be amended by mutual agreement of the 
EPG Members through consultation and consensus. 
 
Adopted at the First Meeting of the EPG on the ASEAN Charter 
Kuala Lumpur, 12-13 December 2005 
Source: ASEAN, Terms of Reference of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) on 
the ASEAN Charter, [http://www.asean.org/news/item/terms-of-reference-
of-the-eminent-persons-group-epg-on-the-asean-charter] 
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Appendix C 
TERMS OF REFERENCE  
HIGH LEVEL TASK FORCE ON THE DRAFTING OF THE  
ASEAN CHARTER (HLTF)  
 
Background 
1. At the 11th ASEAN Summit, held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, ASEAN 
Leaders signed the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the 
ASEAN Charter on 12 December 2005.  
2. The Declaration, among other things, tasked the ASEAN Foreign Ministers 
to establish, as necessary, a high level task force to carry out the drafting 
of the ASEAN Charter based on the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the 
Establishment of the ASEAN Charter and the recommendations of the 
Eminent Persons Group (EPG) on the ASEAN Charter.  
3. At the 39th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Kuala Lumpur, the ASEAN 
Foreign Ministers agreed on the formation of the high level task force on 
the ASEAN Charter and discussed the composition and participation of 
the Task Force.  
 
Role and Functions 
4. The HLTF shall draft the ASEAN Charter based on the directions given by 
the Leaders as reflected in the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the 
Establishment of the ASEAN Charter and the Cebu Declaration on the 
Blueprint of the ASEAN Charter and in consideration of the 
recommendations made by the EPG and other relevant ASEAN documents.  
5. The HLTF may form ad hoc working groups, as may be deemed necessary, 
in order to facilitate its work.  
6. The HLTF may call on any member of the EPG on the ASEAN Charter for 
consultations or guidance, whenever necessary. 
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7. The HLTF shall submit a draft ASEAN Charter to the ASEAN Leaders at the 
13th ASEAN Summit in Singapore. 
 
Membership 
8. The HLTF shall be composed of one high level representative from each 
ASEAN Member Country and assisted by not more than four (4) experts.  
9. When the high level representative of a Member Country is unable to 
attend a HLTF meeting, the representative shall designate one of his or her 
team members as the substitute representative to attend the meeting.  
10. Unless otherwise decided, the Chairman of the HLTF shall be the 
incumbent Chair of ASEAN. The High Level Task Force shall determine its 
own rules of procedure.  
11. The Secretary-General of ASEAN shall serve as the resource person of the 
HLTF.  
 
Reporting Mechanism 
12. The HLTF shall report regularly to the ASEAN Foreign Ministers on the 
progress of their work.  
 
Meeting Schedule 
13. The HLTF shall meet regularly, or whenever deemed necessary.   
14. The HLTF shall hold its first meeting in January 2007 at the ASEAN 
Secretariat in Jakarta. Subsequent meetings will also be held at the 
ASEAN Secretariat unless otherwise decided.  
ASEAN Secretariat Support 
15. The ASEAN Secretariat shall provide secretariat support to the HLTF. 
Source: ASEAN, Terms of Reference High Level Task Force on the Drafting of 
the ASEAN Charter (HLTF), [http://www.asean.org/archive/HLTF-TOR.pdf]. 
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Appendix D 
Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
 
PREAMBLE 
WE THE PEOPLES of the Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN, as represented by the Heads of State or Government of 
Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Republic of Indonesia, the 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Union of Myanmar, the 
Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, the Kingdom of 
Thailand and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam: 
NOTING with satisfaction the significant achievements and expansion of 
ASEAN since its establishment in Bangkok through the promulgation of The 
ASEAN Declaraion; 
RECALLING the decisions to establish an ASEAN Charter in the Vientiane 
Action Programme, the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of 
the ASEAN Charter and the Cebu Declaration on the Blueprint of the ASEAN 
Charter; 
MINDFUL of the existence of mutual interests and interdependence among 
the peoples and Member States of ASEAN which are bound by geography, 
common objectives and shared destiny;  
INSPIRED by and united under One Vision, One Identity and One Caring and 
Sharing Community; 
UNITED by a common desire and collective will to live in a region of lasting 
peace, security and stability, sustained economic growth, shared prosperity 
and social progress, and to promote our vital interests, ideals and 
aspirations; 
RESPECTING the fundamental importance of amity and cooperation, and the 
principles of sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, non-interference, 
consensus and unity in diversity; 
ADHERING to the principles of democracy, the rule of law and good 
governance, respect for and protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms; 
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RESOLVED to ensure sustainable development for the benefit of present and 
future generations and to place the well-being, livelihood and welfare of the 
peoples at the centre of the ASEAN community building process; 
CONVINCED of the need to strengthen existing bonds of regional solidarity to 
realise an ASEAN Community that is politically cohesive, economically 
integrated and socially responsible in order to effectively respond to current 
and future challenges and opportunities; 
COMMITTED to intensifying community building through enhanced regional 
cooperation and integration, in particular by establishing an ASEAN 
Community comprising theASEAN Security Community, the ASEAN Economic 
Community and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, as provided for in the 
Bali Declaration of ASEAN Concord II; 
HEREBY DECIDE to establish, through this Charter, the legal and institutional 
framework for ASEAN, 
AND TO THIS END, the Heads of State or Government of the Member States 
of ASEAN, assembled in Singapore on the historic occasion of the 40th 
anniversary of the founding of ASEAN, have agreed to this Charter. 
 
CHAPTER I 
PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES 
ARTICLE 1 
PURPOSES 
The Purposes of ASEAN are:  
1. To maintain and enhance peace, security and stability and further 
strengthen peace-oriented values in the region; 
2. To enhance regional resilience by promoting greater political, security, 
economic and socio-cultural cooperation; 
3. To preserve Southeast Asia as a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone and free of all 
other weapons of mass destruction; 
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4. To ensure that the peoples and Member States of ASEAN live in peace with 
the world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious environment; 
5. To create a single market and production base which is stable, prosperous, 
highly competitive and economically integrated with effective facilitation for 
trade and investment in which there is free flow of goods, services and 
investment; facilitated movement of business persons, professionals, talents 
and labour; and freer flow of capital; 
6. To alleviate poverty and narrow the development gap within ASEAN 
through mutual assistance and cooperation; 
7. To strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and the rule of law, 
and to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, with 
due regard to the rights and responsibilities of the Member States of ASEAN; 
8. To respond effectively, in accordance with the principle of comprehensive 
security, to all forms of threats, transnational crimes and transboundary 
challenges; 
9. To promote sustainable development so as to ensure the protection of the 
region’s environment, the sustainability of its natural resources, the 
preservation of its cultural heritage and the high quality of life of its peoples; 
10. To develop human resources through closer cooperation in education 
and life-long learning, and in science and technology, for the empowerment 
of the peoples of ASEAN and for the strengthening of the ASEAN Community; 
11. To enhance the well-being and livelihood of the peoples of ASEAN by 
providing them with equitable access to opportunities for human 
development, social welfare and justice; 
12. To strengthen cooperation in building a safe, secure and drug-free 
environment for the peoples of ASEAN; 
13. To promote a people-oriented ASEAN in which all sectors of society are 
encouraged to participate in, and benefit from, the process of ASEAN 
integration and community building; 
14. To promote an ASEAN identity through the fostering of greater 
awareness of the diverse culture and heritage of the region; and 
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15. To maintain the centrality and proactive role of ASEAN as the primary 
driving force in its relations and cooperation with its external partners in a 
regional architecture that is open, transparent and inclusive. 
ARTICLE 2 
PRINCIPLES 
1. In pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, ASEAN and its Member States 
reaffirm and adhere to the fundamental principles contained in the 
declarations, agreements, conventions, concords, treaties and other 
instruments of ASEAN. 
2. ASEAN and its Member States shall act in accordance with the following 
Principles:  
(a) respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity 
and national identity of all ASEAN Member States; 
(b) shared commitment and collective responsibility in enhancing regional 
peace, security and prosperity; 
© renunciation of aggression and of the threat or use of force or other 
actions in any manner inconsistent with international law; 
(d) reliance on peaceful settlement of disputes;  
© non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN Member States; 
(f) respect for the right of every Member State to lead its national existence 
free from external interference, subversion and coercion; 
(g) enhanced consultations on matters seriously affecting the common 
interest of ASEAN; 
(h) adherence to the rule of law, good governance, the principles of 
democracy and constitutional government; 
(i) respect for fundamental freedoms, the promotion and protection of 
human rights, and the promotion of social justice; 
(j) upholding the United Nations Charter and international law, including 
international humanitarian law, subscribed to by ASEAN Member States; 
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(k) abstention from participation in any policy or activity, including the use of 
its territory, pursued by any ASEAN Member State or non-ASEAN State or any 
non-State actor, which threatens the sovereignty, territorial integrity or 
political and economic stability of ASEAN Member States; 
(l) respect for the different cultures, languages and religions of the peoples of 
ASEAN, while 333ndeavor333333333 their common values in the spirit of 
unity in diversity; 
(m) the centrality of ASEAN in external political, economic, social and cultural 
relations while remaining actively engaged, outward-looking, inclusive and 
non-discriminatory; and 
(n) adherence to multilateral trade rules and ASEAN’s rules-based regimes for 
effective implementation of economic commitments and progressive 
reduction towards elimination of all barriers to regional economic integration, 
in a market-driven economy. 
 
CHAPTER II 
LEGAL PERSONALITY 
ARTICLE 3 
LEGAL PERSONALITY OF ASEAN 
ASEAN, as an inter-governmental 333 ndeavor 333 333 333 n, is hereby 
conferred legal personality 
 
CHAPTER III 
MEMBERSHIP 
ARTICLE 4 
MEMBER STATES 
The Member States of ASEAN are Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of 
Cambodia, the Republic of Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 
Malaysia, the Union of Myanmar, the Republic of the Philippines, the 
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Republic of Singapore, the Kingdom of Thailand and the Socialist Republic of 
Viet Nam. 
ARTICLE 5 
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS 
1. Member States shall have equal rights and obligations under this Charter. 
2. Member States shall take all necessary measures, including the enactment 
of appropriate domestic legislation, to effectively implement the provisions 
of this Charter and to comply with all obligations of membership. 
3. In the case of a serious breach of the Charter or non-compliance, the 
matter shall be referred to Article 20. 
ARTICLE 6 
ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS 
1. The procedure for application and admission to ASEAN shall be prescribed 
by the ASEAN Coordinating Council. 
2. Admission shall be based on the following criteria: 
(a) location in the 334 ndeavor 334 334  geographical region of 
Southeast Asia; 
(b) recognition by all ASEAN Member States; 
© agreement to be bound and to abide by the Charter; and 
(d) ability and willingness to carry out the obligations of Membership. 
3. Admission shall be decided by consensus by the ASEAN Summit, upon the 
recommendation of the ASEAN Coordinating Council. 
4. An applicant State shall be admitted to ASEAN upon signing an Instrument 
of Accession to the Charter 
 
CHAPTER IV 
ORGANS 
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ARTICLE 7 
ASEAN SUMMIT 
1. The ASEAN Summit shall comprise the Heads of State or Government of 
the Member States. 
2. The ASEAN Summit shall: 
(a) be the supreme policy-making body of ASEAN; 
(b) deliberate, provide policy guidance and take decisions on key 
issues pertaining to the realization of the objectives of ASEAN, important 
matters of interest to Member States and all issues referred to it by the 
ASEAN Coordinating Council, the ASEAN Community Councils and ASEAN 
Sectoral Ministerial Bodies; 
© instruct the relevant Ministers in each of the Councils concerned to 
hold ad hoc inter-Ministerial meetings, and address important issues 
concerning ASEAN that cut across the Community Councils. Rules of 
procedure for such meetings shall be adopted by the ASEAN Coordinating 
Council; 
(d) address emergency situations affecting ASEAN by taking 
appropriate actions; 
© decide on matters referred to it under Chapters VII and VIII; 
(f) 335ndeavor335 the establishment and the dissolution of Sectoral 
Ministerial Bodies and other ASEAN institutions; and 
(g) appoint the Secretary-General of ASEAN, with the rank and status 
of Minister, who will serve with the confidence and at the pleasure of the 
Heads of State or Government upon the recommendation of the ASEAN 
Foreign Ministers Meeting. 
3. ASEAN Summit Meetings shall be: 
(a) held twice annually, and be hosted by the Member State holding 
the ASEAN Chairmanship; and 
(b) convened, whenever necessary, as special or ad hoc meetings to 
be chaired by the Member State holding the ASEAN Chairmanship, at venues 
to be agreed upon by ASEAN Member States. 
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ARTICLE 8 
ASEAN COORDINATING COUNCIL 
1. The ASEAN Coordinating Council shall comprise the ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers and meet at least twice a year.  
2. The ASEAN Coordinating Council shall:  
(a) prepare the meetings of the ASEAN Summit; 
(b) coordinate the implementation of agreements and decisions of the 
ASEAN Summit; 
© coordinate with the ASEAN Community Councils to enhance policy 
coherence, efficiency and cooperation among them; 
(d) coordinate the reports of the ASEAN Community Councils to the 
ASEAN Summit;  
© consider the annual report of the Secretary-General on the work of 
ASEAN;  
(f) consider the report of the Secretary-General on the functions and 
operations of the ASEAN Secretariat and other relevant bodies; 
(g) approve the appointment and termination of the Deputy 
Secretaries-General upon the recommendation of the Secretary-General; and 
(h) undertake other tasks provided for in this Charter or such other 
functions as may be assigned by the ASEAN Summit.  
3. The ASEAN Coordinating Council shall be supported by the relevant senior 
officials. 
ARTICLE 9 
ASEAN COMMUNITY COUNCILS 
1. The ASEAN Community Councils shall comprise the ASEAN Political-
Security Community Council, ASEAN Economic Community Council, and 
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Council. 
2. Each ASEAN Community Council shall have under its purview the relevant 
ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies. 
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3. Each Member State shall designate its national representation for each 
ASEAN Community Council meeting. 
4. In order to realise the objectives of each of the three pillars of the ASEAN 
Community, each ASEAN Community Council shall: 
(a) ensure the implementation of the relevant decisions of the ASEAN 
Summit;  
(b) coordinate the work of the different sectors under its purview, and 
on issues which cut across the other Community Councils; and 
© submit reports and recommendations to the ASEAN Summit on matters 
under its purview. 
5. Each ASEAN Community Council shall meet at least twice a year and shall 
be chaired by the appropriate Minister from the Member State holding the 
ASEAN Chairmanship. 
6. Each ASEAN Community Council shall be supported by the relevant senior 
officials. 
ARTICLE 10 
ASEAN SECTORAL MINISTERIAL BODIES 
1. ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies shall:  
(a) function in accordance with their respective established mandates; 
(b) implement the agreements and decisions of the ASEAN Summit 
under their respective purview; 
© strengthen cooperation in their respective fields in support of 
ASEAN integration and community building; and 
(d) submit reports and recommendations to their respective 
Community Councils. 
2. Each ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Body may have under its purview the 
relevant senior officials and subsidiary bodies to undertake its functions as 
contained in Annex 1. The Annex may be updated by the Secretary-General 
of ASEAN upon the recommendation of the Committee of Permanent 
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Representatives without recourse to the provision on Amendments under 
this Charter. 
ARTICLE 11 
SECRETARY-GENERAL OF ASEAN 
AND ASEAN SECRETARIAT 
1. The Secretary-General of ASEAN shall be appointed by the ASEAN Summit 
for a non-renewable term of office of five years, selected from among 
nationals of the ASEAN Member States based on alphabetical rotation, with 
due consideration to integrity, capability and professional experience, and 
gender equality. 
2. The Secretary-General shall: 
(a) carry out the duties and responsibilities of this high office in 
accordance with the provisions of this Charter and relevant ASEAN 
instruments, protocols and established practices; 
(b) facilitate and monitor progress in the implementation of ASEAN 
agreements and decisions, and submit an annual report on the work of 
ASEAN to the ASEAN Summit; 
© participate in meetings of the ASEAN Summit, the ASEAN 
Community Councils, the ASEAN Coordinating Council, and ASEAN Sectoral 
Ministerial Bodies and other relevant ASEAN meetings; 
(d) present the views of ASEAN and participate in meetings with 
external parties in accordance with approved policy guidelines and mandate 
given to the Secretary-General; and 
© recommend the appointment and termination of the Deputy 
Secretaries-General to the ASEAN Coordinating Council for approval. 
3. The Secretary-General shall also be the Chief Administrative Officer of 
ASEAN. 
4. The Secretary-General shall be assisted by four Deputy Secretaries-General 
with the rank and status of Deputy Ministers. The Deputy Secretaries-
General shall be accountable to the Secretary-General in carrying out their 
functions. 
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5. The four Deputy Secretaries-General shall be of different nationalities from 
the Secretary-General and shall come from four different ASEAN Member 
States. 
6. The four Deputy Secretaries-General shall comprise: 
(a) two Deputy Secretaries-General who will serve a non-renewable 
term of three years, selected from among nationals of the ASEAN Member 
States based on alphabetical rotation, with due consideration to integrity, 
qualifications, competence, experience and gender equality; and16 
(b) two Deputy Secretaries-General who will serve a term of three 
years, which may be renewed for another three years. These two Deputy 
Secretaries-General shall be openly recruited based on merit.  
7. The ASEAN Secretariat shall comprise the Secretyry-General and such staff 
as may be required. 
8. The Secretary-General and the staff shall: 
 (a) uphold the highest standards of integrity, efficiency and 
competence in the performance of their duties; 
 (b) not seek or receive instructions from any government or external 
party outside of ASEAN; and 
 © refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as 
ASEAN Secretariat officials responsible only to ASEAN. 
9. Each ASEAN Member State undertakes to respect the exclusively ASEAN 
character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff, and 
no to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities. 
ARTICLE 12 
COMMITTEE OF PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES TO ASEAN 
1. Each ASEAN Member State shall appoint a Permanent Representative to 
ASEAN with the rank of Ambassador based in Jakarta. 
2. The Permanent Representatives collectively constitute a Committee of 
Permanent Representatives, which shall: 
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(a) support the work of the ASEAN Community Councils and ASEAN 
Sectoral Ministerial Bodies; 
(b) coordinate with ASEAN National Secretariats and other ASEAN 
Sectoral Ministerial Bodies; 
© liaise with the Secretary-General of ASEAN and the ASEAN 
Secretariat on all subjects relevant to its work; 
(d) facilitate ASEAN cooperation with external partners; and 
© perform such other functions as may be determined by the ASEAN 
Coordinating Council. 
ARTICLE 13 
ASEAN NATIONAL SECRETARIATS 
Each ASEAN Member State shall establish an ASEAN National Secretariat 
which shall: 
(a) serve as the national focal point; 
(b) be the repository of information on all ASEAN matters at the 
national level; 
© coordinate the implementation of ASEAN decisions at the national 
level;  
(d) coordinate and support the national preparations of ASEAN 
meetings; 
© promote ASEAN identity and awareness at the national level; and 
(f) contribute to ASEAN community building. 
ARTICLE 14 
ASEAN HUMAN RIGHTS BODY 
1. In conformity with the purposes and principles of the ASEAN Charter 
relating to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, ASEAN shall establish an ASEAN human rights body. 
2. This ASEAN human rights body shall operate in accordance with the terms 
of reference to be determined by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting. 
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ARTICLE 15 
ASEAN FOUNDATION 
1. The ASEAN Foundation shall support the Secretary-General of ASEAN and 
collaborate with the relevant ASEAN bodies to support ASEAN community 
building by promoting grater awareness of the ASEAN identity, people-to-
people interaction, and close collaboration among the business sector, civil 
society, academia and other stakeholders in ASEAN. 
2. The ASEAN Foundation shall be accountable to the Secretary-General of 
ASEAN, who shall submit its report to the ASEAN Summit through the ASEAN 
Coordinating Council. 
 
CHAPTER V 
ENTITIES ASSOCIATED WITH ASEAN 
ARTICLE 16 
ENTITIES ASSOCIATED WITH ASEAN 
1. ASEAN may engage with entities which support the ASEAN Charter, in 
particular its purposes and principles. These associated entities are listed in 
Annex 2. 
2. Rules of procedure and criteria for engagement shall be prescribed by the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives upon the recommendation of the 
Secretary-General of ASEAN.  
3. Annex 2 may be updated by the Secretary-General of ASEAN upon the 
recommendation of the Committee of Permanent Representatives without 
recourse to the provisionon Amendments under this Charter. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES 
ARTICLE 17 
IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES OF ASEAN 
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1. ASEAN shall enjoy in the territories of the Member States such immunities 
and privileges as are necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes. 
2. The immunities and privileges shall be laid down in separate agreements 
between ASEAN and the host Member State. 
ARTICLE 18 
IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF ASEAN AND 
STAFF OF THE ASEAN SECRETARIAT 
1. The Secretary-General of ASEAN and staff of the ASEAN Secretariat 
participating in official ASEAN activities of representing ASEAN in the 
Member States shall enjoy such immunities and privileges as are necessary 
for the independent exercise of their functions. 
2. The immunities and privileges under this Article shall be laid down in a 
separate ASEAN agreement. 
ARTICLE 19 
IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES OF THE PERMANENT 
REPRESENTATIVES AND OFFICIALS ON ASEAN DUTIES 
1. The Permanent Representatives of the Member States to ASEAN and 
officials of the Member States participating in official ASEAN activities or 
representing ASEAN in the Member States shall enjoy such immunities and 
privileges as are necessary for the exercise of their functions. 
2. The immunities and privileges of the Permanent Representatives and 
officials on ASEAN duties shall be governed by the 1961 Vienna Convention 
on Diplomatic Relations or in accordance with the national law of the ASEAN 
Member State concerned. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
DECISION-MAKING 
ARTICLE 20 
CONSULTATION AND CONSENSUS 
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1. As a basic principle, decision-making in ASEAN shall be based on 
consultation and consensus. 
2. Where consensus connot be achieved, the ASEAN Summit may decide how 
a specific decision can be made. 
3. Nothing in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall affect the modes of 
decision-making as contained in the relevant ASEAN legal instruments. 
4. In the case of a serious breach of the Charter or non-compliance, the 
matter shall be referred to the ASEAN Summit for decision. 
ARTICLE 21 
IMPLEMENTATION AND PROCEDURE 
1. Each ASEAN Community Council shall prescribe its own rules of procedure. 
2. In the implementation of economic commitments, a formula for flexible 
participation, including the ASEAN Minus X formula, may be applied where 
there is a consensus to do so. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 
ARTICLE 22 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
1. Member States shall 343ndeavor to resolve peacefully all disputes in a 
timely manner through dialogue, consultation and negotiation. 
2. ASEAN shall maintain and establish dispute settlement mechanisms in all 
fields of ASEAN cooperation. 
ARTICLE 23 
GOOD OFFICES, CONCILIATION AND MEDIATION 
1. Member States which are parties to a dispute may at any time agree to 
resort to good offices, conciliation or mediation in order to resolve the 
dispute within an agreed time limit. 
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2. Parties to the dispute may request the Chairman of ASEAN or the 
Secretary-General of ASEAN, acting in an ex-officio capacity, to provide good 
offices, conciliation or mediation. 
ARTICLE 24 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS IN SPECIFIC 
INSTRUMENTS 
1. Disputes relating to specific ASEAN instruments shall be settled through 
the mechanisms and procedures provided for in such instruments. 
2. Disputes which do not concern the interpretation or application of any 
ASEAN instrument shall be resolved peacefully in accordance with the Treaty 
of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia and its rules of procedure. 
3. Where not otherwise specifically provided, disputes which concern the 
interpretation or application of ASEAN economic agreements shall be settled 
in accordance with the ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism. 
ARTICLE 25 
ESTABLISHMENT OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS 
Where not otherwise specifically provided, appropriate dispute settlement 
mechanisms, including arbitration, shall be established for disputes which 
concern the interpretation or application of this Charter and other ASEAN 
instruments.  
ARTICLE 26 
UNRESOLVED DISPUTES 
When a dispute remains unresolved, after the application of the preceding 
provisions of this Chapter, this dispute shall be referred to the ASEAN 
Summit, for its decision. 
ARTICLE 27 
COMPLIANCE 
1. The Secretary-General of ASEAN, assisted by the ASEAN Secretariat or any 
other designated ASEAN body, shall monitor the compliance with the findings, 
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recommendations or decisions resulting from an ASEAN dispute settlement 
mechanism, and submit a report to the ASEAN Summit.  
2. Any Member State affected by non-compliance with the findings, 
recommendations or decisions resulting from an ASEAN dispute settlement 
mechanism, may refer the matter to the ASEAN Summit for a decision. 
ARTICLE 28 
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER PROVISIONS AND 
OTHER RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURES 
Unless otherwise provided for in this Charter, Member States have the right 
of recourse to the modes of peaceful settlement contained in Article 33(1) of 
the Charter of the United Nations or any other international legal 
instruments to which the disputing Member States are parties. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
BUDGET AND FINANCE 
ARTICLE 29 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
1. ASEAN shall establish financial rules and procedures in accordance with 
international standards. 
2. ASEAN shall observe sound financial management policies and practices 
and budgetary discipline.  
3. Financial accounts shall be subject to internal and external audits. 
ARTICLE 30 
OPERATIONAL BUDGET AND FINANCES 
OF THE ASEAN SECRETARIAT 
1. The ASEAN Secretariat shall be provided with the necessary financial 
resources to perform its functions effectively. 
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2. The operational budget of the ASEAN Secretariat shall be met by ASEAN 
Member States through equal annual contributions which shall be remitted 
in a timely manner. 
3. The Secretary-General shall prepare the annual operational budget of the 
ASEAN Secretariat for approval by the ASEAN Coordinating Council upon the 
recommendation of the Committee of Permanent Representatives. 
4. The ASEAN Secretariat shall operate in accordance with the financial rules 
and procedures determined by the ASEAN Coordinating Council upon the 
recommendation of the Committee of Permanent Representatives. 
 
CHAPTER X 
ADMINISTRATION AND PROCEDURE 
ARTICLE 31 
CHAIRMAN OF ASEAN 
1. The Chairmanship of ASEAN shall rotate annually, based on the 
alphabetical order of the English names of Member States. 
2. ASEAN shall have, in a calendar year, a single Chairmanship by which the 
Member State assuming the Chairmanship shall chair: 
 (a) the ASEAN Summit and related summits; 
 (b) the ASEAN Coordinating Council; 
 © the three ASEAN Community Councils; 
 (d) where appropriate, the relevant ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies 
and senior officials; and 
 © the Committee of Permanent Representatives. 
ARTICLE 32 
ROLE OF THE CHIARMAN OF ASEAN 
The Member State holding the Chairmanship of ASEAN shall: 
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(a) actively promote and enhance the interests and well-being of 
ASEAN, including efforts to build an ASEAN Community through policy 
initiatives, coordination, consensus and cooperation; 
(b) ensure the centrality of ASEAN; 
© ensure an effective and timely response to urgent issues or crisis 
situations affecting ASEAN, including providing its good offices and such 
other arrangements to immediately address these concerns; 
(d) represent ASEAN in strengthening and promoting closer relations 
with external partners; and 
© carry out such other tasks and functions as may be mandated. 
ARTICLE 33 
DIPLOMATIC PROTOCOL AND PRACTICES 
ASEAN and its Member States shall adhere to existing diplomatic protocol 
and practices in the conduct of all activities relating to ASEAN. Any changes 
shall be approved by the ASEAN Coordinating Council upon the 
recommendation of the Committee of Permanent Representatives. 
ARTICLE 34 
WORKING LANGUAGE OF ASEAN 
The working language of ASEAN shall be English. 
 
CHAPTER XI 
IDENTITY AND SYMBOLS 
ARTICLE 35 
ASEAN IDENTITY 
ASEAN shall promote its common ASEAN identity and a sense of belonging 
among its peoples in order to achieve its shared destiny, goals and values. 
ARTICLE 36 
ASEAN MOTTO 
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The ASEAN motto shall be: “One Vision, One Identity, One Community” 
ARTICLE 37 
ASEAN FLAG 
The ASEAN flag shall be as shown in Annex 3. 
ARTICLE 38 
ASEAN EMBLEM 
The ASEAN emblem shall be as shown in Annex 4. 
ARTICLE 39 
ASEAN DAY 
The eighth of August shall be observed as ASEAN Day. 
ARTICLE 40 
ASEAN ANTHEM 
ASEAN shall have an anthem. 
 
CHAPTER XII 
EXTERNAL RELATIONS 
ARTICLE 41 
CONDUCT OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS 
1. ASEAN shall develop friendly relations and mutually beneficial dialogue, 
cooperation and partnerships with countries and sub-regional, regional and 
international organisations and institutions. 
2. The external relations of ASEAN shall adhere to thepurposes and principles 
set forth in this Charter.  
3. ASEAN shall be the primary driving force in regional arrangements that it 
initiates and maintain its centrality in regional cooperation and community 
building. 
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4. In the conduct of external relations of ASEAN, Member States shall, on the 
basis of unity and solidarity, coordinate and 349ndeavor to develop common 
positions and pursue joint actions. 
5. The strategic policy directions of ASEAN’s external relations shall be set by 
the ASEAN Summit upon the  recommendation of the ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers Meeting. 
6. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting shall ensure consistency and 
coherence in the conduct of ASEAN’s external relations. 
7. ASEAN may conclude agreements with countries or sub-regional, regional 
and international organizations and institutions. The procedures for 
concluding such agreements shall be prescribed by the ASEAN Coordinating 
Council in consultation with the ASEAN Community Councils. 
ARTICLE 42 
DIALOGUE COORDINATOR 
1. Member States, acting as Country Coordinators, shall take turns to take 
overall responsibility in coordinating and promoting the interests of ASEAN in 
its relations with the relevant Dialogue Partners, regional and international 
organisations and institutions. 
2. In relations with the external partners, the Country Coordinators shall, 
inter alia: 
(a) represent ASEAN and enhance relations on the basis of mutual 
respect and equality, in conformity with ASEAN’s principles; 
(b) co-chair relevant meetings between ASEAN and external partners; 
and 
© be supported by the relevant ASEAN Committees in Third Countries 
and International Organisations. 
ARTICLE 43 
ASEAN COMMITTEES IN THIRD COUNTRIES 
AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 
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1. ASEAN Committees in Third Countries may be established in non-ASEAN 
countries comprising heads of diplomatic missions of ASEAN Member States. 
Similar Committees may be established relating to international 
organisations. Such Committees shall promote ASEAN’s interests and identity 
in the host countries and international organisations. 
2. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting shall determine the rules of 
procedure of such Committees.  
ARTICLE 44 
STATUS OF EXTERNAL PARTIES 
1. In conducting ASEAN’s external relations, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers 
Meeting may confer on an external party the formal status of Dialogue 
Partner, Sectoral Dialogue Partner, Development Partner, Special Observer, 
Guest, or other status that may be established henceforth. 
2. External parties may be invited to ASEAN meetings or cooperative 
activities without being conferred any formal status, in accordance with the 
rules of procedure. 
ARTICLE 45 
RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM AND 
OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND 
INSTITUTIONS 
1. ASEAN may seek an appropriate status with the United Nations system as 
well as with other sub-regional, regional, international organisations and 
institutions.  
2. The ASEAN Coordinating Council shall decide on the participation of ASEAN 
in other sub-regional, regional, international organisations and institutions.  
ARTICLE 46 
ACCREDITATION OF NON-ASEAN MEMBER STATES TO 
ASEAN 
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Non-ASEAN Member States and relevant inter-governmental organisations 
may appoint and accredit Ambassadors to ASEAN. The ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers Meeting shall decide on such accreditation. 
 
CHAPTER XIII 
GENERAL AND FINAL PROVISIONS 
ARTICLE 47 
SIGNATURE, RATIFICATION, DEPOSITORY AND ENTRY INTO FORCE 
1. This Charter shall be signed by all ASEAN Member States. 
2. This Charter shall be subject to ratification by all ASEAN Member States in 
accordance with their respective internal procedures. 
3. Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of 
ASEAN who shall promptly notify all Member States of each deposit. 
4. This Charter shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of 
deposit of the tenth instrument of ratification with the Secretary-General of 
ASEAN. 
ARTICLE 48 
AMENDMENTS 
1. Any Member State may propose amendments to the Charter. 
2. Proposed amendments to the Charter shall be submitted by the ASEAN 
Coordinating Council by consensus to the ASEAN Summit for its decision. 
3. Amendments to the Charter agreed to by consensus by the ASEAN Summit 
shall be ratified by all Member States in accordance with Article 47. 
4. An amendment shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the 
date of deposit of the last instrument of ratification with the Secretary-
General of ASEAN. 
ARTICLE 49 
TERMS OF REFERENCE AND RULES OF PROCEDURE 
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Unless otherwise provided for in this Charter, the ASEAN Coordinating 
Council shall determine the terms of reference and rules of procedure and 
shall ensure their consistency. 
ARTICLE 50 
REVIEW 
This Charter may be reviewed five years after its entry into force or as 
otherwise determined by the ASEAN Summit. 
ARTICLE 51 
INTERPRETATION OF THE CHARTER 
1. Upon the request of any Member State, the interpretation of the Charter 
shall be undertaken by the ASEAN Secretariat in accordance with the rules of 
procedure determined by the ASEAN Coordinating Council. 
2. Any dispute arising from the interpretation of the Charter shall be settled 
in accordance with the relevant provisions in Chapter VIII. 
3. Headings and titles used throughout the Charter shall only be for the 
purpose of reference. 
ARTICLE 52 
LEGAL CONTINUITY 
1. All treaties, conventions, agreements, concords, declarations, protocols 
and other ASEAN instruments which have been in effect before the entry into 
force of this Charter shall continue to be valid. 
2. In case of inconsistency between the rights and obligations of ASEAN 
Member States under such instruments and this Charter, the Charter shall 
prevail. 
ARTICLE 53 
ORIGINAL TEXT 
The signed original text of this Charter in English shall be deposited with the 
Secretary-General of ASEAN, who shall provide a certified copy to each 
Member State.  
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ARTICLE 54 
REGISTRATION OF THE ASEAN CHARTER 
This Charter shall be registered by the Secretary-General of ASEAN with the 
Secretariat of the United Nations, pursuant to Article 102, paragraph 1 of the 
Charter of the United Nations. 
ARTICLE 55 
ASEAN ASSETS 
The assets and funds of the Organisation shall be vested in the name of 
ASEAN. 
 
Done in Singapore on the Twentieth Day of November in the Year Two 
Thousand and Seven, in a single original in the English language. 
 
For Brunei Darussalam: 
 
HAJI HASSANAL BOLKIAH 
Sultan of Brunei Darussalam 
 
For the Kingdom of Cambodia: 
 
SAMDECH HUN SEN 
Prime Minister 
 
For the Republic of Indonesia: 
 
DR. SUSILO BAMBANG YUDHOYONO 
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President 
 
For the Lao People’s Democratic Republic: 
 
BOUASONE BOUPHAVANH 
Prime Minister 
 
For Malaysia: 
 
DATO’ SERI ABDULLAH AHMAD BADAWI 
Prime Minister 
 
For the Union of Myanmar: 
 
GENERAL THEIN SEIN 
Prime Minister 
 
For the Republic of the Philippines: 
 
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO 
President  
 
For the Republic of Singapore:  
 
LEE HSIEN LOONG 
355 
 
Prime Minister 
 
For the Kingdom of Thailand: 
 
GENERAL SURAYUD CHULANONT (RET.)  
Prime Minister 
 
For the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam: 
 
NGUYEN TAN DUNG 
Prime Minister 
 
Source: ASEAN. 2008. The ASEAN Charter. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat. 
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Annex I 
ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies 
 
I. ASEAN POLITICAL-SECUITY COMMUNITY 
1. Asean Foreign Ministers Meeting (AMM) 
- ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting (ASEAN SOM) 
- ASEAN Standing Committee (ASC) 
- Senior Officials Meeting on Development Planning (SOMDP) 
2. Committee on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ 
Commission) 
- Executive Committee of the SEANWFZ Commission 
3. ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) 
- ASEAN Defence Senior Officials Meetings (ADSOM) 
4. ASEAN Law Ministers Meeting (ALAWMM) 
- ASEAN Senior Law Officials Meeting (ASLOM) 
5. ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) 
- Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC) 
- ASEAN Senior Officials on Drugs Matters (ASOD) 
- Directors-General of Immigration Departments and Heads of Consular 
Affairs Divisions of Ministries of Foreign Affairs Meeting (DGICM) 
6. ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 
- ASEAN Regional Forum Senior Officials Meeting (ARF SOM) 
 
II. ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 
1. ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting (AEM) 
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- High Level Task Force on ASEAN Economic Integration (HLTF-EI) 
- Senior Economic Officials Meeting (SEOM) 
2. ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) Council 
3. ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) Council 
4. ASEAN Finance Ministers Meeting (AFMM) 
- ASEAN Finance and Central Bank Deputies Meeting (AFDM) 
- ASEAN Directors-General of Customs Meeting (Customs DG) 
5. ASEAN Ministers Meeting on Agriculture and Forestry (AMAF) 
- Senior Officials Meeting of the ASEAN Ministers on Agriculture and Forestry 
(SOM-AMAF) 
- ASEAN Senior Officials on Forestry (ASOF) 
6. ASEAN Ministers on Energy Meeting (AMEM) 
- Senior Officials Meeting on Energy (SOME) 
7. ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Minerals (AMMin) 
- ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Minerals (ASOMM) 
8. ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Science and Technology (AMMST) 
- Committee on Science and Technology (COST) 
9. ASEAN Telecommunications and Information Technology Ministers 
Meeting (TELMIN) 
- Telecommunications and Information Technology Senior Officials Meeting 
(TELSOM) 
- ASEAN Telecommunication Regulators’ Council (ATRC) 
10. ASEAN Transport Ministers Meeting (ATM)  
- Senior Transport Officials Meeting (STOM) 
11. Meeting of the ASEAN Tourism Ministers (M-ATM) 
- Meeting of the ASEAN National Tourism Organisations (ASEAN NTOs) 
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12. ASEAN Mekong Basin Development Cooperation (AMBDC) 
- ASEAN Mekong Basin Development Cooperation Steering Committee 
(AMBDC SC) 
- High Level Finance Committee (HLFC) 
13. ASEAN Centre for Energy 
14. ASEAN-Japan Centre in Tokyo 
 
III. ASEAN SOCIO-CULTURAL COMMUNITY 
1. ASEAN Ministers Responsible for Information (AMRI) 
- Senior Officials Meeting Responsible for Information (SOMRI) 
2. ASEAN Ministers Responsible for Culture and Arts (AMCA) 
- Senior Officials Meeting for Culture and Arts (SOMCA) 
3. ASEAN Education Ministers Meeting (ASED) 
- Senior Officials Meeting on Education (SOM-ED) 
4. ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Disaster Management (AMMDM) 
- ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) 
5. ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the Environment (AMME) 
- ASEAN Senior Officials on the Enviornment (ASOEN) 
6. Conference of the Parties to the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary 
Haze Pollution (COP) 
- Committee (COM) under the COP to the ASEAN Agreement on 
Transboundary Haze Pollution 
7. ASEAN Health Ministers Meeting (AHMM) 
- Senior Officials Meeting on Health Development (SOMHD) 
8. ASEAN Labour Ministers Meeting (ALMM) 
- Senior Labour Officials Meeting (SLOM) 
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- ASEAN Committee on the Implementation of the ASEAN Declaration on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers 
9. ASEAN Ministers on Rural Development and Poverty Eradication (AMRDPE) 
- Senior Officials Meeting on Rural Development and Poverty Eradication 
(SOMRDPE) 
10. ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Social Welfare and Development 
(AMMSWD) 
- Senior Officials Meeting on Social Welfare and Development (SOMSWD) 
11. ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Youth (AMMY) 
- Senior Officials Meeting on Youth (SOMY) 
12. ASEAN Conference on Civil Service Matters (ACCSM) 
13. ASEAN Centre for Biodiversity (ACB) 
14. ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster 
Management (AHA Centre) 
15. ASEAN Earthquakes Information Centre 
16. ASEAN Specialised Meteorological Centre (ASMC) 
17. ASEAN University Network (AUN) 
 
Source: ASEAN. 2008. The ASEAN Charter, Annex 1. Jakarta: ASEAN 
Secretariat. 
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Annex II 
Entities Associated with ASEAN 
 
I. Parliamentarians 
ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (AIPA) 
 
II. Business Organisations 
ASEAN Airlines Meeting 
ASEAN Alliance of Health Supplement Association (AAHSA) 
ASEAN Automotive Federation (AAF) 
ASEAN Bankers Association (ABA) 
ASEAN Business Advisory Council (ASEAN-BAC) 
ASEAN Business Forum (ABF) 
ASEAN Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ASEAN-CCI) 
ASEAN Federation of Textiles Industries (AFTEX) 
ASEAN Furniture Industries Council (AFIC) 
ASEAN Insurance Council (AIC) 
ASEAN Intellectual Property Association (ASEAN IPA) 
ASEAN International Airports Association (AAA) 
ASEAN Iron & Steel Industry Federation 
ASEAN Pharmaceutical Club 
ASEAN Tourism Association (ASEANTA) 
Federation of ASEAN Economic Associations (FAEA) 
Federation of ASEAN Shippers’ Council 
US-ASEAN Business Council 
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III. THINK TANKS AND ACDEMIC INSTITUTIONS 
ASEAN-ISIS Network  
 
IV. ACCREDITED CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS 
ASEAN Academics of Science, Engineering and Technology (ASEAN CASE) 
ASEAN Academy of Engineering and Technology (AAET) 
ASEAN Association for Clinical Laboratory Sciences (AACLS) 
ASEAN Association for Planning and Housing (AAPH) 
ASEAN Association of Radiologists (AAR) 
ASEAN Chess Confederation (ACC) 
ASEAN Confederation of Employers (ACE) 
ASEAN Confederation of Women’s Organisation (ACWO) 
ASEAN Constructors Federation (ACF) 
ASEAN Cosmetics Association (ACA) 
ASEAN Council for Japan Alumni (ASCOJA) 
ASEAN Council of Teachers (ACT) 
ASEAN Federation for Psychiatric and Mental Health (AFPMH) 
ASEAN Federation of Accountants (AFA) 
ASEAN Federation of Electrical Engineering Contractors (AFEEC) 
ASEAN Federation of Engineering Organisation (AFEO) 
ASEAN Federation of Flying Clubs (AFFC) 
ASEAN Federation of Forwarders Associations (AFFA) 
ASEAN Federation of Heart Foundation (AFHF) 
ASEAN Federation of Land Surveying and Geomatics (ASEAN FLAG) 
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ASEAN Federation of Mining Association (AFMA) 
ASEAN Fisheries Federation (AFF) 
ASEAN Football Federation (AFF) 
ASEAN Forest Products Industry Club (AFPIC) 
ASEAN Forestry Students Association (AFSA) 
AEAN Handicraft Promotion and Development Association (AHPADA) 
ASEAN Kite Council (AKC) 
ASEAN Law Association (ALA) 
ASEAN Law Students Association (ALSA) 
ASEAN Music Industry Association (AMIA) 
ASEAN Neurosurgical Society (ANS) 
ASEAN NGO Coalition on Ageing 
ASEAN Non-Governmental Organisations for the Prevention of Drugs and 
Substance Abuse 
ASEAN Oleochemical Manufacturers Group (AOMG) 
ASEAN Orthopaedic Association (AOA) 
ASEAN Pediatric Federation (APSF) 
ASEAN Para Sports Federation (APSF) 
ASEAN Ports Association (APA) 
ASEAN Thalassaemia Society (ATS) 
ASEAN Valuers Association (AVA) 
ASEAN Vegetable Oils Club (AVOC) 
Asian Partnership for Development of Human Resources in Rural Asia 
(AsiaDHRRA) 
Committee for ASEAN Youth Cooperation (CAYC) 
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Federation of ASEAN Consulting Engineers (FACE) 
Federation of ASEAN Public Relations Organisations (FAPRO) 
Federation of ASEAN Shipowners’ Associations (FASA) 
Medical Association of Southeast Asian Nations Committee (MASEAN) 
Rheumatism Association of ASEAN (RAA) 
Southeast Asia Regional Institute for Community and Education (SEARICE) 
Southeast Asian Studies Regional Exchange Program (SEASREP) Foundation  
Veterans Confederation of ASEAN Countries (VECONAC) 
 
V. OTHER STAKEHOLDERS IN ASEAN 
ASEANAPOL  
Federation of Institutes of Food Science and Technology in ASEAN (FIFSTA) 
Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Centre (SEAFDEC) 
Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism 
 
Source: ASEAN. 2008. The ASEAN Charter, Annex 2. Jakarta: ASEAN 
Secretariat. 
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Annex III 
ASEAN Flag 
 
 
 
The ASEAN Flag represents a stable, peaceful, united and dynamic ASEAN. 
The Colours of the Flag – blue, red, white and yellow – represent the main 
colours of the flags of all the ASEAN Member States. 
The blue represents peace and stability. Red depicts courage and dynamism. 
White shows purity and yellow symbolizes prosperity. 
The stalks of padi represent the dream of ASEAN’s Founding Fathers for an 
ASEAN comprising all the countries in Southeast Asia bound together in 
friendship and solidarity. The circle represents the unity of ASEAN. 
The specification of Pantone Colour adopted for the colours of the ASEAN 
Flag are: 
Blue: Pantone 19-4053 TC 
Red: Pantone 18-1655 TC 
White: Pantone 11-4202 TC 
Yellow: Pantone 13-0758 TC 
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For the printed version, the specification of colours (except white) will follow 
those for the colours of the ASEAN Emblem, i.e.: 
Blue: Pantone 286 or Process Colour 100C 60M 0Y 6K 
Red: Pantone Red 032 or Process Colour 0C 91M 87Y 0K 
Yellow: Pantone Process Yellow or Process Colour 0C 0M 100Y 0K 
The ratio of the width to the length of the Flag is two to three and the size 
specifications for the following Flags are: 
Table Flag: 10 cm x 15 cm 
Room Flag: 100 cm x 150 cm 
Car Flag: 10 cm x 30 cm 
Field Flag: 200 cm x 300 cm  
 
Source: ASEAN. 2008. The ASEAN Charter, Annex 3. Jakarta: ASEAN 
Secretariat. 
Source of Picture: http://www.flags.net/ASEA.htm 
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Annex IV 
ASEAN Emblem 
 
         
 
The ASEAN Emblem represents a stable, peaceful, united and dynamic ASEAN. 
The colours of the Emblem – blue, red, white and yellow – represent the 
main colours of the crests of all the ASEAN Member States. 
The blue represents peace and stability. Red depicts courage and dynamism. 
White shows purity and yellow symbolizes prosperity. 
The stalks of padi represent the dream of ASEAN’s Founding Fathers for an 
AEAN comprising all the countries in Southeast Asia bound together in 
friendship and solidarity. The circle represents the unity of ASEAN. 
The specification of Pantone Colour adopted for the colours of the ASEAN 
Emblem are: 
Blue: Pantone 286 
Red: Pantone Red 032 
Yellow: Pantone Process Yellow 
For four-colour printing process the specifications of colours will be: 
Blue: 100C 60M 0Y 6K (100C 60M 0Y 10K) 
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Red: 0C 91M 87Y 0K (0C 90M 90Y 0K) 
Yellow: 0C 0M 100Y 0K 
Specifications in brackets are to be used when an arbitrary measurement of 
process colours is not possible. 
In Pantone Process Colour Simulator, the specifications equal to: 
Blue: Pantone 204-1 
Red: Pantone 60-1 
Yellow: Pantone 1-3 
The font used for the word “ASEAN” in the Emblem is lower-case Helvetica in 
bold.  
 
Source: ASEAN. 2008. The ASEAN Charter, Annex 4. Jakarta: ASEAN 
Secretariat. 
Source of Picture: http://www.asean.org/asean/about-asean/asean-emblem 
 
 
 
